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GHSA-h8mm-c463-wjq3 CVE-2026-33489 GO-2026-5417

CoreDNS' transfer stanza selection uses lexicographic compare (subzone ACL bypass)

High Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.40%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 34.68% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-862 Missing Authorization
CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Fix
1.14.3
Upgrade github.com/coredns/coredns to this version or later

Description

Summary

CoreDNS' transfer plugin can select the wrong ACL stanza when both a parent zone and a more-specific subzone are configured. A permissive parent-zone transfer rule can override a restrictive subzone rule (name-dependent), allowing an unauthorized client to perform AXFR/IXFR for the subzone and retrieve its zone contents.

Details

In plugin/transfer/transfer.go, stanza selection is implemented by longestMatch(), which is documented as "longest zone match wins", but it actually chooses the winner via a lexicographic string comparison:

  • zone := "" // longest zone match wins (plugin/transfer/transfer.go)
  • if z > zone { zone = z; x = xfr } (plugin/transfer/transfer.go)

So, a parent zone like example.org. can beat a child zone like a.example.org. purely due to lexicographic ordering ("example.org." > "a.example.org."), even though the child zone is the longer/more specific suffix match. The bypass is data-dependent (some child labels will win, some will lose), making it operationally non-intuitive.

PoC

  1. Adjust COREDNS_BIN in the PoC to point at right path (see the top-level const definitions for tunables as well)
  2. Run python3 ./acl-repro.py
  3. Expected output: *** Baseline (only subzone transfer rule) *** axfr a.example.org.: rcode=5 ancount=0 (expected REFUSED=5)

*** Candidate (add permissive parent transfer rule) *** axfr a.example.org.: rcode=0 ancount=5 (expected NOERROR=0 with ancount>0)

*** OK *** Subzone transfer ACL bypass reproduced: adding a permissive parent-zone stanza can override a stricter child-zone stanza due to lexicographic zone selection.

Impact

Unauthorized zone transfer can expose full zone contents to a remote network client that was intended to be denied by a subzone-specific transfer policy.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/coredns/coredns
< 1.14.3
1.14.3

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/coredns/coredns Go → 1.14.3

go
go get github.com/coredns/coredns@v1.14.3 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-862: Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-9gm5-9rfh-m6vx
CoreDNS DoH/DoQ/gRPC bypass UPDATE rejection enforced on UDP/TCP
High Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns
GHSA-mrg3-qvqr-jw29
CoreDNS: Unauthenticated memory exhaustion in custom transports
High Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns
GHSA-74w3-63xv-x9mv
CoreDNS `k8s_external` headless AXFR can emit an empty transfer batch that panics the `transfer` plugin
Low Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns
GHSA-vp29-5652-4fw9
CoreDNS has TSIG authentication bypass on gRPC and QUIC transports
Critical Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns
GHSA-qhmp-q7xh-99rh
CoreDNS has TSIG authentication bypass on DoT, DoH, DoH3, DoQ, and gRPC
High Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns
GHSA-63cw-r7xf-jmwr
CoreDNS DoH GET oversized dns= query parameter causes pre-validation CPU and memory amplification
High Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns
GHSA-2wpx-qpw2-g5h5
CoreDNS' DoQ worker pool does not bound stream backlog
High Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns
GHSA-h75p-j8xm-m278
CoreDNS Loop Detection Denial of Service Vulnerability
High Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns
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