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GHSA-crvj-82cr-hjcx CVE-2026-84363

Hono: Query parser reads parameters after the URL fragment, causing cache-key and proxy interpretation differentials

Medium npm
Severity
5.9 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.45%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 38.98% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-444 Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
Fix
4.13.5
Upgrade hono to this version or later

Description

Summary

Hono's query parsing does not stop at the URL fragment: a ? appearing after a # is treated as the start of a query string. As a result, the application can read request parameters that no other component involved in handling the request can see.

Details

A fragment is never part of the query, and every standard URL consumer — browsers, new URL(), reverse proxies — ignores everything from the first # onward. Hono's routing followed that rule; its query helpers did not.

For one and the same request, this produces an interpretation differential:

  • A component in front of the application that inspects the query string — filtering rules, parameter allow/deny lists, access logging — observes no parameters, while the application reads and acts on them.
  • The cache middleware removed the fragment when building its cache key, so a response influenced by parameters carried inside the fragment could be stored under a key that did not reflect them and later returned to other users.

The same divergence reaches request validation and any middleware that reads query parameters.

This requires a request target containing a literal # to reach the application. Deployments on runtimes that normalise such a target — including Cloudflare Workers — are not affected, and neither are those behind an intermediary that strips the fragment.

Impact

An attacker can cause the application to act on parameters that components in front of it never observe.

This may lead to:

  • filtering rules, allow/deny lists, and audit logging being blind to parameters the application still processes
  • a cached response being stored under a key that does not reflect the parameters used to produce it, and served to other users
  • stored cross-site scripting, where such a parameter is reflected into a cached HTML response without escaping

This issue affects applications that read query parameters and run on a runtime that passes a literal # through to the request URL.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
hono
< 4.13.5
4.13.5

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

hono npm → 4.13.5

npm
npm install hono@4.13.5
yarn
yarn add hono@4.13.5
pnpm
pnpm add hono@4.13.5

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')

The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Use a web server that employs a strict HTTP parsing procedure, such as Apache [REF-433].
  • Implementation: Use only SSL communication.
  • Implementation: Terminate the client session after each request.
  • System Configuration: Turn all pages to non-cacheable.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-5r4p-p66f-jhc7
Hono: `serveStatic` decodes the request path a second time, leading to bypass of middleware on static paths
Medium Also affects hono
GHSA-hxh3-vqpv-xpqv
hono/jsx renders plain strings unescaped in boundary components, leading to XSS
Low Also affects hono
GHSA-gqvv-2mrq-wpjv
Hono: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-39408: `toSSG()` still writes files outside the output directory
Medium Also affects hono
GHSA-g6gw-c38x-mqfc
Hono: Unbounded dot-notation nesting in `parseBody()` can cause memory exhaustion
Medium Also affects hono
GHSA-f23p-vx2j-j53r
Hono: `memo()` retains SSR output across requests, leading to cross-user data disclosure
Medium Also affects hono
GHSA-79qm-7rj5-m7r9
Hono: Proxy Helper does not remove response headers listed in the `Connection` header
Low Also affects hono
GHSA-54fx-42gc-7vw4
Hono: Algorithmic Complexity DoS in Language Middleware
Medium Also affects hono
GHSA-8j4g-w8fx-2239
Hono: ReDoS in CORS middleware via Access-Control-Request-Headers
Medium Also affects hono
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