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GHSA-p76j-5v6v-6c22 CVE-2018-1310

Apache NiFi JMS Deserialization issue

High Maven
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
3.12%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 87.82% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
1.6.0
Upgrade org.apache.nifi:nifi to this version or later

Description

Apache NiFi JMS Deserialization issue because of ActiveMQ client vulnerability. Malicious JMS content could cause denial of service. See ActiveMQ CVE-2015-5254 announcement for more information. The fix to upgrade the activemq-client library to 5.15.3 was applied on the Apache NiFi 1.6.0 release. Users running a prior 1.x release should upgrade to the appropriate release.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
org.apache.nifi:nifi
< 1.6.0
1.6.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

org.apache.nifi:nifi Maven → 1.6.0

maven
<dependency><groupId>org.apache.nifi</groupId><artifactId>nifi</artifactId><version>1.6.0</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("org.apache.nifi:nifi:1.6.0")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 7.5

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-77hf-23pq-2g7c
Code injection in Apache NiFi and NiFi Registry
High Also affects org.apache.nifi:nifi
GHSA-m5r7-w9v3-ghmx
Cross-site Scripting in Apache NiFi
Medium Also affects org.apache.nifi:nifi
GHSA-jvx9-rj3w-jq99
Origin Validation Error in Apache NiFi
High Also affects org.apache.nifi:nifi
GHSA-qj7f-j6h9-g5rq
XML External Entity Reference in Apache NiFi
Medium Also affects org.apache.nifi:nifi
GHSA-jrcc-7jf5-3pxg
Injection in Apache NiFi
Critical Also affects org.apache.nifi:nifi
GHSA-29ph-fjf3-c5cm
Apache NiFi XSS issue in context path handling
Critical Also affects org.apache.nifi:nifi
GHSA-w4x6-j349-9r57
Apache NiFi host header poisoning issue
High Also affects org.apache.nifi:nifi
GHSA-g2fm-x3cp-mqw9
Cross-site Scripting in Apache NiFi
Medium Also affects org.apache.nifi:nifi
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