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GHSA-8mv7-9c27-98vc CVE-2026-73423

Astro: composable `astro/hono` pipeline bypasses `security.checkOrigin` when `middleware()` is absent or misordered

Medium npm
Severity
5.1 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.26%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 18.41% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Fix
7.0.6
Upgrade astro to this version or later

Description

Summary

In the composable astro/hono pipeline, the security.checkOrigin protection is only installed by the middleware() primitive. The actions() and pages() primitives each dispatch to user code independently, so a pipeline that mounts either primitive before (or without) middleware() will bypass the origin check for those requests.

Details

security.checkOrigin (default: true) is intended to reject cross-site POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE form submissions. In the classic pipeline (astro() all-in-one), the check always runs because Astro injects a virtual middleware module even when the user has no src/middleware.ts. In the composable astro/hono pipeline, the user assembles primitives manually. The check is only installed inside middleware() — so:

  • Mounting actions() before middleware() allows cross-origin form-encoded action requests to execute before the gate runs. The examples/advanced-routing example and the Cloudflare hono docs shipped this order.
  • Omitting middleware() entirely (reasonable for apps with no custom middleware) silently drops checkOrigin protection for all on-demand endpoints and pages dispatched through pages().

The attack is a blind write-only CSRF: the attacker can trigger a state-mutating action or endpoint handler using the victim's cookies, but cannot read the cross-origin response body.

Affected versions

Astro >= 7.0.0 when using the composable astro/hono pipeline with either:

  • actions() mounted before middleware(), or
  • pages() used without middleware()

The default (non-composable) pipeline is not affected.

Fix

The origin check is now applied at each dispatch sink (ActionHandler.handle and PagesHandler.handleWithErrorFallback), gated on manifest.checkOrigin, using the same predicate as the middleware. The check is order-independent and a no-op when middleware() has already run.

Fix: https://github.com/withastro/astro/pull/17250

Workaround

Ensure middleware() is mounted before both actions() and pages() in the composable pipeline, and that it is always included even when no custom middleware logic is needed:

app.use(middleware());
app.use(actions());
app.use(pages());

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
astro
>= 7.0.0, < 7.0.6
7.0.6
astro
>= 7.0.0, < 7.0.6
7.0.6

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

astro npm → 7.0.6

npm
npm install astro@7.0.6
yarn
yarn add astro@7.0.6
pnpm
pnpm add astro@7.0.6

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 5.1

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Active
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
Low
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

Weakness

CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330] Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
  • Implementation: Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
  • Architecture and Design: Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
  • Architecture and Design: Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
  • Architecture and Design: Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller: When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult. This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
  • Architecture and Design: Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
  • Implementation: Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-98hj-9722-w3j8
Astro: Reflected/Stored XSS via unescaped <script>/<style> tag content in JSX/MDX rendering
Medium Also affects astro
GHSA-mpr7-6m5w-76rw
Astro: Arbitrary CSS injection in Astro View Transitions
Low Also affects astro
GHSA-26w7-cxv4-gfx2
Astro: Remote code execution through AVIF image optimization
Critical Also affects astro
GHSA-376h-93r7-7g6f
Astro: Authorization bypass from missing path-segment boundary check when stripping the configured base
Medium Also affects astro
GHSA-f48w-9m4c-m7f5
Astro: XSS via unescaped spread attribute names in renderHTMLElement (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-54298)
Medium Also affects astro
GHSA-7pw4-f3q4-r2p2
Astro: Cross-site scripting via unescaped transition:* directive values on hydrated islands
Low Also affects astro
GHSA-4g3v-8h47-v7g6
Astro: Reflected XSS via unescaped View Transition animation properties
Medium Also affects astro
GHSA-vj59-8hwv-xxmv
Astro: Authorization Bypass via Decode Iteration Limit and Rewrite Path Canonicalization Mismatch
High Also affects astro

Credits: jlgore

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