GHSA-wf69-r4mx-43rr CVE-2026-33692
AVideo Vulnerable to Unauthenticated .env File Exposure via Official Docker Compose Configuration
High
Packagist
- Severity
- 7.5 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.35%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 28.35% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
- Fix
29.0- Upgrade wwbn/avideo to this version or later
Description
Vulnerability Details
CWE: CWE-538 - Insertion of Sensitive Information into Externally-Accessible File or Directory
The official docker-compose.yml (line 61) mounts the entire project root directory as the Apache document root:
volumes:
- "./:/var/www/html/AVideo"
This causes the .env file — which contains database credentials, admin passwords, and infrastructure configuration — to be served as a static file at /.env. No .htaccess rule or Apache configuration blocks access to dotfiles.
Exposed Information
An unauthenticated request to GET /.env returns:
DB_MYSQL_HOST=database
DB_MYSQL_USER=avideo
DB_MYSQL_PASSWORD=avideo
SYSTEM_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin123
TLS_CERTIFICATE_FILE=/etc/apache2/ssl/localhost.crt
TLS_CERTIFICATE_KEY=/etc/apache2/ssl/localhost.key
NETWORK_SUBNET=172.30.0.0/16
Steps to Reproduce
Prerequisites
- AVideo deployed using the official
docker-compose.yml - No modifications to the default configuration
Steps
- Deploy AVideo using
docker compose up -d - Send:
curl http://target/.env - The full
.envfile contents are returned, including database credentials and admin password
Impact
- Attacker: Unauthenticated (any remote user)
- Victim: AVideo server and database
- Specific damage: Attacker obtains database credentials (
DB_MYSQL_USER,DB_MYSQL_PASSWORD), admin password (SYSTEM_ADMIN_PASSWORD), and internal network topology (NETWORK_SUBNET). This enables direct database access, admin panel takeover, and further lateral movement within the Docker network.
Proposed Fix
Add a .htaccess rule to block access to dotfiles:
# Block access to hidden files (.env, .git, etc.)
<FilesMatch "^\.">
Order Allow,Deny
Deny from all
</FilesMatch>
Or configure Apache to deny dotfile access in the virtual host configuration.
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| wwbn/avideo | < 29.0 |
29.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
wwbn/avideo Packagist → 29.0
- composer
composer require wwbn/avideo:^29.0
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
- Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
- Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
- Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
- Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
- Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-7cqp-7cfv-6c3q AVideo Meet plugin: anonymous-to-admin stored XSS via unescaped participant User-Agent in getMeetInfo.json.php Participants panel | Medium | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-wc3f-xc32-435f AVideo has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-33482: sanitizeFFmpegCommand still allows a single '&' (background operator), giving OS command execution at the same execAsync sh -c sink | High | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-95jh-7r58-xmxw AVideo has an Authorize.Net Webhook Signature Bypass that Enables Wallet Balance Inflation via Forged Payment Data | Medium | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm AVideo's Privilege Escalation via Unguarded Permission Parameters in signUp API Allows Self-Granting Upload/Stream/Meet Permissions | Medium | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-8whc-2wmv-ww35 WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting via Per-Client Metadata Broadcast in YPTSocket Plugin | Critical | Also affects WWBN/AVideo |
| GHSA-66q5-cj5g-wrfx WWBN AVideo: Stored XSS via Hostile YouTube Video Title in AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Section | Medium | Also affects WWBN/AVideo |
| GHSA-hgjh-6wj8-gcgf WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Reflected XSS via $_GET['search'] in AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Pagination | Medium | Also affects WWBN/AVideo |
| GHSA-2fhx-q92v-5fhv WWBN AVideo: Stored XSS via autoEvalCodeOnHTML Bypass in MessageSQLite WebSocket Handler (CVE-2026-43874 Bypass) | High | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.
Check your repos with MergeHarbor