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GHSA-mpr7-6m5w-76rw CVE-2026-114127

Astro: Arbitrary CSS injection in Astro View Transitions

Low npm
Severity
2.3 / 10
Low · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.50%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 42.74% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
Fix
7.3.3
Upgrade astro to this version or later

Description

Summary

Astro's server-side View Transition CSS generator did not keep string animation properties within their generated CSS declarations. In an application that passes attacker-controlled data into an animation property such as duration, a value containing CSS delimiters could terminate the declaration and rule, then add attacker-selected CSS to the server-rendered page.

The injected content remains inside the generated <style> element. It cannot terminate that element or inject HTML or JavaScript because Astro escapes < before emitting the stylesheet.

Severity

Exploitation requires an application to pass untrusted, request-derived, or user-controlled content directly into a transition animation value. This is an uncommon application pattern, and applications using static or otherwise trusted transition values are unaffected.

The resulting capability is limited to CSS in the rendered document. The proof of concept does not demonstrate JavaScript execution, HTML injection, an origin-boundary bypass, or access to server-only data.

Details

Animation values are collected by stringifyAnimations() in packages/astro/src/runtime/server/transition.ts and passed to addAnimationProperty(). String values were converted directly with toString():

function addAnimationProperty(builder: AnimationBuilder, prop: string, value: string | number) {
  let arr = builder[prop];
  if (Array.isArray(arr)) {
    arr.push(value.toString());
  } else {
    builder[prop] = [value.toString()];
  }
}

The animation builder then interpolated each value into a declaration:

out += `\n\t${k}: ${value.join(', ')};`;

The completed stylesheet passes through escapeStyleText(), which escapes literal < characters to keep the content inside its HTML <style> element. CSS delimiters such as ;, {, and } remained active, allowing a value to escape its intended declaration and add another rule.

The shared serializer handles duration, delay, easing, direction, fillMode, and animation names, so custom transition objects using those string properties followed the same path.

The fix encodes CSS declaration delimiters while serializing each animation value. Supported CSS functions and strings, including calc() and var(), remain unchanged.

Proof of Concept

Using astro@7.3.2, create an on-demand rendered page:

---
import { fade } from "astro:transitions";
const duration = Astro.url.searchParams.get("duration") ?? "1ms";
---
<div id="target" transition:animate={fade({ duration })}>SAFE</div>

Request the page with:

/?duration=1ms%3B%7D%23target%7Bcolor%3Argb(1%2C2%2C3)%3Bfont-size%3A37px%7Dx%7Banimation-duration%3A1ms

Before the fix, the generated stylesheet contains an active rule equivalent to:

#target {
  color: rgb(1, 2, 3);
  font-size: 37px;
}

In Chromium, the target's computed styles change to rgb(1, 2, 3) and 37px. This behavior is reproducible in a production standalone SSR build, not only in the development server.

Impact

An attacker can inject CSS into the affected application's rendered page when the application places attacker-controlled data into a transition animation value. The CSS can restyle or conceal content, reposition existing controls, add generated text, or otherwise misrepresent the page's UI.

CSS selectors and conditional resource loads may expose data already present in selectable DOM attributes in some applications, depending on the page and its Content Security Policy. The issue does not expose cookies, server-only values, arbitrary DOM text, or cross-origin response data by itself.

Affected Versions

astro >= 7.1.0, <= 7.3.2.

Versions through 7.0.9 are covered by GHSA-4g3v-8h47-v7g6 / CVE-2026-73422, which had the stronger impact of escaping the <style> element and injecting HTML or JavaScript.

Patched Versions

This issue is patched in astro@7.3.3. Fix: https://github.com/withastro/astro/pull/17970

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted or request-derived values into View Transition animation properties. If dynamic values are required, validate them according to the expected CSS grammar before constructing the transition. For duration and delay, prefer finite numbers or strictly validated CSS time values.

Credits

Reported by @avrlab233.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
astro
>= 7.1.0, <= 7.3.2
No fix yet
astro
>= 7.1.0, < 7.3.3
7.3.3

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

astro npm → 7.3.3

npm
npm install astro@7.3.3
yarn
yarn add astro@7.3.3
pnpm
pnpm add astro@7.3.3

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 2.3

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Passive
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
Low
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

Weakness

CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
  • Implementation, Architecture and Design: Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies. For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters. Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the: HTML body Element attributes (such as src="XYZ") URIs JavaScript sections Cascading Style Sheets and style property etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body. Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Architecture and Design: If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • Implementation: Use and specify an output encoding that can be handled by the downstream component that is reading the output. Common encodings include ISO-8859-1, UTF-7, and UTF-8. When an encoding is not specified, a downstream component may choose a different encoding, either by assuming a default encoding or automatically inferring which encoding is being used, which can be erroneous. When the encodings are inconsistent, the downstream component might treat some character or byte sequences as special, even if they are not special in the original encoding. Attackers might then be able to exploit this discrepancy and conduct injection attacks; they even might be able to bypass protection mechanisms that assume the original encoding is also being used by the downstream component. The problem of inconsistent output encodings often arises in web pages. If an encoding is not specified in an HTTP header, web browsers often guess about which encoding is being used. This can open up the browser to subtle XSS attacks.
  • Implementation: With Struts, write all data from form beans with the bean's filter attribute set to true.
  • Implementation: To help mitigate XSS attacks against the user's session cookie, set the session cookie to be HttpOnly. In browsers that support the HttpOnly feature (such as more recent versions of Internet Explorer and Firefox), this attribute can prevent the user's session cookie from being accessible to malicious client-side scripts that use document.cookie. This is not a complete solution, since HttpOnly is not supported by all browsers. More importantly, XmlHttpRequest and other powerful browser technologies provide read access to HTTP headers, including the Set-Cookie header in which the HttpOnly flag is set.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When dynamically constructing web pages, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. All input should be validated and cleansed, not just parameters that the user is supposed to specify, but all data in the request, including hidden fields, cookies, headers, the URL itself, and so forth. A common mistake that leads to continuing XSS vulnerabilities is to validate only fields that are expected to be redisplayed by the site. It is common to see data from the request that is reflected by the application server or the application that the development team did not anticipate. Also, a field that is not currently reflected may be used by a future developer. Therefore, validating ALL parts of the HTTP request is recommended. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most ef
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
  • Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-98hj-9722-w3j8
Astro: Reflected/Stored XSS via unescaped <script>/<style> tag content in JSX/MDX rendering
Medium Also affects astro
GHSA-26w7-cxv4-gfx2
Astro: Remote code execution through AVIF image optimization
Critical Also affects astro
GHSA-376h-93r7-7g6f
Astro: Authorization bypass from missing path-segment boundary check when stripping the configured base
Medium Also affects astro
GHSA-8mv7-9c27-98vc
Astro: composable `astro/hono` pipeline bypasses `security.checkOrigin` when `middleware()` is absent or misordered
Medium Also affects astro
GHSA-f48w-9m4c-m7f5
Astro: XSS via unescaped spread attribute names in renderHTMLElement (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-54298)
Medium Also affects astro
GHSA-7pw4-f3q4-r2p2
Astro: Cross-site scripting via unescaped transition:* directive values on hydrated islands
Low Also affects astro
GHSA-4g3v-8h47-v7g6
Astro: Reflected XSS via unescaped View Transition animation properties
Medium Also affects astro
GHSA-vj59-8hwv-xxmv
Astro: Authorization Bypass via Decode Iteration Limit and Rewrite Path Canonicalization Mismatch
High Also affects astro

Credits: avrlab233

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