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GHSA-59w7-v8rr-pr4p BIT-openbao-2026-71543 CVE-2026-71543 GO-2026-6556

OpenBao's Templated Policies Allow Privilege Escalation via Wildcard Characters

High Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.42%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 36.49% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Fix
0.0.0-20260710001938-2d4ebafec5c5
Upgrade github.com/openbao/openbao to this version or later

Description

Impact

ACL Policies

OpenBao supports "templated polices": Policies with placeholders that are replaced at evaluation time.

This allows you to write a single policy which e.g. grants user "alice" access to all entries in a key value engine prefixed with alice/ while granting "bob" access to bob/, "carol" access to carol/, etc.

If the data used in the template can be controlled by an attacker (e.g. your system allows the user to freely select their username) and "globbing" characters are considered valid ( e.g. * is a valid username) they will be able to escalate their privileges.

The problematic characters are *, + and /.

PKI Secrets Engine allowed_uri_sans_template and allowed_domains Polices

The PKI secrets engine allows you to limit the "common names" a user can requests a TLS certificate for. Similar to the ACL polices this allows you to restrict e.g. "alice" to alice.example.com, "bob" to bob.example.com, etc. via templates.

Again, if an attacker can control this data freely, they can trick the PKI engine into using e.g. the *.example.com glob effectively allowing them to issue certificates for any subdomain of example.com

The problematic character in this case is *.

SSH Secrets Engine allowed_users and allowed_domains Polices

The SSH secrets engine allows you to limit the "principal" a user can request as SSH certificate for. Similar to ACL and PKI, this allows templates.

The problematic character in this case is , as the template result is split at all commas and each entry will be allowed.

Am I affected?

You are affected, if a) you use a templated policy (ACL, PKI or SSH) and b) your users can modify data used by your template freely.

If you can guarantee that the data used in your templates will never contain the problematic characters, you are not affected. For example, if you use {{ identity.entity.id }} in your policy, you are not affected, because identity.entity.id is randomly generated by OpenBao.

Even with this vulnerability patched: Using user controllable data in your policies is probably not the best idea.

Patches

All three have been patched in OpenBao v2.6.0.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/openbao/openbao
< 0.0.0-20260710001938-2d4ebafec5c5
0.0.0-20260710001938-2d4ebafec5c5
github.com/openbao/openbao
>= 0.1.0, <= 1.1.5
No fix yet
github.com/openbao/openbao
< 0.0.0-20260710001938-2d4ebafec5c5
>= 0.1.0
0.0.0-20260710001938-2d4ebafec5c5

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/openbao/openbao Go → 0.0.0-20260710001938-2d4ebafec5c5

go
go get github.com/openbao/openbao@v0.0.0-20260710001938-2d4ebafec5c5 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

Weakness

CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-xp3c-3jw3-4vcr
OpenBao Skips Stricter Deny Policy for LIST operations
Medium Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao
GHSA-34fc-gh42-pj53
OpenBao's Recovery Mode Vulnerable To Token Leakage via Timing Attack
Critical Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao
GHSA-444v-8vxr-p36h
OpenBao Agent Writes Secrets to Stdout
Low Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao
GHSA-8w8f-r2xv-4q4j
OpenBao: Transit secrets engine crashes on key creation with `derived: true` for asymmetric key types
Medium Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao
GHSA-mwr2-wmgp-crj6
OpenBao's System Backend allows Unauthorized Management of the containing Namespace
Low Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao
GHSA-c36x-h252-g9x2
OpenBao: Cross-namespace lease revocation/renewal via canonical sys/leases/{revoke,renew} — incomplete fix of CVE-2026-45808
Low Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao
GHSA-6mwx-4547-5vc9
OpenBao: LDAPi ldaputil (wrong escape func)
Medium Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao
GHSA-7j6w-vvw2-5f9c
OpenBao's Kerberos Auth Method Accumulates Unaccessible Tokens
Medium Also affects github.com/openbao/openbao
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