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GHSA-r275-j57c-7mf2 CVE-2023-47634

Race condition in Endorsements

Low RubyGems
Severity
3.1 / 10
Low · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.44%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 38.68% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
Fix
0.26.9
Upgrade decidim to this version or later

Description

Impact

A race condition in the endorsement of resources (for instance, a proposal) allows a user to make more than once endorsement.

To exploit this vulnerability, the request to set an endorsement must be sent several times in parallel.

Workarounds

Disable the Endorsement feature in the components.

Affected versions

RubyGems

PackageVulnerableFixed in
decidim
>= 0.10.0, < 0.26.9
0.26.9
decidim
>= 0.27.0, < 0.27.5
0.27.5

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

decidim RubyGems → 0.26.9

bundler
bundle update decidim # Gemfile: gem "decidim", ">= 0.26.9"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 3.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: In languages that support it, use synchronization primitives. Only wrap these around critical code to minimize the impact on performance.
  • Architecture and Design: Use thread-safe capabilities such as the data access abstraction in Spring.
  • Architecture and Design: Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring. Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).
  • Implementation: When using multithreading and operating on shared variables, only use thread-safe functions.
  • Implementation: Use atomic operations on shared variables. Be wary of innocent-looking constructs such as "x++". This may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read, followed by a computation, followed by a write.
  • Implementation: Use a mutex if available, but be sure to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-412.
  • Implementation: Avoid double-checked locking (CWE-609) and other implementation errors that arise when trying to avoid the overhead of synchronization.
  • Implementation: Disable interrupts or signals over critical parts of the code, but also make sure that the code does not go into a large or infinite loop.
  • Implementation: Use the volatile type modifier for critical variables to avoid unexpected compiler optimization or reordering. This does not necessarily solve the synchronization problem, but it can help.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-r3v7-5x4c-c69q
Decidim: JWT-backed authentication can be replayed across organizations
High Also affects decidim
GHSA-3cx6-j9j4-54mp
Decidim's private data exports can lead to data leaks
Medium Also affects decidim
GHSA-cc4g-m3g7-xmw8
Decidim has a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the version control page
High Also affects decidim
GHSA-vvqw-fqwx-mqmm
Decidim::Admin vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS) in the admin panel with QuillJS WYSWYG editor
Medium Also affects decidim
GHSA-7cx8-44pc-xv3q
Decidim cross-site scripting (XSS) in the pagination
High Also affects decidim
GHSA-qcj6-vxwx-4rqv
Decidim vulnerable to data disclosure through the embed feature
Medium Also affects decidim
GHSA-9w99-78rj-hmxq
Cross-site scripting (XSS) in the dynamic file uploads
Medium Also affects decidim
GHSA-w3q8-m492-4pwp
Possibility to circumvent the invitation token expiry period
High Also affects decidim
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