GHSA-rjvx-x5h2-6px5 GO-2026-6074
Gitea: API Fork Endpoint Authorization Bypass Allows Organization Members to Bypass Repository Creation Restrictions
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- —
- No score published
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
- Fix
1.26.0- Upgrade code.gitea.io/gitea to this version or later
Description
Summary
The API endpoint used to fork repositories into organizations performs a weaker authorization check than the corresponding web UI and other repository creation endpoints.
When a repository is forked into an organization through the API, the endpoint only verifies that the user is an organization member (IsOrgMember()), but does not verify whether the user is allowed to create repositories in that organization (CanCreateOrgRepo()).
As a result, organization members belonging to teams with can_create_org_repo=false can still create repositories inside the organization by using the fork API.
Details
Affected endpoint:
POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/forks
In routers/api/v1/repo/fork.go, the endpoint performs the following authorization check:
if !ctx.Doer.IsAdmin {
isMember, err := org.IsOrgMember(ctx, ctx.Doer.ID)
if !isMember {
ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, ...)
return
}
}
The equivalent web UI implementation uses the stronger permission check:
isAllowedToFork, err := organization.OrgFromUser(ctxUser).
CanCreateOrgRepo(ctx, ctx.Doer.ID)
The same CanCreateOrgRepo() authorization check is also used by:
- CreateOrgRepo API endpoint
- GenerateRepository API endpoint
The fork endpoint appears to be the only repository creation path that relies solely on organization membership.
Proof of Concept
Tested on Gitea 1.23.7.
- Create an organization.
- Create a team with
can_create_org_repo=false. - Add a test user to that team.
- Verify that normal repository creation is denied:
POST /api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos
Result:
403 Forbidden
- Fork a repository into the organization:
POST /api/v1/repos/admin/public-repo/forks
Content-Type: application/json
{
"organization": "target-org"
}
Result:
202 Accepted
The repository is successfully created despite repository creation permissions being disabled.
Impact
Users who are organization members but are intentionally prevented from creating repositories can bypass that restriction through the API.
This allows unauthorized repository creation inside the organization and may expose additional attack surface depending on the organization's Actions, runner, and workflow configuration.
The vulnerability represents an authorization bypass because API behavior is less restrictive than both the web UI and other repository creation endpoints.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| code.gitea.io/gitea | < 1.26.0 |
1.26.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
code.gitea.io/gitea Go → 1.26.0
- go
go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.26.0 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
Weakness
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation | Critical Known exploited | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata | High | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-3r5c-2xxx-h872 Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API | Low | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6 Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-2fcr-jfvc-vgg2 Gitea: Two SSRF findings | High | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-fw57-jgch-pgf3 Gitea: ParseAcceptLanguage quadratic-time DoS via Locale middleware on unauthenticated requests | High | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
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