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GHSA-rjvx-x5h2-6px5 GO-2026-6074

Gitea: API Fork Endpoint Authorization Bypass Allows Organization Members to Bypass Repository Creation Restrictions

Medium Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
—
No score published
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Fix
1.26.0
Upgrade code.gitea.io/gitea to this version or later

Description

Summary

The API endpoint used to fork repositories into organizations performs a weaker authorization check than the corresponding web UI and other repository creation endpoints.

When a repository is forked into an organization through the API, the endpoint only verifies that the user is an organization member (IsOrgMember()), but does not verify whether the user is allowed to create repositories in that organization (CanCreateOrgRepo()).

As a result, organization members belonging to teams with can_create_org_repo=false can still create repositories inside the organization by using the fork API.

Details

Affected endpoint:

POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/forks

In routers/api/v1/repo/fork.go, the endpoint performs the following authorization check:

if !ctx.Doer.IsAdmin {
    isMember, err := org.IsOrgMember(ctx, ctx.Doer.ID)
    if !isMember {
        ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, ...)
        return
    }
}

The equivalent web UI implementation uses the stronger permission check:

isAllowedToFork, err := organization.OrgFromUser(ctxUser).
    CanCreateOrgRepo(ctx, ctx.Doer.ID)

The same CanCreateOrgRepo() authorization check is also used by:

  • CreateOrgRepo API endpoint
  • GenerateRepository API endpoint

The fork endpoint appears to be the only repository creation path that relies solely on organization membership.

Proof of Concept

Tested on Gitea 1.23.7.

  1. Create an organization.
  2. Create a team with can_create_org_repo=false.
  3. Add a test user to that team.
  4. Verify that normal repository creation is denied:
POST /api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos

Result:

403 Forbidden
  1. Fork a repository into the organization:
POST /api/v1/repos/admin/public-repo/forks
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "organization": "target-org"
}

Result:

202 Accepted

The repository is successfully created despite repository creation permissions being disabled.

Impact

Users who are organization members but are intentionally prevented from creating repositories can bypass that restriction through the API.

This allows unauthorized repository creation inside the organization and may expose additional attack surface depending on the organization's Actions, runner, and workflow configuration.

The vulnerability represents an authorization bypass because API behavior is less restrictive than both the web UI and other repository creation endpoints.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
code.gitea.io/gitea
< 1.26.0
1.26.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

code.gitea.io/gitea Go → 1.26.0

go
go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.26.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
Low
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

Weakness

CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m
Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation
Critical Known exploited Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j
Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc
Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata
High Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-3r5c-2xxx-h872
Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API
Low Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6
Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh
Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-2fcr-jfvc-vgg2
Gitea: Two SSRF findings
High Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-fw57-jgch-pgf3
Gitea: ParseAcceptLanguage quadratic-time DoS via Locale middleware on unauthenticated requests
High Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
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