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GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj CVE-2026-26278

fast-xml-parser affected by DoS through entity expansion in DOCTYPE (no expansion limit)

High npm
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.94%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 60.87% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-776 Improper Restriction of Recursive Entity References in DTDs ('XML Entity Expansion')
Fix
4.5.4
Upgrade fast-xml-parser to this version or later

Description

Summary

The XML parser can be forced to do an unlimited amount of entity expansion. With a very small XML input, it’s possible to make the parser spend seconds or even minutes processing a single request, effectively freezing the application.

Details

There is a check in DocTypeReader.js that tries to prevent entity expansion attacks by rejecting entities that reference other entities (it looks for & inside entity values). This does stop classic “Billion Laughs” payloads.

However, it doesn’t stop a much simpler variant.

If you define one large entity that contains only raw text (no & characters) and then reference it many times, the parser will happily expand it every time. There is no limit on how large the expanded result can become, or how many replacements are allowed.

The problem is in replaceEntitiesValue() inside OrderedObjParser.js. It repeatedly runs val.replace() in a loop, without any checks on total output size or execution cost. As the entity grows or the number of references increases, parsing time explodes.

Relevant code:

DocTypeReader.js (lines 28–33): entity registration only checks for &

OrderedObjParser.js (lines 439–458): entity replacement loop with no limits

PoC

const { XMLParser } = require('fast-xml-parser');

const entity = 'A'.repeat(1000);
const refs = '&big;'.repeat(100);
const xml = `<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY big "${entity}">]><root>${refs}</root>`;

console.time('parse');
new XMLParser().parse(xml); // ~4–8 seconds for ~1.3 KB of XML
console.timeEnd('parse');

// 5,000 chars × 100 refs takes 200+ seconds
// 50,000 chars × 1,000 refs will hang indefinitely

Impact

This is a straightforward denial-of-service issue.

Any service that parses user-supplied XML using the default configuration is vulnerable. Since Node.js runs on a single thread, the moment the parser starts expanding entities, the event loop is blocked. While this is happening, the server can’t handle any other requests.

In testing, a payload of only a few kilobytes was enough to make a simple HTTP server completely unresponsive for several minutes, with all other requests timing out.

Workaround

Avoid using DOCTYPE parsing by processEntities: false option.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
fast-xml-parser
>= 4.1.3, < 4.5.4
4.5.4
fast-xml-parser
>= 5.0.0, < 5.3.6
5.3.6
fast-xml-parser
>= 4.1.3, < 4.5.4
4.5.4
fast-xml-parser
>= 5.0.0, < 5.3.6
5.3.6

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

fast-xml-parser npm → 4.5.4

npm
npm install fast-xml-parser@4.5.4
yarn
yarn add fast-xml-parser@4.5.4
pnpm
pnpm add fast-xml-parser@4.5.4

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-776: Improper Restriction of Recursive Entity References in DTDs ('XML Entity Expansion')

The product uses XML documents and allows their structure to be defined with a Document Type Definition (DTD), but it does not properly control the number of recursive definitions of entities.

How to prevent it
  • Operation: If possible, prohibit the use of DTDs or use an XML parser that limits the expansion of recursive DTD entities.
  • Implementation: Before parsing XML files with associated DTDs, scan for recursive entity declarations and do not continue parsing potentially explosive content.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-8r6m-32jq-jx6q
fast-xml-parser: Repeated DOCTYPE declarations reset entity expansion limits
High Also affects fast-xml-parser
GHSA-gh4j-gqv2-49f6
fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: XML Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters
Medium Also affects fast-xml-parser
GHSA-jp2q-39xq-3w4g
Entity Expansion Limits Bypassed When Set to Zero Due to JavaScript Falsy Evaluation in fast-xml-parser
Medium Also affects fast-xml-parser
GHSA-8gc5-j5rx-235r
fast-xml-parser affected by numeric entity expansion bypassing all entity expansion limits (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-26278)
High Also affects fast-xml-parser
GHSA-fj3w-jwp8-x2g3
fast-xml-parser has stack overflow in XMLBuilder with preserveOrder
Low Also affects fast-xml-parser
GHSA-m7jm-9gc2-mpf2
fast-xml-parser has an entity encoding bypass via regex injection in DOCTYPE entity names
Critical Also affects fast-xml-parser
GHSA-37qj-frw5-hhjh
fast-xml-parser has RangeError DoS Numeric Entities Bug
High Also affects fast-xml-parser
GHSA-mpg4-rc92-vx8v
fast-xml-parser vulnerable to ReDOS at currency parsing
High Also affects fast-xml-parser

Credits: ByamB4, yuezk

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