GHSA-7p3p-8qv8-m2vh CVE-2026-6790
Eclipse Jetty: HTTP Authority/Host mismatch
- Severity
- 5.3 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.31%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 23.92% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
- Fix
12.0.35- Upgrade org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server to this version or later
Description
Summary
Jetty currently accepts HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 requests where the regular Host header and the pseudo-header :authority do not match. As a result, the same request can carry two different host identities through Jetty:
- logic based on
HttpURI/Request.getServerName(request)uses:authority - logic based on raw request headers continues to use
Host
This creates a host/authority confusion condition that can break security assumptions in higher layers.
Jetty already performs an explicit authority/Host consistency check on the HTTP/1.1 path, but equivalent validation is missing on the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 paths.
Security Impact
This issue is not inherently remote code execution, but it can become security-relevant in deployments that rely on the request host for security-sensitive decisions, including:
- host-based access control
- virtual host isolation
- multi-tenant routing by hostname
- login/logout/callback URL construction
- reverse proxy and forwarded-header trust chains
- auditing, cache keys, and absolute URL generation
Potential consequences include:
- bypass of host-based ACLs
- virtual host or tenant isolation failures
- incorrect or attacker-influenced redirect/callback targets
- inconsistent proxy/downstream interpretation of the original target host
- misleading logs and audit records
Technical Root Cause
- On the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 metadata builder paths:
:authorityis parsed separately into authority/URI stateHostis preserved as a normal request header- the two values are not compared for consistency
- On the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 server entry paths:
- Jetty calls
ComplianceUtils.verify(httpCompliance, requestMetaData, listener) - this verification does not enforce
MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY
- On the HTTP/1.1 path:
- Jetty explicitly checks whether authority and
Hostmatch - mismatches are rejected by default
Relevant Code Locations
HTTP/2 metadata builder:
jetty-core/jetty-http2/jetty-http2-hpack/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http2/hpack/internal/MetaDataBuilder.java
HTTP/3 metadata builder:
jetty-core/jetty-http3/jetty-http3-qpack/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http3/qpack/internal/metadata/MetaDataBuilder.java
HTTP/2 server entry:
jetty-core/jetty-http2/jetty-http2-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http2/server/internal/HttpStreamOverHTTP2.java
HTTP/3 server entry:
jetty-core/jetty-http3/jetty-http3-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http3/server/internal/HttpStreamOverHTTP3.java
Shared HTTP compliance verification:
jetty-core/jetty-http/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http/ComplianceUtils.java
HTTP/1.1 authority/Host consistency check:
jetty-core/jetty-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/server/internal/HttpConnection.java
Defined but not enforced on H2/H3:
jetty-core/jetty-http/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http/HttpCompliance.java- violation: MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY
Reproduction
I reproduced this on local Jetty 12.1.9-SNAPSHOT source.
Minimal reproduction steps:
- Start a Jetty HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 test server.
- Send a request with:
- :authority = localhost:<port>
- Host = evil.example:<port>
- In the request handler, inspect both:
- Request.getServerName(request)
- request.getHeaders().get(HttpHeader.HOST)
- Observe whether Jetty rejects the request or allows both values to remain visible.
Observed result:
- HTTP/2: request is accepted and returns 200
- HTTP/3: request is accepted and returns 200
- the server can observe both:
- serverName=localhost
- hostHeader=evil.example:<port>
This shows that a single attacker-controlled request can preserve two conflicting host interpretations inside Jetty.
