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GHSA-h6j3-j35f-v2x7 CVE-2024-58381

PocketMine-MP server crash with certain invalid JSON payloads in `LoginPacket` due to dependency vulnerability (3rd time)

High Packagist
Severity
8.7 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.78%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 55.79% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
5.11.1
Upgrade pocketmine/pocketmine-mp to this version or later

Description

Impact

An attacker could crash PocketMine-MP by sending malformed JSON in LoginPacket.

netresearch/jsonmapper allows objects to be hydrated from scalar types in JSON. However, due to the lack of validation in the code for this feature, it may output improperly initialized objects if applied to objects whose constructors don't handle the input values.

Code handling these objects in PocketMine-MP could then crash due to @required properties not being set within the objects.

In addition, because JsonMapper does not respect bStrictObjectTypes when processing arrays, it's not possible to avoid the issue by disabling the feature.

Due to the relatively high number of security issues arising from unexpected behaviour in JsonMapper, the team is exploring options to replace it.

Patches

In the meantime, the issue was fixed by pmmp/netresearch-jsonmapper@b96a209f9e8b76b899a0d0918493cd87eb3c02a7 and 6872661fd03649cc7a8762c41c16e9ee5a4de1c9.

Workarounds

Detecting the malicious data that triggers this issue is of rather high difficulty, so it's not likely that a plugin would be able to easily remediate this.

References

https://github.com/cweiske/jsonmapper/pull/225 https://github.com/cweiske/jsonmapper/issues/226

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
pocketmine/pocketmine-mp
< 5.11.1
5.11.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

pocketmine/pocketmine-mp Packagist → 5.11.1

composer
composer require pocketmine/pocketmine-mp:^5.11.1

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 8.7

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-pg53-p7qp-65cv
PocketMine-MP has potential memory/network vulnerability from repeated ResourcePackClientResponsePacket packets
Low Also affects pocketmine/pocketmine-mp
GHSA-xp4f-g2cm-rhg7
PocketMine-MP has LogDoS by many junk properties in client data JWT in LoginPacket
Medium Also affects pocketmine/pocketmine-mp
GHSA-f9jp-856v-8642
PocketMine-MP: Player entities can still die and drop items in flaggedForDespawn state
Medium Also affects pocketmine/pocketmine-mp
GHSA-7hmv-4j2j-pp6f
PocketMine-MP: Network amplification vulnerability with `ActorEventPacket`
Medium Also affects pocketmine/pocketmine-mp
GHSA-788v-5pfp-93ff
PocketMine-MP: JSON decoding of unlimited size large arrays/objects in ModalFormResponse Handling
Medium Also affects pocketmine/pocketmine-mp
GHSA-h6rj-3m53-887h
PocketMine-MP: LogDoS by large complex unknown property logging in clientData in LoginPacket
High Also affects pocketmine/pocketmine-mp
GHSA-fqqv-56h5-f57g
PocketMine-MP `ResourcePackDataInfoPacket` amplification vulnerability due to lack of resource pack sequence status checking
Medium Also affects pocketmine/pocketmine-mp
GHSA-g274-c6jj-h78p
PocketMine-MP allows malicious client data to waste server resources due to lack of limits for explode()
Medium Also affects pocketmine/pocketmine-mp
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