Skip to content

GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c CVE-2026-50020

Netty: HttpObjectDecoder skips arbitrary initial control characters when only initial CRLF characters are permitted

Medium Maven
Severity
5.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.23%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 14.17% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-444 Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
Fix
4.2.15.Final
Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-http to this version or later

Description

Summary

Before reading the first request-line, HttpObjectDecoder skips every byte for which Character.isISOControl(b) is true (0x00–0x1F and 0x7F) as well as all whitespace. RFC 9112 §2.2 only asks servers to ignore empty CRLF lines preceding the request-line — a carefully scoped robustness allowance intended to handle HTTP/1.0 POST workarounds. Silently absorbing NUL bytes, SOH, STX, and other non-CRLF control characters goes significantly beyond this, and can be exploited for request-boundary confusion in pipelined or multiplexed transports where a front-end component treats those bytes differently.

Affected Code

File Lines Role
codec-http/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http/HttpObjectDecoder.java 1298–1313 ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE static initialiser — marks all ISO control chars
codec-http/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http/HttpObjectDecoder.java 1307–1313 SKIP_CONTROL_CHARS_BYTES ByteProcessor — skips the entire set
codec-http/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http/HttpObjectDecoder.java 1275–1289 LineParser.skipControlChars — advances readerIndex past all matching bytes

Specification Analysis

RFC 9112 §2.2 — Message Parsing

In the interest of robustness, a server that is expecting to receive and parse a request-line SHOULD ignore at least one empty line (CRLF) received prior to the request-line.

An HTTP/1.1 user agent MUST NOT preface or follow a request with an extra CRLF.

Deviation

The RFC names a single permitted exception: an empty line (bare CRLF, i.e. the two-byte sequence \r\n). The ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE table is initialised as:

for (byte b = Byte.MIN_VALUE; b < Byte.MAX_VALUE; b++) {
    ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE[128 + b] =
        Character.isISOControl(b) || isWhitespace(b);
}

Character.isISOControl returns true for 0x00–0x1F and 0x7F. This includes NUL (0x00), SOH (0x01), STX (0x02), BEL (0x07), DEL (0x7F), and every other non-CRLF control character. The SKIP_CONTROL_CHARS state runs this scan unconditionally before the first READ_INITIAL, meaning any sequence of such bytes prepended to a request is silently consumed.

A load balancer or TLS terminator that does not perform the same scan sees a different message boundary than Netty does, which is the basis of a request-desync / smuggling attack.

Suggested Unit Test

Add to HttpRequestDecoderTest.java.

@Test
public void testNonCrlfControlBytesPrecedingRequestLineAreRejected() {
    // RFC 9112 §2.2: servers SHOULD ignore "at least one empty line (CRLF)" before the
    // request-line.  Non-CRLF control bytes are not part of this robustness allowance
    // and must not be silently swallowed.
    EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());

    ByteBuf buf = Unpooled.buffer();
    buf.writeByte(0x00);   // NUL  — not an empty CRLF line
    buf.writeByte(0x01);   // SOH  — not an empty CRLF line
    buf.writeCharSequence(
            "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\n\r\n",
            CharsetUtil.US_ASCII);

    channel.writeInbound(buf);
    HttpRequest req = channel.readInbound();

    // Current behaviour: NUL and SOH are in ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE, so they are
    // silently skipped; the request decodes successfully and isFailure() == false.
    //
    // RFC-correct behaviour: only empty CRLF lines should be ignored; NUL/SOH must
    // cause a parse error — isFailure() == true.
    assertTrue(
            req.decoderResult().isFailure(),
            "Non-CRLF control bytes before the request-line must not be silently skipped " +
            "(RFC 9112 §2.2 allows only empty CRLF lines)");

    assertFalse(channel.finish());
}

Current behaviour (unfixed): skipControlChars advances past 0x00 and 0x01 because both are in ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE; the request parses normally, isFailure() is false → test fails.

Expected behaviour after fix: only CRLF empty lines are tolerated; non-CRLF control bytes produce an error, isFailure() is true → test passes.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
io.netty:netty-codec-http
>= 4.2.0.Final, < 4.2.15.Final
4.2.15.Final
io.netty:netty-codec-http
< 4.1.135.Final
4.1.135.Final

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

io.netty:netty-codec-http Maven → 4.2.15.Final

maven
<dependency><groupId>io.netty</groupId><artifactId>netty-codec-http</artifactId><version>4.2.15.Final</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("io.netty:netty-codec-http:4.2.15.Final")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')

The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Use a web server that employs a strict HTTP parsing procedure, such as Apache [REF-433].
  • Implementation: Use only SSL communication.
  • Implementation: Terminate the client session after each request.
  • System Configuration: Turn all pages to non-cacheable.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-8c42-7qj2-3j46
Netty Vulnerable to Cache Poisoning and Information Disclosure via CORS Vary Header Overwrite
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-gcjf-9mgh-3p7g
Netty: CRLF Injection via Multipart Filename in Netty HttpPostRequestEncoder
Medium Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-q4f6-jm68-57ww
Netty: [HttpContentEncoder] Unbounded Per-Connection Queue Growth via HTTP/1.1 Pipelining Leads to Denial of Service
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-4mp9-239f-g9hg
Netty: WebSockets V07/V08 handshaker missing Connection/Upgrade validation
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-6cqp-g7gg-8hr5
Netty: Security Control Bypass via CORS Short-Circuit Failure
Medium Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-jppx-w49h-x2qq
Netty: [SpdyHttpDecoder] ByteBuf Reference Leak on RST_STREAM Leads to Native Memory Exhaustion
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-mvh2-crg5-v77c
Netty SPDY zlib header block continues decoded expansion after maxHeaderSize truncation
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w
Netty SPDY SETTINGS frame count materializes unbounded settings map
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor