GHSA-p57w-9q28-j6v7 CVE-2018-16650
phpMyFAQ CSRF
High
Packagist
- Severity
- 8.8 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.50%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 42.60% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- Fix
2.9.11- Upgrade thorsten/phpmyfaq to this version or later
Description
phpMyFAQ before 2.9.11 allows CSRF.
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| thorsten/phpmyfaq | < 2.9.11 |
2.9.11 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
thorsten/phpmyfaq Packagist → 2.9.11
- composer
composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^2.9.11
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.0 8.8
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330] Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
- Implementation: Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
- Architecture and Design: Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
- Architecture and Design: Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
- Architecture and Design: Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller: When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult. This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
- Architecture and Design: Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
- Implementation: Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rw77-vq4g-x3hp phpMyFAQ has SQL Injection in `StopWords::add()` — Unescaped Stop Word Insertion | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5 phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-pgwp-vc7q-cvj3 phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in Admin FAQ Editor via HTML Entity Bypass in Frontend FAQ Submission | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-6pvm-2vjj-rx4w phpMyFAQ: SQL LIKE Wildcard Injection in Chat User Search Allows Authenticated User Enumeration | Medium | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-mf8r-wm2w-f8c5 phpMyFAQ public FAQ APIs expose inactive FAQ content | Medium | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-88g4-74f3-63x9 phpMyFAQ has Potential Authenticated Path Traversal in PDF Export | Medium | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-pg62-f8g4-4wqh phpMyFAQ privilege escalation: GroupController::updatePermissions lets a GROUP_EDIT admin grant rights they do not hold | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-985r-q3qp-299h phpMyFAQ has an incomplete fix for GHSA-xvp4-phqj-cjr3 — editUser() and updateUserRights() lack authorization guards | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
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