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GHSA-hj7x-hmf2-hc2p BIT-harbor-2026-4404 CVE-2026-4404 GO-2026-4845

Harbor allows the use of the default password for web UI login

Critical Go
Severity
9.4 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.50%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 42.77% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-1393 Use of Default Password
CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

Use of hard coded credentials in GoHarbor Harbor version 2.15.0 and below, allows attackers to use the default password and gain access to the web UI.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/goharbor/harbor
<= 2.15.0
No fix yet
github.com/goharbor/harbor
all versions
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 9.4

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-1393: Use of Default Password

The product uses default passwords for potentially critical functionality.

How to prevent it
  • Requirements: Prohibit use of default, hard-coded, or other values that do not vary for each installation of the product - especially for separate organizations.
  • Documentation: Ensure that product documentation clearly emphasizes the presence of default passwords and provides steps for the administrator to change them.
  • Architecture and Design: Force the administrator to change the credential upon installation.
  • Installation, Operation: The product administrator could change the defaults upon installation or during operation.

CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials

The product contains hard-coded credentials, such as a password or cryptographic key.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: For outbound authentication: store passwords, keys, and other credentials outside of the code in a strongly-protected, encrypted configuration file or database that is protected from access by all outsiders, including other local users on the same system. Properly protect the key (CWE-320). If you cannot use encryption to protect the file, then make sure that the permissions are as restrictive as possible [REF-7]. In Windows environments, the Encrypted File System (EFS) may provide some protection.
  • Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication: Rather than hard-code a default username and password, key, or other authentication credentials for first time logins, utilize a "first login" mode that requires the user to enter a unique strong password or key.
  • Architecture and Design: If the product must contain hard-coded credentials or they cannot be removed, perform access control checks and limit which entities can access the feature that requires the hard-coded credentials. For example, a feature might only be enabled through the system console instead of through a network connection.
  • Architecture and Design: For inbound authentication using passwords: apply strong one-way hashes to passwords and store those hashes in a configuration file or database with appropriate access control. That way, theft of the file/database still requires the attacker to try to crack the password. When handling an incoming password during authentication, take the hash of the password and compare it to the saved hash. Use randomly assigned salts for each separate hash that is generated. This increases the amount of computation that an attacker needs to conduct a brute-force attack, possibly limiting the effectiveness of the rainbow table method.
  • Architecture and Design: For front-end to back-end connections: Three solutions are possible, although none are complete. The first suggestion involves the use of generated passwords or keys that are changed automatically and must be entered at given time intervals by a system administrator. These passwords will be held in memory and only be valid for the time intervals. Next, the passwords or keys should be limited at the back end to only performing actions valid for the front end, as opposed to having full access. Finally, the messages sent should be tagged and checksummed with time sensitive values so as to prevent replay-style attacks.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-prh4-vhfh-24mj
Harbor: LDAP password and OIDC secret are not redacted in the audit log
Medium Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-h27m-3qw8-3pw8
Possible ORM Leak Vulnerability in the Harbor
Medium Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-f9vc-vf3r-pqqq
Harbor repository description page has Cross-site Scripting vulnerability
Medium Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-r864-28pw-8682
Harbor fails to validate the user permissions when updating p2p preheat policies
High Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-hw28-333w-qxp3
Harbor fails to validate the user permissions when updating project configurations
Medium Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-vw63-824v-qf2j
SQL Injection in Harbor scan log API
Medium Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-5757-v49g-f6r7
Open Redirect URL in Harbor
Medium Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
GHSA-mq6f-5xh5-hgcf
Harbor timing attack risk
Medium Also affects github.com/goharbor/harbor
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