GHSA-mwr2-wmgp-crj6 BIT-openbao-2026-55775 CVE-2026-55775 GO-2026-5517
OpenBao's System Backend allows Unauthorized Management of the containing Namespace
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- Low · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.48%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 41.69% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-285 Improper Authorization
- Fix
0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae- Upgrade github.com/openbao/openbao to this version or later
Description
Summary
A user that is granted namespace management (/sys/namespaces) capabilities within a non-root namespace ("the victim namespace") can abuse special handling of the literal path "root" in namespace path canonicalization to manage the victim namespace itself.
Details
Several endpoints under /sys/namespaces/* accept a namespace path segment that is canonicalized and then appended to the path of the sys mount's containing namespace (set via path prefix or X-Vault-Namespace header) to determine the absolute path of the namespace to operate on.
Given the special namespace path "root" canonicalizes to en empty path (""), when passed as /sys/namespaces/root, the resulting absolute namespace path remains equal to the sys mount's containing namespace. Given ACLs are evaluated before namespace path canonicalization, this allows users with capabilities on /sys/namespaces/root within any given namespace to operate on the namespace itself instead.
Impact
Users that were granted the required capabilities can abuse this vulnerability to:
- Look up
- Delete
- Lock
- Patch custom metadata
against the namespace containing the system backend they can manage sys/namespaces/root in. The exact range of operations that can be performed depends on the specific capabilities granted on said path and any sub-paths such as /api-lock.
Notably, the root namespace is immutable and cannot be modified, deleted or locked, and is thus unaffected. Also note that users can only abuse this vulnerability to operate on the direct parent or "containing" namespace relative to their capabilities, not arbitrary namespaces.
Patch
This will be fixed in OpenBao v2.5.5.
PoC
Start a development server:
bao server -dev
Create a namespace:
bao namespace create victim
This will be the namespace we gain unauthorized management of.
Create a policy that allows management of namespaces, inside of the victim namespace.
bao policy write -namespace=victim namespace-management - <<EOF
path "sys/namespaces/*" {
capabilities = ["read", "update", "patch", "delete"]
}
EOF
Then create a token with above policy attached:
export BAO_TOKEN=$(bao token create -namespace=victim -policy=namespace-management -field=token)
Operate on the victim's namespace using the token, for example by outright deleting it:
bao namespace delete -namespace=victim root
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/openbao/openbao | < 0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae |
0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae |
| github.com/openbao/openbao | >= 0.1.0, <= 2.5.4 |
No fix yet |
| github.com/openbao/openbao | < 0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae>= 0.1.0 |
0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/openbao/openbao Go → 0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae
- go
go get github.com/openbao/openbao@v0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
Weakness
CWE-285: Improper Authorization
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Packages
Other links
- github.com/openbao/openbao/security/advisories/GHSA-mwr2-wmgp-crj6
- github.com/openbao/openbao/commit/d3c1cc64b1ae7f9868b5c3e80b8b11671f0d97ae
- github.com/openbao/openbao/releases/tag/v2.5.5
- github.com/openbao/openbao/commit/216b623cdde161eb7798bd095fc874c2174a4dd2
- github.com/openbao/openbao/pull/3308
- github.com/openbao/openbao/pull/3311
- github.com/openbao/openbao/releases/tag/v2.6.0
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-xp3c-3jw3-4vcr OpenBao Skips Stricter Deny Policy for LIST operations | Medium | Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao |
| GHSA-34fc-gh42-pj53 OpenBao's Recovery Mode Vulnerable To Token Leakage via Timing Attack | Critical | Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao |
| GHSA-444v-8vxr-p36h OpenBao Agent Writes Secrets to Stdout | Low | Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao |
| GHSA-59w7-v8rr-pr4p OpenBao's Templated Policies Allow Privilege Escalation via Wildcard Characters | High | Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao |
| GHSA-8w8f-r2xv-4q4j OpenBao: Transit secrets engine crashes on key creation with `derived: true` for asymmetric key types | Medium | Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao |
| GHSA-c36x-h252-g9x2 OpenBao: Cross-namespace lease revocation/renewal via canonical sys/leases/{revoke,renew} — incomplete fix of CVE-2026-45808 | Low | Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao |
| GHSA-6mwx-4547-5vc9 OpenBao: LDAPi ldaputil (wrong escape func) | Medium | Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao |
| GHSA-7j6w-vvw2-5f9c OpenBao's Kerberos Auth Method Accumulates Unaccessible Tokens | Medium | Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao |
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