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GHSA-jg22-mg44-37j8 CVE-2026-34993 PYSEC-2026-2104

AIOHTTP is Vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data

High PyPI
Severity
6.4 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.18%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 7.46% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
3.14.0
Upgrade aiohttp to this version or later

Description

Summary

Using CookieJar.load() with untrusted input may allow arbitrary code execution.

Impact

Most applications using this function will be doing so with the user's own data, so this is unlikely to affect many applications.

Workaround

If an application does allow attacker controlled files to be loaded, a workaround on older releases would be to sanitise the files before loading.


Patch: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/dcf40f30637e8752c76781cf6703b5a236749a00

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
aiohttp
< 3.14.0
3.14.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

aiohttp PyPI → 3.14.0

pip
pip install --upgrade "aiohttp>=3.14.0"
poetry
poetry add "aiohttp>=3.14.0"
uv
uv add "aiohttp>=3.14.0"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.4

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
High
User interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
High
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-pqxq-w44r-73xw
AIOHTTP: Pure-Python parser request smuggling
Medium Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-gx76-c99x-2c96
AIOHTTP: Cookie from subdomain can remove Host-Only Scope from existing cookies
Low Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-f9xw-jh8m-3mwq
AIOHTTP: Absolute-form request targets can spoof Request.scheme
Medium Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-9xw5-w5jj-pvcg
AIOHTTP: File descriptor exhaustion in multipart requests
High Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-6cjc-53gc-5rqm
AIOHTTP: Connector pool exhaustion via Max-Age overflow
Medium Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-5wr8-gcqf-gqf3
aiohttp server lacks an initial request/header timeout
High Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-494j-54xm-rwp3
AIOHTTP: Secure attribute not enforced for shared cookie
Medium Also affects aiohttp
GHSA-2g87-pp6c-29x5
aiohttp: Multiple instances of excessive or unbounded memory/CPU use
High Also affects aiohttp
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