GHSA-h75p-j8xm-m278 CVE-2026-26018 GO-2026-4635
CoreDNS Loop Detection Denial of Service Vulnerability
- Severity
- 7.5 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 1.16%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 67.20% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-337 Predictable Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
- Fix
1.14.2- Upgrade github.com/coredns/coredns to this version or later
Description
Executive Summary
A Denial of Service vulnerability exists in CoreDNS's loop detection plugin that allows an attacker to crash the DNS server by sending specially crafted DNS queries. The vulnerability stems from the use of a predictable pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) for generating a secret query name, combined with a fatal error handler that terminates the entire process.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Description
The CoreDNS loop plugin is designed to detect forwarding loops by performing a self-test during server startup. The plugin generates a random query name (qname) using Go's math/rand package and sends an HINFO query to itself. If the server receives multiple matching queries, it assumes a forwarding loop exists and terminates.
The vulnerability arises from two design flaws:
-
Predictable PRNG Seed: The random number generator is seeded with
time.Now().UnixNano(), making the generated qname predictable if an attacker knows the approximate server start time. -
Fatal Error Handler: When the plugin detects what it believes is a loop (3+ matching HINFO queries), it calls
log.Fatalf()which invokesos.Exit(1), immediately terminating the process without cleanup or recovery.
Affected Code
File: plugin/loop/setup.go
// PRNG seeded with predictable timestamp
var r = rand.New(time.Now().UnixNano())
// Qname generation using two consecutive PRNG calls
func qname(zone string) string {
l1 := strconv.Itoa(r.Int())
l2 := strconv.Itoa(r.Int())
return dnsutil.Join(l1, l2, zone)
}
File: plugin/loop/loop.go
func (l *Loop) ServeDNS(ctx context.Context, w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) (int, error) {
// ... validation checks ...
if state.Name() == l.qname {
l.inc() // Increment counter
}
if l.seen() > 2 {
// FATAL: Terminates entire process
log.Fatalf("Loop (%s -> %s) detected for zone %q...", ...)
}
// ...
}
File: plugin/pkg/log/log.go
func Fatalf(format string, v ...any) {
logf(fatal, format, v...)
os.Exit(1) // Immediate process termination
}
Exploitation Window
The loop plugin remains active during the following conditions:
| Condition | Window Duration | Attack Feasibility |
|---|---|---|
| Healthy startup | 2 seconds | Requires precise timing |
| Self-test failure (upstream unreachable) | 30 seconds | HIGH - Extended window |
| Network degradation | Variable | Depends on retry behavior |
Attack Scenario
Primary Attack Vector: Network Degradation
When the upstream DNS server is unreachable (network partition, misconfiguration, outage), the loop plugin's self-test fails repeatedly. During this period:
- The loop plugin remains active for up to 30 seconds
- Each self-test attempt generates an HINFO query visible in CoreDNS logs
- An attacker with log access (shared Kubernetes cluster, centralized logging) can observe the qname
- The attacker sends 3 HINFO queries with the observed qname
- The server immediately crashes
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ ATTACK TIMELINE │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ T+0s CoreDNS starts, PRNG seeded with UnixNano() │
│ T+0.5s Self-test HINFO query sent (visible in logs) │
│ T+2s Self-test fails (upstream timeout) │
│ T+3s Retry #1 - counter resets, qname unchanged │
│ T+5s Retry #2 - attacker observes qname in logs │
│ T+5.1s ATTACKER: Send HINFO #1 → counter = 1 │
│ T+5.2s ATTACKER: Send HINFO #2 → counter = 2 │
│ T+5.3s ATTACKER: Send HINFO #3 → counter = 3 → os.Exit(1) │
│ T+5.3s SERVER CRASHES │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Impact Assessment
Attack Requirements
| Requirement | Notes |
|---|---|
| Network Access | Must be able to send UDP packets to CoreDNS port |
| Log Access | Required to observe the qname (common in shared clusters) |
| Timing | Extended window during network degradation |
| Authentication | None required |
Real-World Impact
CoreDNS is the default DNS server for Kubernetes clusters. A successful attack would:
- Disruption: All DNS resolution fails within the cluster
- Cascading Failures: Services unable to discover each other
- Restart Loop: If attack persists, CoreDNS enters crash-restart cycle
- Data Plane Impact: Application-level failures across the cluster
References
- CoreDNS GitHub: https://github.com/coredns/coredns
- Loop Plugin Documentation: https://coredns.io/plugins/loop/
- Go math/rand Documentation: https://pkg.go.dev/math/rand
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/coredns/coredns | < 1.14.2 |
1.14.2 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/coredns/coredns Go → 1.14.2
- go
go get github.com/coredns/coredns@v1.14.2 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-337: Predictable Seed in Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
A Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) is initialized from a predictable seed, such as the process ID or system time.
How to prevent it
- Use non-predictable inputs for seed generation.
- Architecture and Design, Requirements: Use products or modules that conform to FIPS 140-2 [REF-267] to avoid obvious entropy problems, or use the more recent FIPS 140-3 [REF-1192] if possible.
- Implementation: Use a PRNG that periodically re-seeds itself using input from high-quality sources, such as hardware devices with high entropy. However, do not re-seed too frequently, or else the entropy source might block.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
- github.com/coredns/coredns/security/advisories/GHSA-h75p-j8xm-m278
- github.com/coredns/coredns/releases/tag/v1.14.2
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:25127
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:36873
- access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:8151
- access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-26018
- bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi
- security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-26018.json
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-9gm5-9rfh-m6vx CoreDNS DoH/DoQ/gRPC bypass UPDATE rejection enforced on UDP/TCP | High | Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns |
| GHSA-mrg3-qvqr-jw29 CoreDNS: Unauthenticated memory exhaustion in custom transports | High | Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns |
| GHSA-74w3-63xv-x9mv CoreDNS `k8s_external` headless AXFR can emit an empty transfer batch that panics the `transfer` plugin | Low | Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns |
| GHSA-vp29-5652-4fw9 CoreDNS has TSIG authentication bypass on gRPC and QUIC transports | Critical | Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns |
| GHSA-qhmp-q7xh-99rh CoreDNS has TSIG authentication bypass on DoT, DoH, DoH3, DoQ, and gRPC | High | Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns |
| GHSA-h8mm-c463-wjq3 CoreDNS' transfer stanza selection uses lexicographic compare (subzone ACL bypass) | High | Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns |
| GHSA-63cw-r7xf-jmwr CoreDNS DoH GET oversized dns= query parameter causes pre-validation CPU and memory amplification | High | Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns |
| GHSA-2wpx-qpw2-g5h5 CoreDNS' DoQ worker pool does not bound stream backlog | High | Also affects github.com/coredns/coredns |
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