GHSA-hcrc-79hj-m3qh CVE-2025-24016 GO-2025-3459
Wazuh server vulnerable to remote code execution
- Severity
- 9.9 / 10
- Critical · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 93.84%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 99.84% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- Yes
- In CISA's catalog since Jun 10, 2025
- Weakness
- CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
- Fix
4.9.1- Upgrade github.com/wazuh/wazuh to this version or later
Description
Summary
An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows for remote code execution on Wazuh servers.
The vulnerability can be triggered by anybody with API access (compromised dashboard or Wazuh servers in the cluster) or, in certain configurations, even by a compromised agent.
Details
DistributedAPI parameters are a serialized as JSON and deserialized using as_wazuh_object (in framework/wazuh/core/cluster/common.py). If an attacker manages to inject an unsanitized dictionary in DAPI request/response, they can forge an unhandled exception (__unhandled_exc__) to evaluate arbitrary python code.
Using the server API, it quite easy to trigger. For example, using the run_as endpoint (implemented by run_as_login in api/api/controllers/security_controller.py): the auth_context argument is completely controlled by the attacker, and is forwarded to the master server to handle. By sending a malicious run_as request to a worker server, it is possible to execute code on the master server.
It is also possible to exploit the bug as a compromised agent, in certain configurations.
A compromised agent can respond to a getconfig request with a malicious JSON object (containing a serialized unhandled exception). If the getconfig request was caused because of a server API request to /agents/{agent_id}/config/{component}/{configuration} (api.controllers.agent_controller.get_agent_config), and the agent is managed by a server other than the one that received the server API request, the unsafe deserialization will occur on the server that received the original server API request.
user server A server B agent
| | | |
| -get-config-> | | |
| | --get-config-dapi-> | |
| | | --getconf-> |
| | | <-payload-- |
| X <-----payload------ | |
| | | |
It is likely that there are more ways to reach the unsafe deserialization function (as_wazuh_object), some of them might even be accessible from different contexts (without credentials, or initiated by a compromised agent). I suggest fixing the root cause instead of attempting to sanitize inputs that reach it. Note that there are multiple other ways to execute arbitrary code in as_wazuh_object, easier by using a __callable__, or potentially abusing callable gadgets in exception, wresults or Wazuh.
PoC
To trigger using the server API (assuming default credentials):
curl -X POST -k -u "wazuh-wui:MyS3cr37P450r.*-" -H "Content-Type: application/json" --data '{"__unhandled_exc__":{"__class__": "exit", "__args__": []}}' https://<worker-server>:55000/security/user/authenticate/run_as
this will shut down the master server.
Impact
This is a remote code execution on Wazuh server, affecting the latest version (v4.9.0 at this time)
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/wazuh/wazuh | >= 4.4.0, < 4.9.1 |
4.9.1 |
| github.com/wazuh/wazuh | >= 4.4.0, < 4.9.1 |
4.9.1 |
| github.com/wazuh/wazuh | >= 4.4.0+incompatible, < 4.9.1+incompatible |
4.9.1+incompatible |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/wazuh/wazuh Go → 4.9.1
- go
go get github.com/wazuh/wazuh@v4.9.1 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 9.9
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:H/E:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
- Exploit maturity
- H
Weakness
CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
- Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
- Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
- Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
- Remediation due for U.S. federal agencies
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-110879 jackson-databind validates the outer class of a class-name type ID but accepts attacker-selected classes inside its generic arguments, even when those classes… | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-6757-hggm-hp2w vLLM: Public multimodal SHM handle forgery reaches worker-side `pickle.loads()` with insecure serialization disabled | High | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-673q-mjm6-r5xr Next.js: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in `use cache` functions returning typed arrays | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-c27m-942f-rcfh Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-87697 - .NET and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | High | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-4w5f-7jp2-w48g Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-83520 - .NET and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | High | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-4j9v-h7pp-725h Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-70035 - .NET and Visual Studio Remote Code Execution Vulnerability | High | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-gqvg-gmmx-x4hm MLFLOW_ALLOW_PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION=False safety control bypassed by mlflow.statsmodels flavor — RCE via crafted model artifact | High | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
| GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j jackson-databind: Comparable missing from DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator's unsafe base types (incomplete PolymorphicTypeValidator denylist) | Medium | Same weakness, CWE-502 |
Credits: DanielFi, GGP1
MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.
Check your repos with MergeHarbor