GHSA-qf2f-qh6p-7v89 CVE-2026-59766 GO-2026-6071

Gitea CVE-2026-20800 sibling endpoints not covered: revoked user still reads private repo objects via `/api/v1/user/starred` and private issue titles via `/api/v1/user/times`

Medium Go

Severity: 4.3 / 10; Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.28%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 20.66% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Fix: Available; 2 packages have a fixed version

Description

Summary

CVE-2026-20800 fixed private-info leakage to revoked users only for the notification endpoint. Two sibling endpoints that return data keyed on the caller's own relationship still do not re-check repo access at output time:

GET /api/v1/user/starred — getStarredRepos() computes a per-repo permission but still lists every starred repo (no filtering), so the full repo object (full_name, private, clone_url, ssh_url) of a now-inaccessible private repo is returned.
GET /api/v1/user/times — ListMyTrackedTimes() queries by UserID only and LoadAttributes brings in the issue (title, state), leaking private issue titles after revocation.

Steps to reproduce

Using the provided reproduction materials, as a revoked user:

Control: GET /api/v1/repos/admin/starred-test → 404.
GET /api/v1/user/starred → leaks admin/starred-test, private:true, clone_url.
GET /api/v1/user/times → leaks issue.title = "SECRET: …", state.

(Runtime-confirmed on gitea/gitea:1.25.4. Oracle = planted sentinel title; no real secret exfiltrated.)

Impact

A former collaborator can enumerate private repos they starred and read private issue titles they logged time on, indefinitely after access revocation. Metadata only (no repo content / comment bodies). Low.

Suggested remediation

getStarredRepos: drop (or minimally redact) repos where permission.HasAnyUnitAccessOrPublicAccess() is false for the caller.
ListMyTrackedTimes: filter tracked-time entries by current repo access.
Optionally clear a user's stars / time entries for a private repo on revocation.

Credit

Reported as part of an incomplete-patch measurement study (responsible disclosure).

Affected versions

Go

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
code.gitea.io/gitea	`< 1.27.0`	`1.27.0`
gitea.dev	`< 1.27.0`	`1.27.0`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

code.gitea.io/gitea Go → `1.27.0`

go

go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy

gitea.dev Go → `1.27.0`

go

go get gitea.dev@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 4.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: Low
Integrity: None
Availability: None

Weakness

CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Packages

github.com/go-gitea/gitea

Timeline

Jul 21, 2026 Published
Oct 14, 2026 Last updated by the source
Oct 31, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation	Critical Known exploited	Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints	Medium	Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata	High	Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-3r5c-2xxx-h872 Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API	Low	Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6 Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs	Medium	Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private	Medium	Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-h56g-4qw7-2mxg Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes	Medium	Also affects gitea.dev
GHSA-prr9-9mp4-5gp2 Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145	High	Also affects gitea.dev

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