GHSA-m4pq-fv2w-6hrw CVE-2024-27936
Deno's deno_runtime vulnerable to interactive permission prompt spoofing via improper ANSI stripping
- Severity
- 8.8 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.94%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 61.05% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-150 Improper Neutralization of Escape, Meta, or Control Sequences
- Fix
- Available
- 2 packages have a fixed version
Description
Summary
A maliciously crafted permission request can show the spoofed permission prompt by inserting a broken ANSI escape sequence into the request contents.
Details
In the patch for CVE-2023-28446, Deno is stripping any ANSI escape sequences from the permission prompt, but permissions given to the program are based on the contents that contain the ANSI escape sequences.
For example, requesting the read permission with /tmp/hello\u001b[/../../etc/hosts as a path will display the /tmp/hellotc/hosts in the permission prompt, but the actual permission given to the program is /tmp/hello\u001b[/../../etc/hosts, which is /etc/hosts after the normalization.
This difference allows a malicious Deno program to spoof the contents of the permission prompt.
PoC
Run the following JavaScript and observe that /tmp/hellotc/hosts is displayed in the permission prompt instead of /etc/hosts, although Deno gives access to /etc/hosts.
const permission = { name: "read", path: "/tmp/hello\u001b[/../../etc/hosts" };
await Deno.permissions.request(permission);
console.log(await Deno.readTextFile("/etc/hosts"));
Expected prompt
┌ ⚠️ Deno requests read access to "/etc/hosts".
├ Requested by `Deno.permissions.query()` API
├ Run again with --allow-read to bypass this prompt.
└ Allow? [y/n/A] (y = yes, allow; n = no, deny; A = allow all read permissions) >
Actual prompt
┌ ⚠️ Deno requests read access to "/tmp/hellotc/hosts".
├ Requested by `Deno.permissions.query()` API
├ Run again with --allow-read to bypass this prompt.
└ Allow? [y/n/A] (y = yes, allow; n = no, deny; A = allow all read permissions) >
Impact
Any Deno program can spoof the content of the interactive permission prompt by inserting a broken ANSI code, which allows a malicious Deno program to display the wrong file path or program name to the user.
Affected versions
crates.io
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| deno | >= 1.32.1, < 1.41.0 |
1.41.0 |
| deno_runtime | >= 0.103.0, < 0.147.0 |
0.147.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
deno crates.io → 1.41.0
- cargo
cargo update -p deno --precise 1.41.0
deno_runtime crates.io → 0.147.0
- cargo
cargo update -p deno_runtime --precise 0.147.0
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 8.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-150: Improper Neutralization of Escape, Meta, or Control Sequences
The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could be interpreted as escape, meta, or control character sequences when they are sent to a downstream component.
How to prevent it
- Developers should anticipate that escape, meta and control characters/sequences will be injected/removed/manipulated in the input vectors of their product. Use an appropriate combination of denylists and allowlists to ensure only valid, expected and appropriate input is processed by the system.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Implementation: While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Implementation: When using output from an LLM, neutralize or strip escape codes before redirecting output to the terminal or other rendering engine that would process the codes. The neutralization could require that the character be printable and/or allowable whitespace, such as a carriage return or newline. Be deliberate about what to allow.
- Build and Compilation: When using an LLM: during tokenizer training, suppress escape codes from the tokenizer's vocabulary. Depending on context, this could be accomplished by removing the codes from input to the tokenizer, or removing the map from the string to its token ID. It is generally unlikely that this removal would adversely affect the quality or correctness of what is generated, e.g. advice requests for terminal settings to change colors.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-x2qc-cmh9-f4hf Deno: Denial of service via non-ASCII bytes in WebSocket response headers | Medium | Also affects deno |
| GHSA-8xpq-cjcf-3wh9 Deno: Permission Bypass via Unicode Normalization Mismatch on macOS (APFS) | High | Also affects deno |
| GHSA-968w-xfqw-vp9q Deno: BYONM module resolution allows `package.json` main path traversal to bypass `--allow-read` restrictions | Medium | Also affects deno |
| GHSA-v8fw-85r8-5m23 Deno: Node TCPWrap numeric hostname aliases bypass --deny-net resolved-IP deny checks | Medium | Also affects deno |
| GHSA-9xg4-qhm4-g43w Deno: Miller-Rabin Primality Test Allows Zero Rounds | High | Also affects deno |
| GHSA-7xh3-mhg9-jcw8 Deno: Command Injection via spawnSync & spawn on Windows | High | Also affects deno |
| GHSA-4c8g-jvcx-v4hv Deno: process.loadEnvFile() bypasses env permission checks and mutates process.env with only read access | Medium | Also affects deno |
| GHSA-83pc-3rw9-qpwj Deno: WebSocket API sandbox bypass via missing post-DNS check | Medium | Also affects deno |
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