GHSA-r344-xw3p-2frj CVE-2023-45812
Apollo Router vulnerable to Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
- Severity
- 7.5 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.87%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 58.75% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-703 Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
- CWE-754 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
- Fix
1.33.0- Upgrade apollo-router to this version or later
Description
Impact
The Apollo Router is a configurable, high-performance graph router written in Rust to run a federated supergraph that uses Apollo Federation. Affected versions are subject to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) type vulnerability which causes the Router to panic and terminate when a multi-part response is sent. When users send queries to the router that uses the @defer or Subscriptions, the Router will panic.
To be vulnerable, users of Router must have a coprocessor with coprocessor.supergraph.response configured in their router.yaml and also to support either @defer or Subscriptions.
Patches
Router version 1.33.0 has a fix for this vulnerability. https://github.com/apollographql/router/pull/4014 fixes the issue.
Workarounds
For affected versions, avoid using the coprocessor supergraph response:
# do not use this stage in your coprocessor configuration
coprocessor:
supergraph:
response:
Or you can disable defer and subscriptions support:
# disable defer and subscriptions:
supergraph:
defer_support: false # enabled by default
subscription:
enabled: false # disabled by default
and continue to use the coprocessor supergraph response.
References
Affected versions
crates.io
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| apollo-router | >= 1.31.0, < 1.33.0 |
1.33.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
apollo-router crates.io → 1.33.0
- cargo
cargo update -p apollo-router --precise 1.33.0
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
The product does not properly anticipate or handle exceptional conditions that rarely occur during normal operation of the product.
CWE-754: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
The product does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the product.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Choose languages with features such as exception handling that force the programmer to anticipate unusual conditions that may generate exceptions. Custom exceptions may need to be developed to handle unusual business-logic conditions. Be careful not to pass sensitive exceptions back to the user (CWE-209, CWE-248).
- Implementation: Check the results of all functions that return a value and verify that the value is expected.
- Implementation: If using exception handling, catch and throw specific exceptions instead of overly-general exceptions (CWE-396, CWE-397). Catch and handle exceptions as locally as possible so that exceptions do not propagate too far up the call stack (CWE-705). Avoid unchecked or uncaught exceptions where feasible (CWE-248).
- Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. Exposing additional information to a potential attacker in the context of an exceptional condition can help the attacker determine what attack vectors are most likely to succeed beyond DoS.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Architecture and Design: Use system limits, which should help to prevent resource exhaustion. However, the product should still handle low resource conditions since they may still occur.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-hff2-gcpx-8f4p Apollo Router Core: Browser Bug Enables Bypass of XS-Search Prevention via Read-Only Cross-Site Request Forgery | Medium | Also affects apollo-router |
| GHSA-x33c-7c2v-mrj9 Apollo Router Affected by an Access Control Bypass on Polymorphic Types | High | Also affects apollo-router |
| GHSA-g8jh-vg5j-4h3f Apollo Router Improperly Enforces Renamed Access Control Directives | High | Also affects apollo-router |
| GHSA-3j43-9v8v-cp3f Apollo Router Query Validation Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Named Fragment Processing | High | Also affects apollo-router |
| GHSA-84m6-5m72-45fp Apollo Router Operation Limits Vulnerable to Bypass via Integer Overflow | High | Also affects apollo-router |
| GHSA-75m2-jhh5-j5g2 Apollo Router Query Planner Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Named Fragment Expansion | High | Also affects apollo-router |
| GHSA-94hh-jmq8-2fgp Apollo Router Query Planner Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Optimization Bypass | High | Also affects apollo-router |
| GHSA-x6xq-whh3-gg32 Apollo Router Coprocessors may cause Denial-of-Service when handling request bodies | High | Also affects apollo-router |
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