GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c CVE-2026-50020
Netty: HttpObjectDecoder skips arbitrary initial control characters when only initial CRLF characters are permitted
- Severity
- 5.3 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.23%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 14.17% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-444 Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
- Fix
4.2.15.Final- Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-http to this version or later
Description
Summary
Before reading the first request-line, HttpObjectDecoder skips every byte for which
Character.isISOControl(b) is true (0x00–0x1F and 0x7F) as well as all whitespace.
RFC 9112 §2.2 only asks servers to ignore empty CRLF lines preceding the request-line —
a carefully scoped robustness allowance intended to handle HTTP/1.0 POST workarounds.
Silently absorbing NUL bytes, SOH, STX, and other non-CRLF control characters goes
significantly beyond this, and can be exploited for request-boundary confusion in pipelined
or multiplexed transports where a front-end component treats those bytes differently.
Affected Code
| File | Lines | Role |
|---|---|---|
codec-http/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http/HttpObjectDecoder.java |
1298–1313 | ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE static initialiser — marks all ISO control chars |
codec-http/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http/HttpObjectDecoder.java |
1307–1313 | SKIP_CONTROL_CHARS_BYTES ByteProcessor — skips the entire set |
codec-http/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http/HttpObjectDecoder.java |
1275–1289 | LineParser.skipControlChars — advances readerIndex past all matching bytes |
Specification Analysis
RFC 9112 §2.2 — Message Parsing
In the interest of robustness, a server that is expecting to receive and parse a request-line SHOULD ignore at least one empty line (CRLF) received prior to the request-line.
An HTTP/1.1 user agent MUST NOT preface or follow a request with an extra CRLF.
Deviation
The RFC names a single permitted exception: an empty line (bare CRLF, i.e. the two-byte
sequence \r\n). The ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE table is initialised as:
for (byte b = Byte.MIN_VALUE; b < Byte.MAX_VALUE; b++) {
ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE[128 + b] =
Character.isISOControl(b) || isWhitespace(b);
}
Character.isISOControl returns true for 0x00–0x1F and 0x7F. This includes NUL
(0x00), SOH (0x01), STX (0x02), BEL (0x07), DEL (0x7F), and every other non-CRLF
control character. The SKIP_CONTROL_CHARS state runs this scan unconditionally before the
first READ_INITIAL, meaning any sequence of such bytes prepended to a request is silently
consumed.
A load balancer or TLS terminator that does not perform the same scan sees a different message boundary than Netty does, which is the basis of a request-desync / smuggling attack.
Suggested Unit Test
Add to HttpRequestDecoderTest.java.
@Test
public void testNonCrlfControlBytesPrecedingRequestLineAreRejected() {
// RFC 9112 §2.2: servers SHOULD ignore "at least one empty line (CRLF)" before the
// request-line. Non-CRLF control bytes are not part of this robustness allowance
// and must not be silently swallowed.
EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new HttpRequestDecoder());
ByteBuf buf = Unpooled.buffer();
buf.writeByte(0x00); // NUL — not an empty CRLF line
buf.writeByte(0x01); // SOH — not an empty CRLF line
buf.writeCharSequence(
"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: example.com\r\n\r\n",
CharsetUtil.US_ASCII);
channel.writeInbound(buf);
HttpRequest req = channel.readInbound();
// Current behaviour: NUL and SOH are in ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE, so they are
// silently skipped; the request decodes successfully and isFailure() == false.
//
// RFC-correct behaviour: only empty CRLF lines should be ignored; NUL/SOH must
// cause a parse error — isFailure() == true.
assertTrue(
req.decoderResult().isFailure(),
"Non-CRLF control bytes before the request-line must not be silently skipped " +
"(RFC 9112 §2.2 allows only empty CRLF lines)");
assertFalse(channel.finish());
}
Current behaviour (unfixed): skipControlChars advances past 0x00 and 0x01 because
both are in ISO_CONTROL_OR_WHITESPACE; the request parses normally, isFailure() is
false → test fails.
Expected behaviour after fix: only CRLF empty lines are tolerated; non-CRLF control
bytes produce an error, isFailure() is true → test passes.
Affected versions
Maven
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| io.netty:netty-codec-http | >= 4.2.0.Final, < 4.2.15.Final |
4.2.15.Final |
| io.netty:netty-codec-http | < 4.1.135.Final |
4.1.135.Final |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
io.netty:netty-codec-http Maven → 4.2.15.Final
- maven
<dependency><groupId>io.netty</groupId><artifactId>netty-codec-http</artifactId><version>4.2.15.Final</version></dependency>- gradle
implementation("io.netty:netty-codec-http:4.2.15.Final")
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 5.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-444: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')
The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: Use a web server that employs a strict HTTP parsing procedure, such as Apache [REF-433].
- Implementation: Use only SSL communication.
- Implementation: Terminate the client session after each request.
- System Configuration: Turn all pages to non-cacheable.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-8c42-7qj2-3j46 Netty Vulnerable to Cache Poisoning and Information Disclosure via CORS Vary Header Overwrite | High | Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http |
| GHSA-gcjf-9mgh-3p7g Netty: CRLF Injection via Multipart Filename in Netty HttpPostRequestEncoder | Medium | Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http |
| GHSA-q4f6-jm68-57ww Netty: [HttpContentEncoder] Unbounded Per-Connection Queue Growth via HTTP/1.1 Pipelining Leads to Denial of Service | High | Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http |
| GHSA-4mp9-239f-g9hg Netty: WebSockets V07/V08 handshaker missing Connection/Upgrade validation | High | Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http |
| GHSA-6cqp-g7gg-8hr5 Netty: Security Control Bypass via CORS Short-Circuit Failure | Medium | Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http |
| GHSA-jppx-w49h-x2qq Netty: [SpdyHttpDecoder] ByteBuf Reference Leak on RST_STREAM Leads to Native Memory Exhaustion | High | Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http |
| GHSA-mvh2-crg5-v77c Netty SPDY zlib header block continues decoded expansion after maxHeaderSize truncation | High | Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http |
| GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w Netty SPDY SETTINGS frame count materializes unbounded settings map | High | Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http |
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