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GHSA-mwcx-532g-8pq3 CVE-2018-12538

Access and integrity issue within Eclipse Jetty

High Maven
Severity
8.8 / 10
High · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
2.56%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 85.09% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-384 Session Fixation
CWE-6 J2EE Misconfiguration: Insufficient Session-ID Length
Fix
9.4.11.v20180605
Upgrade org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server to this version or later

Description

In Eclipse Jetty versions 9.4.0 through 9.4.8, when using the optional Jetty provided FileSessionDataStore for persistent storage of HttpSession details, it is possible for a malicious user to access/hijack other HttpSessions and even delete unmatched HttpSessions present in the FileSystem's storage for the FileSessionDataStore.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server
>= 9.4.0, < 9.4.11.v20180605
9.4.11.v20180605

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server Maven → 9.4.11.v20180605

maven
<dependency><groupId>org.eclipse.jetty</groupId><artifactId>jetty-server</artifactId><version>9.4.11.v20180605</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server:9.4.11.v20180605")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 8.8

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-384: Session Fixation

Authenticating a user, or otherwise establishing a new user session, without invalidating any existing session identifier gives an attacker the opportunity to steal authenticated sessions.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Invalidate any existing session identifiers prior to authorizing a new user session.
  • Architecture and Design: For platforms such as ASP that do not generate new values for sessionid cookies, utilize a secondary cookie. In this approach, set a secondary cookie on the user's browser to a random value and set a session variable to the same value. If the session variable and the cookie value ever don't match, invalidate the session, and force the user to log on again.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

CWE-6: J2EE Misconfiguration: Insufficient Session-ID Length

The J2EE application is configured to use an insufficient session ID length.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Session identifiers should be at least 128 bits long to prevent brute-force session guessing. A shorter session identifier leaves the application open to brute-force session guessing attacks.
  • Implementation: A lower bound on the number of valid session identifiers that are available to be guessed is the number of users that are active on a site at any given moment. However, any users that abandon their sessions without logging out will increase this number. (This is one of many good reasons to have a short inactive session timeout.) With a 64 bit session identifier, assume 32 bits of entropy. For a large web site, assume that the attacker can try 1,000 guesses per second and that there are 10,000 valid session identifiers at any given moment. Given these assumptions, the expected time for an attacker to successfully guess a valid session identifier is less than 4 minutes. Now assume a 128 bit session identifier that provides 64 bits of entropy. With a very large web site, an attacker might try 10,000 guesses per second with 100,000 valid session identifiers available to be guessed. Given these assumptions, the expected time for an attacker to successfully guess a valid session identifier is greater than 292 years.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-7p3p-8qv8-m2vh
Eclipse Jetty: HTTP Authority/Host mismatch
Medium Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server
GHSA-f4v5-65jj-pcr2
Eclipse Jetty: Cross-Request Leakage for trailers on HTTP/1.1 keep-alive connections
High Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server
GHSA-9299-c6m4-mjhc
Eclipse Jetty: DoS attack triggering OutOfMemory with 100-Continue requests
High Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server
GHSA-xxh7-fcf3-rj7f
The Eclipse Jetty Server Artifact has a Gzip request memory leak
High Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server
GHSA-q4rv-gq96-w7c5
**UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED** GzipHandler causes part of request body to be seen as request body of a separate request
High Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server
GHSA-g8m5-722r-8whq
Eclipse Jetty's ThreadLimitHandler.getRemote() vulnerable to remote DoS attacks
Medium Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server
GHSA-p26g-97m4-6q7c
Eclipse Jetty's cookie parsing of quoted values can exfiltrate values from other cookies
Medium Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server
GHSA-qw69-rqj8-6qw8
OutOfMemoryError for large multipart without filename in Eclipse Jetty
Medium Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server
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