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GHSA-hwqm-x785-qh8p BIT-consul-2020-12797 CVE-2020-12797 GO-2022-0847

Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource in Hashicorp Consul

Medium Go
Severity
5.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.55%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 75.05% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
Fix
1.6.6
Upgrade github.com/hashicorp/consul to this version or later

Description

HashiCorp Consul and Consul Enterprise failed to enforce changes to legacy ACL token rules due to non-propagation to secondary data centers. Introduced in 1.4.0, fixed in 1.6.6 and 1.7.4.

Specific Go Packages Affected

github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/hashicorp/consul
>= 1.6.0, < 1.6.6
1.6.6
github.com/hashicorp/consul
>= 1.7.0, < 1.7.4
1.7.4
github.com/hashicorp/consul
>= 1.6.0, < 1.6.6
>= 1.7.0, < 1.7.4
1.6.6
1.7.4

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/hashicorp/consul Go → 1.6.6

go
go get github.com/hashicorp/consul@v1.6.6 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource

The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: When using a critical resource such as a configuration file, check to see if the resource has insecure permissions (such as being modifiable by any regular user) [REF-62], and generate an error or even exit the software if there is a possibility that the resource could have been modified by an unauthorized party.
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully defining distinct user groups, privileges, and/or roles. Map these against data, functionality, and the related resources. Then set the permissions accordingly. This will allow you to maintain more fine-grained control over your resources. [REF-207]
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Implementation, Installation: During program startup, explicitly set the default permissions or umask to the most restrictive setting possible. Also set the appropriate permissions during program installation. This will prevent you from inheriting insecure permissions from any user who installs or runs the program.
  • System Configuration: For all configuration files, executables, and libraries, make sure that they are only readable and writable by the software's administrator.
  • Documentation: Do not suggest insecure configuration changes in documentation, especially if those configurations can extend to resources and other programs that are outside the scope of the application.
  • Installation: Do not assume that a system administrator will manually change the configuration to the settings that are recommended in the software's manual.
  • Operation, System Configuration: Ensure that the software runs properly under the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [REF-199] or an equivalent hardening configuration guide, which many organizations use to limit the attack surface and potential risk of deployed software.
  • Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to disable public access.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-cpfq-66p2-336j
Consul is vulnerable to arbitrary file read when configured with Kubernetes authentication
Medium Also affects github.com/hashicorp/consul
GHSA-qh7p-pfq3-677h
Consul event endpoint is vulnerable to denial of service
Medium Also affects github.com/hashicorp/consul
GHSA-7g3r-8c6v-hfmr
Consul key/value endpoint is vulnerable to denial of service
Medium Also affects github.com/hashicorp/consul
GHSA-99wr-c2px-grmh
Hashicorp Consul Cross-site Scripting vulnerability
Medium Also affects github.com/hashicorp/consul
GHSA-5c4w-8hhh-3c3h
Hashicorp Consul Improper Neutralization of HTTP Headers for Scripting Syntax vulnerability
Medium Also affects github.com/hashicorp/consul
GHSA-chgm-7r52-whjj
Hashicorp Consul Path Traversal vulnerability
Medium Also affects github.com/hashicorp/consul
GHSA-6m72-467w-94rh
Privilege Escalation in HashiCorp Consul
Medium Also affects github.com/hashicorp/consul
GHSA-496g-fr33-whrf
Denial of service in HashiCorp Consul
High Also affects github.com/hashicorp/consul
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