GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q CVE-2026-58434 GO-2026-6062
Gitea: Private Repository Metadata Remains Accessible After Access Revocation
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.47%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 40.36% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
- CWE-862 Missing Authorization
- Fix
- Available
- 2 packages have a fixed version
Description
Summary
A user who previously had access to a private repository can continue to obtain repository metadata through GET /api/v1/user/starred after their access to the repository has been revoked.
After a collaborator is removed from a private repository, direct access to the repository is correctly denied. However, the repository may still appear in the user's starred repository list, and the endpoint continues to return repository metadata. Changes made to that metadata after access revocation are also reflected in subsequent responses.
Details
The issue affects the authenticated endpoint:
GET /api/v1/user/starred
The same behavior was also observed on:
GET /api/v1/user/subscriptions
A reproducible scenario is:
- User
alicecreates a private repository. - User
bobis granted collaborator access. bobstars the repository.aliceremovesbobfrom the repository collaborators.- Direct repository access by
bobis denied. bobrequests/api/v1/user/starred.- The repository is still present in the response together with repository metadata.
Additionally, if repository metadata is modified after access revocation, the updated values are returned by /api/v1/user/starred.
As a result, a user who no longer has permission to access the repository can continue to obtain repository metadata through the starred repository list.
PoC
PoC Link
https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Gitea_PoC-EC93/5_poc_starred_list
PoC Details
- Create a private repository:
alice/P
description = "INITIAL"
-
Add
bobas a collaborator with read access. -
As
bob, star the repository:
PUT /api/v1/user/starred/alice/P
Response:
204 No Content
-
Remove
bobfrom the collaborator list. -
Update the repository description:
description = "AFTER-REVOKE"
- Verify that direct repository access is no longer allowed:
GET /api/v1/repos/alice/P
Response:
404 Not Found
- As
bob, request the starred repository list:
GET /api/v1/user/starred
The response still contains the repository entry and reflects the updated description:
{
"full_name": "alice/P",
"description": "AFTER-REVOKE",
"private": true
}
This demonstrates that repository metadata remains accessible through the starred repository list even after repository access has been revoked.
Impact
A user who previously had legitimate access to a private repository can continue to retrieve repository metadata after losing access to the repository.
The exposed information includes repository metadata returned by the endpoint, such as:
- Repository name (
full_name) - Repository description
- Repository visibility status (
private)
This issue does not expose repository contents, source code, issues, pull requests, secrets, or collaborator information.
The impact is limited to continued access to repository metadata after repository permissions have been revoked.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| code.gitea.io/gitea | < 1.27.0 |
1.27.0 |
| gitea.dev | < 1.27.0 |
1.27.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
code.gitea.io/gitea Go → 1.27.0
- go
go get code.gitea.io/gitea@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy
gitea.dev Go → 1.27.0
- go
go get gitea.dev@v1.27.0 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CWE-862: Missing Authorization
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Packages
Other links
- github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q
- github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38321
- github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38390
- github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/362539b78e50dfcc4bd1b9368fdd2a1b8cab0129
- github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/500a09e044156d7a8d6eb58d67a28b8a1512c887
- github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0
- blog.gitea.com/gitea-1.27.0-is-released
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation | Critical Known exploited | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-fq2p-5p22-8g6j Gitea: Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc Gitea: SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata | High | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-3r5c-2xxx-h872 Gitea: Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API | Low | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-frpw-3h2q-4jj6 Gitea: Cross-Repo Information Disclosure via Org-Level Actions Run/Job APIs | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-q423-49rw-g9mh Gitea: GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private | Medium | Also affects code.gitea.io/gitea |
| GHSA-h56g-4qw7-2mxg Gitea: Public-only API token restriction is not enforced on team API routes | Medium | Also affects gitea.dev |
| GHSA-prr9-9mp4-5gp2 Gitea: Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145 | High | Also affects gitea.dev |
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