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GHSA-gw59-x2xr-wwvr

Duplicate Advisory: SurrealDB: ES512 silently downgraded to ES384 due to jsonwebtoken crate limitation

Medium Withdrawn Sep 4, 2026 crates.io
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
—
No score published
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-327 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-fwg2-gr34-q3w8. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

SurrealDB before 3.1.0 silently substitutes the ES384 algorithm when a JWT access method is configured with ALGORITHM ES512 (DEFINE ACCESS ... TYPE JWT ALGORITHM ES512), because the underlying jsonwebtoken crate (v10.x) has no ES512 variant and the mapping defaults to ES384 without any error, warning, or log message. Users who supply the correct P-521 key for ES512 experience authentication handshake failures due to the curve mismatch with ES384 (which expects P-384), and tokens are rejected by external systems expecting genuine ES512 signatures. The flaw cannot be used to forge tokens or compromise data confidentiality or integrity, as ES384 remains cryptographically strong.

Affected versions

crates.io

PackageVulnerableFixed in
surrealdb
all versions
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
Low
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 4.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm

The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis. For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192]. Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak. Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.
  • Architecture and Design: Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.
  • Implementation, Architecture and Design: When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Withdrawn
  3. Last updated by the source
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-8rw6-p7m8-63jp
SurrealDB: Array element-level (field.*) SELECT permissions leak denied elements to record users
High Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-848m-r628-vrxw
SurrealDB: Custom API route lets authenticated callers override namespace/database scope via URL path
High Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-m3c3-78fh-w3w7
SurrealDB allows bypass of deny-net flags via DNS resolution
High Also affects SurrealDB
GHSA-whwg-vh4f-pmmf
SurrealDB: Edge PERMISSIONS FOR delete bypassed when a connected node is deleted
Medium Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-fwg2-gr34-q3w8
SurrealDB: ES512 silently downgraded to ES384 due to jsonwebtoken crate limitation
Medium Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp
SurrealDB: Field-level SELECT permissions bypassed via indexed COUNT fast paths
Medium Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-wp87-mgvq-5j93
SurrealDB: USE NS/DB implicit creation bypasses DEFINE authorization
Medium Also affects surrealdb
GHSA-97vg-427p-8hx5
SurrealDB: Port-specific --deny-net rules silently bypassed on HTTP redirect
Medium Also affects surrealdb
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