GHSA-qgxx-4xv5-6hcw CVE-2024-27299

phpMyFAQ SQL Injection at "Save News"

High Packagist

Severity: 8.8 / 10; High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): 1.15%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 66.91% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Fix: 3.2.6; Upgrade phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq to this version or later

Description

Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability has been discovered in the the "Add News" functionality due to improper escaping of the email address. This allows any authenticated user with the rights to add/edit FAQ news to exploit this vulnerability to exfiltrate data, take over accounts and in some cases, even achieve RCE.

Details

The vulnerable field lies in the authorEmail field which uses PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL filter. This filter is insufficient in protecting against SQL injection attacks and should still be properly escaped. However, in this version of phpMyFAQ (3.2.5), this field is not escaped properly can be used together with other fields to fully exploit the SQL injection vulnerability.

PoCs

4 PoCs are demonstrated here to illustrate the potential impacts.

PoC 1 - Postgres Time Based SQLi

Login as admin or any user with the rights to view and save news.
Navigate to "../phpmyfaq/admin/?action=news", click on "Add news", fill in some data, send and intercept the request.
Modify the intercepted "/admin/?action=save-news" request to look like the SS below: 3.1 - Set the "authorEmail" field in the body to "test'/*@[email.com](http://email.com/)". 3.2 - Set the "linkTitle" field in the body to "*/,1,1,1,1,1,1,1);select+pg_sleep(5)--". 3.3 - Set the rest of the fields as empty and send the request.
Notice the 5s delay in the response time, indicating that the sleep function was executed, verifying the existence of the SQLi vulnerability. image

PoC 2 - SQLi to Read Data from PostgresDB

Steps 1 and 2 are the same as PoC 1.
Modify the intercepted "/admin/?action=save-news" request to look like the SS below and send the request: 2.1 - Set the "authorEmail" field in the body to "test'/*@[email.com](http://email.com/)". 2.2 - Set the "linkTitle" field in the body to "*/,1,1,1,1,1,1,1);SELECT+remember_me+FROM+faquser+limit+1+offset+1%3b--". image (1)

PoC 3 - SQLi to Read Files from PostgresDB

Steps 1 and 2 are the same as PoC 1.
Modify the intercepted "/admin/?action=save-news" request to look like the SS below and send the request: 2.1 - Set the "authorEmail" field in the body to "test'/*@[email.com](http://email.com/)". 2.2 - Set the "linkTitle" field in the body to "*/,1,1,1,1,1,(select+pg_read_file(CONCAT(CHR(67),CHR(58),CHR(92),CHR(87),CHR(105),CHR(110),CHR(100),CHR(111),CHR(119),CHR(115),CHR(92),CHR(119),CHR(105),CHR(110),CHR(46),CHR(105),CHR(110),CHR(105)))),1)--". (the CONCAT() and CHR() functions are used to bypass the escaping of single quotes, these characters in its decoded form is "select pg_read_file('C:\Windows\win.ini')") image (2)

PoC 4 - SQLi to Shell

It is also possible to obtain a shell if superuser is enabled on the postgres DB. These are the high level steps of the exploit chain:

Create a table called "cmd_exec" to store the payload.
Create a function in postgres to store the command to write a web shell to the "../htdocs" directory. (This step is required as CONCAT() function cannot be used to bypass the step where; "COPY cmd_exec FROM PROGRAM '<command>' " is run as it requires single quotes.)
Trigger the function to write the PHP web shell at "http://<URL>/shell.php" that takes in commands via the "?cmd=" parameter.
Send the Python reverse shell command via a GET request to launch the reverse shell.

The video demo and the Python PoC script can be accessed from this link: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1BFL8GHIBxSUxu0TneYf66KjFA0A4RZga?usp=sharing

Impact

The SQL injection vulnerability discovered in the "Add News" functionality of the application allows authenticated users with appropriate privileges to execute malicious SQL queries, potentially leading to data exfiltration, account takeover, and even remote code execution. Attackers can exploit the vulnerability to read sensitive data from the database, such as user credentials and system files, compromising the confidentiality and integrity of the system. Moreover, successful exploitation may enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to user accounts or execute arbitrary commands on the server, impacting both system administrators and end users.

Affected versions

Packagist

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq	`>= 3.2.5, < 3.2.6`	`3.2.6`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq Packagist → `3.2.6`

composer

composer require phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq:^3.2.6

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: High
Availability: High

Weakness

CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Architecture and Design: If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated. Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations. Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Implementation: While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88). Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the data
Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

References

Advisories

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27299

Packages

github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ

Timeline

Mar 25, 2024 Published
Sep 10, 2026 Last updated by the source
Oct 31, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-rw77-vq4g-x3hp phpMyFAQ has SQL Injection in `StopWords::add()` — Unescaped Stop Word Insertion	High	Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5 phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor	High	Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
GHSA-pgwp-vc7q-cvj3 phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in Admin FAQ Editor via HTML Entity Bypass in Frontend FAQ Submission	High	Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
GHSA-mf8r-wm2w-f8c5 phpMyFAQ public FAQ APIs expose inactive FAQ content	Medium	Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
GHSA-88g4-74f3-63x9 phpMyFAQ has Potential Authenticated Path Traversal in PDF Export	Medium	Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
GHSA-pg62-f8g4-4wqh phpMyFAQ privilege escalation: GroupController::updatePermissions lets a GROUP_EDIT admin grant rights they do not hold	High	Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
GHSA-985r-q3qp-299h phpMyFAQ has an incomplete fix for GHSA-xvp4-phqj-cjr3 — editUser() and updateUserRights() lack authorization guards	High	Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 phpMyFAQ: Missing userHasPermission() in 4 API write endpoints (CVE-2026-24421 Incomplete Fix)	Medium	Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

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