GHSA-8mv7-9c27-98vc CVE-2026-73423
Astro: composable `astro/hono` pipeline bypasses `security.checkOrigin` when `middleware()` is absent or misordered
- Severity
- 5.1 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.26%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 18.41% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- Fix
7.0.6- Upgrade astro to this version or later
Description
Summary
In the composable astro/hono pipeline, the security.checkOrigin protection is only installed by the middleware() primitive. The actions() and pages() primitives each dispatch to user code independently, so a pipeline that mounts either primitive before (or without) middleware() will bypass the origin check for those requests.
Details
security.checkOrigin (default: true) is intended to reject cross-site POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE form submissions. In the classic pipeline (astro() all-in-one), the check always runs because Astro injects a virtual middleware module even when the user has no src/middleware.ts. In the composable astro/hono pipeline, the user assembles primitives manually. The check is only installed inside middleware() — so:
- Mounting
actions()beforemiddleware()allows cross-origin form-encoded action requests to execute before the gate runs. Theexamples/advanced-routingexample and the Cloudflarehonodocs shipped this order. - Omitting
middleware()entirely (reasonable for apps with no custom middleware) silently dropscheckOriginprotection for all on-demand endpoints and pages dispatched throughpages().
The attack is a blind write-only CSRF: the attacker can trigger a state-mutating action or endpoint handler using the victim's cookies, but cannot read the cross-origin response body.
Affected versions
Astro >= 7.0.0 when using the composable astro/hono pipeline with either:
actions()mounted beforemiddleware(), orpages()used withoutmiddleware()
The default (non-composable) pipeline is not affected.
Fix
The origin check is now applied at each dispatch sink (ActionHandler.handle and PagesHandler.handleWithErrorFallback), gated on manifest.checkOrigin, using the same predicate as the middleware. The check is order-independent and a no-op when middleware() has already run.
Fix: https://github.com/withastro/astro/pull/17250
Workaround
Ensure middleware() is mounted before both actions() and pages() in the composable pipeline, and that it is always included even when no custom middleware logic is needed:
app.use(middleware());
app.use(actions());
app.use(pages());
Affected versions
npm
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
astro npm → 7.0.6
- npm
npm install astro@7.0.6- yarn
yarn add astro@7.0.6- pnpm
pnpm add astro@7.0.6
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 5.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Active
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- Low
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
Weakness
CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330] Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
- Implementation: Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
- Architecture and Design: Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
- Architecture and Design: Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
- Architecture and Design: Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller: When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult. This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
- Architecture and Design: Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
- Implementation: Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.
References
Advisories
Fixes and patches
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-98hj-9722-w3j8 Astro: Reflected/Stored XSS via unescaped <script>/<style> tag content in JSX/MDX rendering | Medium | Also affects astro |
| GHSA-mpr7-6m5w-76rw Astro: Arbitrary CSS injection in Astro View Transitions | Low | Also affects astro |
| GHSA-26w7-cxv4-gfx2 Astro: Remote code execution through AVIF image optimization | Critical | Also affects astro |
| GHSA-376h-93r7-7g6f Astro: Authorization bypass from missing path-segment boundary check when stripping the configured base | Medium | Also affects astro |
| GHSA-f48w-9m4c-m7f5 Astro: XSS via unescaped spread attribute names in renderHTMLElement (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-54298) | Medium | Also affects astro |
| GHSA-7pw4-f3q4-r2p2 Astro: Cross-site scripting via unescaped transition:* directive values on hydrated islands | Low | Also affects astro |
| GHSA-4g3v-8h47-v7g6 Astro: Reflected XSS via unescaped View Transition animation properties | Medium | Also affects astro |
| GHSA-vj59-8hwv-xxmv Astro: Authorization Bypass via Decode Iteration Limit and Rewrite Path Canonicalization Mismatch | High | Also affects astro |
Credits: jlgore
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