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GHSA-gwfq-86j8-7qhv BIT-rclone-2026-79777 CVE-2026-79777 GO-2026-6181

rclone: Verbose Stack Trace Disclosure in RC API Error Responses

Medium Go
Severity
5.1 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.30%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 22.65% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-209 Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
Fix
1.75.0
Upgrade github.com/rclone/rclone to this version or later

Description

Summary

When an RC API call triggers a panic (recovered by the job runner), the full Go stack trace is included in the JSON error response. This leaks internal file paths, Go module versions, goroutine state, and memory addresses to the API caller.

Details

The panic recovery in fs/rc/jobs/job.go:110-115:

func (j *Job) run(ctx context.Context, fn rc.Func, in rc.Params) {
    defer func() {
        if r := recover(); r != nil {
            j.mu.Lock()
            j.EndTime = time.Now()
            j.Error = fmt.Sprintf("panic received: %v \n%s", r, string(debug.Stack()))
            // ...
        }
    }()

The full debug.Stack() output is placed into j.Error, which is then returned in the HTTP response JSON.

PoC

Trigger a parse error by setting config path to a non-INI file, then calling dump:

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:5572/config/setpath \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"path":"/etc/hostname"}' 

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:5572/config/dump

Response includes:

{
  "error": "panic received: fatal error: Failed to load config file \"/etc/hostname\": could not parse line: ... \ngoroutine 9 [running]:\nruntime/debug.Stack()\n\truntime/debug/stack.go:26 +0x64\ngithub.com/rclone/rclone/fs/rc/jobs.(*Job).run.func1()\n\tgithub.com/rclone/rclone/fs/rc/jobs/job.go:112 +0x34\n...",
  "status": 500
}

Disclosed information includes:

  • Full filesystem paths (github.com/rclone/rclone/fs/config/config.go:377)
  • Go module versions (github.com/go-chi/chi/v5@v5.2.5)
  • Go runtime version (from binary)
  • Goroutine IDs and states
  • Memory addresses (ASLR leak)
  • File contents (first unparseable line of the target file)

Tested and confirmed on rclone v1.74.4.

Impact

Information disclosure that aids exploitation of other vulnerabilities. Stack traces reveal internal architecture, dependency versions (useful for known-CVE targeting), and memory layout. The error message also leaks partial file contents (the first line that fails INI parsing), which can be used alongside the arbitrary file read finding as a complementary file read primitive for non-INI files.

Affected Versions

All versions with RC API support through at least v1.74.4.

Remediation

Return a generic error message to the API caller. Log the full stack trace server-side only. Strip debug.Stack() from HTTP responses.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/rclone/rclone
< 1.75.0
1.75.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/rclone/rclone Go → 1.75.0

go
go get github.com/rclone/rclone@v1.75.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 5.1

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 2.7

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-209: Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information

The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • Implementation: Handle exceptions internally and do not display errors containing potentially sensitive information to a user.
  • Implementation: Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as much as possible.
  • Implementation, Build and Compilation: Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.
  • Implementation, Build and Compilation: Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.
  • System Configuration: Where available, configure the environment to use less verbose error messages. For example, in PHP, disable the display_errors setting during configuration, or at runtime using the error_reporting() function.
  • System Configuration: Create default error pages or messages that do not leak any information.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-38xv-hf3p-h7mq
rclone: source object names can escape the configured root on upload
Medium Also affects github.com/rclone/rclone
GHSA-2p48-j3qc-rx9f
rclone: S3 multipart declared-length memory exhaustion
High Also affects github.com/rclone/rclone
GHSA-p569-5gjg-9cmj
rclone: RC per-server auth-proxy bypass
Critical Also affects github.com/rclone/rclone
GHSA-xwwr-4h3p-r22c
rclone serve s3: --auth-proxy without --auth-key authenticates nobody - full SigV4 signature bypass
Critical Also affects github.com/rclone/rclone
GHSA-c476-6w5q-jw77
rclone: FTP cross-session auth-proxy backend confusion
High Also affects github.com/rclone/rclone
GHSA-f8g7-2xjc-7mfh
rclone: Directory metadata (chmod/chown/chtimes) applied through a planted symlink in rclone local --links escapes the destination
High Also affects github.com/rclone/rclone
GHSA-p6m2-r3w9-mpxw
rclone local: crafted Range request against a translated symlink panics (DoS)
Medium Also affects github.com/rclone/rclone
GHSA-66hp-wgxq-6f5q
rclone archive/zip: Zip Slip via unsanitized zip entry names lets a malicious archive escape its own namespace
Medium Also affects github.com/rclone/rclone

Credits: Kai Aizen (GitHub: SnailSploit)

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