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GHSA-hw34-rqc5-h2gm

Duplicate Advisory: Picklescan Allows Remote Code Execution via Malicious Pickle File Bypassing Static Analysis

Medium Withdrawn Mar 3, 2025 PyPI
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
—
No score published
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-646 Reliance on File Name or Extension of Externally-Supplied File
CWE-807 Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-769v-p64c-89pr. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

picklescan before 0.0.22 only considers standard pickle file extensions in the scope for its vulnerability scan. An attacker could craft a malicious model that uses Pickle include a malicious pickle file with a non-standard file extension. Because the malicious pickle file inclusion is not considered as part of the scope of picklescan, the file would pass security checks and appear to be safe, when it could instead prove to be problematic.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
picklescan
<= 0.0.21
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Passive
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
Low
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

Weakness

CWE-646: Reliance on File Name or Extension of Externally-Supplied File

The product allows a file to be uploaded, but it relies on the file name or extension of the file to determine the appropriate behaviors. This could be used by attackers to cause the file to be misclassified and processed in a dangerous fashion.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Make decisions on the server side based on file content and not on file name or extension.

CWE-807: Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision

The product uses a protection mechanism that relies on the existence or values of an input, but the input can be modified by an untrusted actor in a way that bypasses the protection mechanism.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Store state information and sensitive data on the server side only. Ensure that the system definitively and unambiguously keeps track of its own state and user state and has rules defined for legitimate state transitions. Do not allow any application user to affect state directly in any way other than through legitimate actions leading to state transitions. If information must be stored on the client, do not do so without encryption and integrity checking, or otherwise having a mechanism on the server side to catch tampering. Use a message authentication code (MAC) algorithm, such as Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [REF-529]. Apply this against the state or sensitive data that has to be exposed, which can guarantee the integrity of the data - i.e., that the data has not been modified. Ensure that a strong hash function is used (CWE-328).
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. With a stateless protocol such as HTTP, use a framework that maintains the state for you. Examples include ASP.NET View State [REF-756] and the OWASP ESAPI Session Management feature [REF-45]. Be careful of language features that provide state support, since these might be provided as a convenience to the programmer and may not be considering security.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls. Identify all inputs that are used for security decisions and determine if you can modify the design so that you do not have to rely on submitted inputs at all. For example, you may be able to keep critical information about the user's session on the server side instead of recording it within external data.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Withdrawn
  3. Last updated by the source
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-g38g-8gr9-h9xp
PickleScan has multiple stdlib modules with direct RCE not in blocklist
Critical Also affects picklescan
GHSA-vvpj-8cmc-gx39
PickleScan's pkgutil.resolve_name has a universal blocklist bypass
Critical Also affects picklescan
GHSA-7wx9-6375-f5wh
PickleScan's profile.run blocklist mismatch allows exec() bypass
Critical Also affects picklescan
GHSA-97f8-7cmv-76j2
Picklescan (scan_pytorch) Bypass via dynamic eval MAGIC_NUMBER
High Also affects picklescan
GHSA-m7j5-r2p5-c39r
picklescan vulnerable to arbitrary file create using logging.FileHandler
Medium Also affects picklescan
GHSA-9m3x-qqw2-h32h
picklescan missing detection by simple obfuscation of a `builtins.eval` call
Critical Also affects picklescan
GHSA-9726-w42j-3qjr
picklescan has Arbitrary file read using `io.FileIO`
High Also affects picklescan
GHSA-46h3-79wf-xr6c
Picklescan is vulnerable to RCE via missing detection when calling built-in python _operator.attrgetter
High Also affects picklescan
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