Tests Used
HTTP/2 rejection test:
org.eclipse.jetty.http2.tests.HTTP2Test#testRejectMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthority
HTTP/2 exploitability test:
org.eclipse.jetty.http2.tests.HTTP2Test#testMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthoritySplitsAuthorityFromHostHeader
HTTP/3 rejection test:
org.eclipse.jetty.http3.tests.HandlerClientServerTest#testRejectMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthority
HTTP/3 exploitability test:
org.eclipse.jetty.http3.tests.HandlerClientServerTest#testMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthoritySplitsAuthorityFromHostHeader
Observed behavior:
- both rejection tests fail because Jetty returns 200 instead of 400
- both exploitability tests pass, confirming that Jetty exposes different host values to different layers
Project-Internal Evidence of Real Impact
Examples:
jetty-openidusesRequest.getServerName(request)to construct redirect URLsjetty-ee11-proxyuses the rawHostheader when buildingForwarded
This indicates that the issue is not merely theoretical: Jetty’s own ecosystem already contains code paths where different host sources are used for different purposes.
Affected Version
Confirmed affected version:
- 12.1.9-SNAPSHOT
Other versions may also be affected if they share the same HTTP/2 / HTTP/3 request construction and compliance-validation logic. I have not yet completed a historical version matrix and would recommend confirming exact affected ranges from Jetty’s branch history.
Suggested Fix
Recommend adding HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 validation equivalent to the existing HTTP/1.1 authority/Host consistency check:
- if both :authority and regular Host are present
- normalize and compare them
- if they do not match, reject the request with 400 Bad Request
- route the failure through the existing MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY compliance mechanism
Also adding explicit HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 regression coverage for this case.
Disclosure Status
- not publicly disclosed
- no public issue filed
- shared only privately with the Jetty security contacts
Affected versions
Maven
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server | >= 9.4.0.v20161208, <= 9.4.58.v20250814 |
No fix yet |
| org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server | >= 10.0.0, <= 10.0.26 |
No fix yet |
| org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server | >= 11.0.0, <= 11.0.26 |
No fix yet |
| org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server | >= 12.0.0, < 12.0.35 |
12.0.35 |
| org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server | >= 12.1.0, < 12.1.9 |
12.1.9 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server Maven → 12.0.35
- maven
<dependency><groupId>org.eclipse.jetty</groupId><artifactId>jetty-server</artifactId><version>12.0.35</version></dependency>- gradle
implementation("org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server:12.0.35")
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 5.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
- Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
- Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
- Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
- Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
- Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
- github.com/jetty/jetty.project/security/advisories/GHSA-7p3p-8qv8-m2vh
- github.com/jetty/jetty.project/issues/14870
- github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/14871
- github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/14897
- github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/14970
- github.com/jetty/jetty.project/commit/3e5a4daec196859b8886b6f67b1157dab47cdb6f
- github.com/jetty/jetty.project/commit/67ba9e6b39661810123680d9c894e99a7940c73d
- github.com/jetty/jetty.project/commit/cbca3076f7c914a232e7a8b22fa95fbf7e67a6cc
- github.com/jetty/jetty.project/releases/tag/jetty-12.0.35
- github.com/jetty/jetty.project/releases/tag/jetty-12.1.9
- gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/99
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-f4v5-65jj-pcr2 Eclipse Jetty: Cross-Request Leakage for trailers on HTTP/1.1 keep-alive connections | High | Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server |
| GHSA-9299-c6m4-mjhc Eclipse Jetty: DoS attack triggering OutOfMemory with 100-Continue requests | High | Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server |
| GHSA-xxh7-fcf3-rj7f The Eclipse Jetty Server Artifact has a Gzip request memory leak | High | Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server |
| GHSA-q4rv-gq96-w7c5 **UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED** GzipHandler causes part of request body to be seen as request body of a separate request | High | Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server |
| GHSA-g8m5-722r-8whq Eclipse Jetty's ThreadLimitHandler.getRemote() vulnerable to remote DoS attacks | Medium | Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server |
| GHSA-p26g-97m4-6q7c Eclipse Jetty's cookie parsing of quoted values can exfiltrate values from other cookies | Medium | Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server |
| GHSA-qw69-rqj8-6qw8 OutOfMemoryError for large multipart without filename in Eclipse Jetty | Medium | Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server |
| GHSA-8mpp-f3f7-xc28 Jetty SslConnection does not release pooled ByteBuffers in case of errors | High | Also affects org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server |
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