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GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q CVE-2026-58434 GO-2026-6062

Gitea: Private Repository Metadata Remains Accessible After Access Revocation

High Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.47%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 40.36% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
CWE-862 Missing Authorization
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

Summary

A user who previously had access to a private repository can continue to obtain repository metadata through GET /api/v1/user/starred after their access to the repository has been revoked.

After a collaborator is removed from a private repository, direct access to the repository is correctly denied. However, the repository may still appear in the user's starred repository list, and the endpoint continues to return repository metadata. Changes made to that metadata after access revocation are also reflected in subsequent responses.

Details

The issue affects the authenticated endpoint:

GET /api/v1/user/starred

The same behavior was also observed on:

GET /api/v1/user/subscriptions

A reproducible scenario is:

  1. User alice creates a private repository.
  2. User bob is granted collaborator access.
  3. bob stars the repository.
  4. alice removes bob from the repository collaborators.
  5. Direct repository access by bob is denied.
  6. bob requests /api/v1/user/starred.
  7. The repository is still present in the response together with repository metadata.

Additionally, if repository metadata is modified after access revocation, the updated values are returned by /api/v1/user/starred.

As a result, a user who no longer has permission to access the repository can continue to obtain repository metadata through the starred repository list.

PoC

PoC Link

https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Gitea_PoC-EC93/5_poc_starred_list

PoC Details

  1. Create a private repository:
alice/P
description = "INITIAL"
  1. Add bob as a collaborator with read access.

  2. As bob, star the repository:

PUT /api/v1/user/starred/alice/P

Response:

204 No Content
  1. Remove bob from the collaborator list.

  2. Update the repository description:

description = "AFTER-REVOKE"
  1. Verify that direct repository access is no longer allowed:
GET /api/v1/repos/alice/P

Response:

404 Not Found
  1. As bob, request the starred repository list:
GET /api/v1/user/starred

The response still contains the repository entry and reflects the updated description:

{
  "full_name": "alice/P",
  "description": "AFTER-REVOKE",
  "private": true
}

This demonstrates that repository metadata remains accessible through the starred repository list even after repository access has been revoked.

Impact

A user who previously had legitimate access to a private repository can continue to retrieve repository metadata after losing access to the repository.

The exposed information includes repository metadata returned by the endpoint, such as:

  • Repository name (full_name)
  • Repository description
  • Repository visibility status (private)

This issue does not expose repository contents, source code, issues, pull requests, secrets, or collaborator information.

The impact is limited to continued access to repository metadata after repository permissions have been revoked.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
code.gitea.io/gitea
< 1.27.0
1.27.0
gitea.dev
< 1.27.0
1.27.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

code.gitea.io/gitea Go → 1.27.0

go
go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy

gitea.dev Go → 1.27.0

go
go get gitea.dev@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

CWE-862: Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m
Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation
Critical Known exploited Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j
Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc
Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata
High Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-3r5c-2xxx-h872
Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API
Low Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6
Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh
Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private
Medium Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea
GHSA-h56g-4qw7-2mxg
Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes
Medium Also affects gitea.dev
GHSA-prr9-9mp4-5gp2
Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145
High Also affects gitea.dev
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