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GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w CVE-2026-55831

Netty SPDY SETTINGS frame count materializes unbounded settings map

High Maven
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.66%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 51.81% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Fix
4.2.16.Final
Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-http to this version or later

Description

Summary

Netty's SPDY SETTINGS decoder accepts a peer-declared SETTINGS entry count up to the 24-bit frame-length limit and materializes every unique setting ID in DefaultSpdySettingsFrame without an implementation-level count cap. A remote SPDY/3.1 peer can send one syntactically valid roughly 2 MiB SETTINGS frame that creates 262144 map entries, amplifying network input into heap growth and ordered-map insertion work.

Details

Inbound SPDY bytes enter SpdyFrameCodec.decode() and are passed directly to the frame decoder. The decoder reads the peer-controlled flags and 24-bit frame length from the common header, then accepts SETTINGS frames with only length >= 4. For SETTINGS payloads, it reads the peer-controlled numSettings field and validates only that the remaining payload is divisible into 8-byte entries and exactly matches that count. Each accepted entry then supplies an attacker-controlled 24-bit ID and value, and the normal delegate path forwards it into spdySettingsFrame.setValue(). The sink is DefaultSpdySettingsFrame: it backs settings with a TreeMap, checks only that IDs fit the SPDY 24-bit maximum, and inserts a new Setting for each previously unseen ID. There is no count budget between the wire-format count validation and the TreeMap insertion site.

PoC

poc.zip

run with

bash ./poc/run.sh

expected output:

NETTY_SPDY_SETTINGS_COUNT_MAP_TRIGGERED settings_count=262144 wire_bytes=2097164 approx_heap_delta=17692272 first_value=1 last_value=262144

The NETTY_SPDY_SETTINGS_COUNT_MAP_TRIGGERED line means the harness decoded the crafted SETTINGS frame and observed all 262144 peer-selected IDs in the resulting settings map. The wire_bytes=2097164, first_value=1, and last_value=262144 fields distinguish this from a setup failure: they show the exact oversized frame was accepted and fully materialized.

Impact

remote unauthenticated network peer that can speak SPDY/3.1 to a Netty pipeline containing SpdyFrameCodec can trigger resource-exhaustion denial of service. The required guards are satisfied by a complete valid SETTINGS frame using the expected SPDY version, a length of 4 + numSettings * 8, and IDs within the accepted 24-bit range; the verified PoC uses numSettings=262144 and wire_bytes=2097164. On that input, Netty materializes 262144 attacker-controlled entries in a TreeMap-backed DefaultSpdySettingsFrame, with local runs observing about 17-18 MiB of heap growth per decoded frame plus CPU work for ordered-map insertion.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
io.netty:netty-codec-http
>= 4.2.0.Final, < 4.2.16.Final
4.2.16.Final
io.netty:netty-codec-http
>= 4.1.0.Final, < 4.1.136.Final
4.1.136.Final

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

io.netty:netty-codec-http Maven → 4.2.16.Final

maven
<dependency><groupId>io.netty</groupId><artifactId>netty-codec-http</artifactId><version>4.2.16.Final</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("io.netty:netty-codec-http:4.2.16.Final")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-8c42-7qj2-3j46
Netty Vulnerable to Cache Poisoning and Information Disclosure via CORS Vary Header Overwrite
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-gcjf-9mgh-3p7g
Netty: CRLF Injection via Multipart Filename in Netty HttpPostRequestEncoder
Medium Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-q4f6-jm68-57ww
Netty: [HttpContentEncoder] Unbounded Per-Connection Queue Growth via HTTP/1.1 Pipelining Leads to Denial of Service
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-4mp9-239f-g9hg
Netty: WebSockets V07/V08 handshaker missing Connection/Upgrade validation
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-6cqp-g7gg-8hr5
Netty: Security Control Bypass via CORS Short-Circuit Failure
Medium Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-jppx-w49h-x2qq
Netty: [SpdyHttpDecoder] ByteBuf Reference Leak on RST_STREAM Leads to Native Memory Exhaustion
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-mvh2-crg5-v77c
Netty SPDY zlib header block continues decoded expansion after maxHeaderSize truncation
High Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
GHSA-hvcg-qmg6-jm4c
Netty: HttpObjectDecoder skips arbitrary initial control characters when only initial CRLF characters are permitted
Medium Also affects io.netty:netty-codec-http
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