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GHSA-mq6f-5xh5-hgcf BIT-harbor-2023-20902 CVE-2023-20902 GO-2023-2109

Harbor timing attack risk

Medium Go
Severity
5.9 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.45%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 39.32% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-208 Observable Timing Discrepancy
CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
Fix
1.10.18
Upgrade github.com/goharbor/harbor to this version or later

Description

In the Harbor jobservice container, the comparison of secrets in the authenticator type is prone to timing attacks. The vulnerability occurs due to the following code: https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/blob/aaea068cceb4063ab89313d9785f2b40f35b0d63/src/jobservice/api/authenticator.go#L69-L69 To avoid this issue, constant time comparison should be used.

subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(expectedSecret), []byte(secret)) == 0

Impact

This attack might be possible theoretically, but no workable proof of concept is available, and access complexity is set at High. The jobservice exposes these APIs

Create a job task --- POST /api/v1/jobs    
Get job task information --- GET /api/v1/jobs/{job_id}
Stop job task ---  POST /api/v1/jobs/{job_id}
Get job log task ---  GET /api/v1/jobs/{job_id}/log
Get job execution --- GET /api/v1/jobs/{job_id}/executions
Get job stats ---  GET /api/v1/stats
Get job service configuration ---  GET /api/v1/config

It is used to create jobs/stop job tasks and retrieve job task information. If an attacker obtains the secrets, it is possible to retrieve the job information, create a job, or stop a job task.

The following versions of Harbor are involved: <=Harbor 2.8.2, <=Harbor 2.7.2, <= Harbor 2.6.x, <=Harbor 1.10.17

Patches

Harbor 2.8.3, Harbor 2.7.3, Harbor 1.10.18

Workarounds

Because the jobservice only exposes HTTP service to harbor-core containers, blocking any inbound traffic from the external network to the jobservice container can reduce the risk.

Credits

Thanks to Porcupiney Hairs for reporting this issue.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/goharbor/harbor
< 1.10.18
1.10.18
github.com/goharbor/harbor
>= 2.0.0, < 2.7.3
2.7.3
github.com/goharbor/harbor
>= 2.8.0, < 2.8.3
2.8.3
github.com/goharbor/harbor
< 1.10.18
>= 2.0.0+incompatible, < 2.7.3+incompatible
>= 2.8.0+incompatible, < 2.8.3+incompatible
1.10.18
2.7.3+incompatible
2.8.3+incompatible

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/goharbor/harbor Go → 1.10.18

go
go get github.com/goharbor/harbor@v1.10.18 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy

Two separate operations in a product require different amounts of time to complete, in a way that is observable to an actor and reveals security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not.

CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: In languages that support it, use synchronization primitives. Only wrap these around critical code to minimize the impact on performance.
  • Architecture and Design: Use thread-safe capabilities such as the data access abstraction in Spring.
  • Architecture and Design: Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring. Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).
  • Implementation: When using multithreading and operating on shared variables, only use thread-safe functions.
  • Implementation: Use atomic operations on shared variables. Be wary of innocent-looking constructs such as "x++". This may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read, followed by a computation, followed by a write.
  • Implementation: Use a mutex if available, but be sure to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-412.
  • Implementation: Avoid double-checked locking (CWE-609) and other implementation errors that arise when trying to avoid the overhead of synchronization.
  • Implementation: Disable interrupts or signals over critical parts of the code, but also make sure that the code does not go into a large or infinite loop.
  • Implementation: Use the volatile type modifier for critical variables to avoid unexpected compiler optimization or reordering. This does not necessarily solve the synchronization problem, but it can help.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-prh4-vhfh-24mj
Harbor: LDAP password and OIDC secret are not redacted in the audit log
Medium Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-hj7x-hmf2-hc2p
Harbor allows the use of the default password for web UI login
Critical Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-h27m-3qw8-3pw8
Possible ORM Leak Vulnerability in the Harbor
Medium Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-f9vc-vf3r-pqqq
Harbor repository description page has Cross-site Scripting vulnerability
Medium Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-r864-28pw-8682
Harbor fails to validate the user permissions when updating p2p preheat policies
High Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-hw28-333w-qxp3
Harbor fails to validate the user permissions when updating project configurations
Medium Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-vw63-824v-qf2j
SQL Injection in Harbor scan log API
Medium Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-5757-v49g-f6r7
Open Redirect URL in Harbor
Medium Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
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