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GHSA-pgqf-926r-548m CVE-2026-58445 GO-2026-6067

Gitea: Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API

Low Go
Severity
2.7 / 10
Low · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.37%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 30.50% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-203 Observable Discrepancy
CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

Summary

The API endpoint DELETE /repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/labels/{id} loads the label by ID with a global, unscoped lookup and never verifies the label belongs to the URL's repository (or its owning organization). Because the response status differs by whether the label ID exists anywhere on the instance (204) versus not (422), an authenticated user can use the endpoint as a cross-repository label-ID existence / enumeration oracle, including for labels in repositories and organizations they cannot access.

Severity

  • The leaked information is minimal (existence/count of label IDs instance-wide); no label name, color, or owning repository is disclosed, and no cross-repository write occurs.

Affected / patched versions

  • Affected: through 1.26.3 (latest at time of report).
  • Patched: none yet.

Details

DeleteIssueLabel resolves the label with a global loader and never checks its scope:

// routers/api/v1/repo/issue_label.go  (DeleteIssueLabel)
label, err := issues_model.GetLabelByID(ctx, ctx.PathParamInt64("id"))   // global, unscoped

GetLabelByID (models/issues/label.go) is e.ID(labelID).Get(l) with no repo_id / org_id filter. The handler never verifies label.RepoID == ctx.Repo.Repository.ID (nor the org-label equivalent), and the downstream issue_service.RemoveLabel (services/issue/label.go) only re-checks the doer's write permission on the issue's own repository — never that the label belongs to it.

Every sibling label handler is correctly scoped — GetLabel / EditLabel / DeleteLabel (repo and org) use GetLabelInRepoByID / GetLabelInOrgByID and return 404 for a foreign ID. DeleteIssueLabel is the only outlier.

Why it is only an oracle: deleteIssueLabel (models/issues/issue_label.go) deletes the issue_label row keyed by (issue.ID, label.ID). For a foreign label, no such row exists → the function returns early before any mutation or comment creation. So there is no cross-repo write and no leak of the label's name. But the HTTP status differs:

  • label ID exists anywhere on the instance (incl. private repos/orgs) → 204 No Content
  • label ID does not exist → 422 (ErrLabelNotExist)

Label IDs are sequential auto-increment, so this enumerates the instance-wide label population and probes existence of specific IDs across tenant boundaries.

Proof of Concept

Verified end-to-end on a build of the v1.26.3 tag.

  • alice (private repo alice/secret) creates a label → internal id 1.
  • Attacker bob (separate user; public repo bob/pub with issue #1; no access to alice/secret) holds a token with write:issue on his own repo.
bob DELETE /api/v1/repos/bob/pub/issues/1/labels/1          -> HTTP 204   (alice's PRIVATE label id exists)
bob DELETE /api/v1/repos/bob/pub/issues/1/labels/99999999   -> HTTP 422   (no such label)

Differing only by the label ID: 204 vs 422 distinguishes "label ID exists" from "does not exist." bob has zero rights to alice/secret but can still learn label id 1 exists. (Alice's label is untouched — no write.)

Reproduction steps:

  1. Create two users alice, bob. As alice, create a private repo and a label on it (note the label id from the API response).
  2. As bob, create any repo with an issue, and a token with write:issue.
  3. curl -u bob:$T -X DELETE https://<gitea>/api/v1/repos/bob/pub/issues/1/labels/<alice_label_id> → 204.
  4. curl -u bob:$T -X DELETE https://<gitea>/api/v1/repos/bob/pub/issues/1/labels/99999999 → 422.
  5. The differing status across an ID bob cannot otherwise see is the oracle.

Impact

Cross-tenant authorization-key bypass producing a label-ID existence/enumeration oracle: an authenticated user can determine whether arbitrary label IDs (including in private repositories and organizations they cannot access) exist, and enumerate the instance-wide label population.

Remediation

Scope the loader like every sibling handler, returning 404 for a label that is not in the URL repository (or its owning organization), so the status no longer distinguishes existence:

// routers/api/v1/repo/issue_label.go — in DeleteIssueLabel, after loading the label
if label.RepoID != ctx.Repo.Repository.ID && label.OrgID != ctx.Repo.Repository.OwnerID {
    ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
    return
}

(Equivalently, resolve via GetLabelInRepoByID and, for org repositories, also accept the repo owner's org labels — mirroring the scoping in GetLabel/EditLabel/DeleteLabel.)

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
code.gitea.io/gitea
< 1.27.0
1.27.0
gitea.dev
< 1.27.0
1.27.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

code.gitea.io/gitea Go → 1.27.0

go
go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy

gitea.dev Go → 1.27.0

go
go get gitea.dev@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 2.7

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-203: Observable Discrepancy

The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
  • Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.

CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
  • Architecture and Design: Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m
Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation
Critical Known exploited Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j
Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc
Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata
High Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-3r5c-2xxx-h872
Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API
Low Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6
Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh
Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-h56g-4qw7-2mxg
Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes
Medium Also affects gitea.dev
GHSA-prr9-9mp4-5gp2
Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145
High Also affects gitea.dev
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