GHSA-j6c9-qvp8-699f
Duplicate Advisory: picklescan missing detection by simple obfuscation of a `builtins.eval` call
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- Critical · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- —
- No score published
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- Fix
- None yet
- No fixed version published
Description
Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-9m3x-qqw2-h32h. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
picklescan before 1.0.1 contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability allowing unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary code by hiding eval calls nested under callable objects via getattr. Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle files that evades detection but executes when the pickle is loaded from untrusted sources.
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| picklescan | all versions |
No fix yet |
How to fix
No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- High
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Not defined
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
- Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
- Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
- Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
References
Advisories
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Withdrawn
- Last updated by the source
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-g38g-8gr9-h9xp PickleScan has multiple stdlib modules with direct RCE not in blocklist | Critical | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-vvpj-8cmc-gx39 PickleScan's pkgutil.resolve_name has a universal blocklist bypass | Critical | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-7wx9-6375-f5wh PickleScan's profile.run blocklist mismatch allows exec() bypass | Critical | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-97f8-7cmv-76j2 Picklescan (scan_pytorch) Bypass via dynamic eval MAGIC_NUMBER | High | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r picklescan vulnerable to arbitrary file create using logging.FileHandler | Medium | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-9m3x-qqw2-h32h picklescan missing detection by simple obfuscation of a `builtins.eval` call | Critical | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-9726-w42j-3qjr picklescan has Arbitrary file read using `io.FileIO` | High | Also affects picklescan |
| GHSA-46h3-79wf-xr6c Picklescan is vulnerable to RCE via missing detection when calling built-in python _operator.attrgetter | High | Also affects picklescan |
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