GHSA-8rw6-p7m8-63jp CVE-2026-63740
SurrealDB: Array element-level (field.*) SELECT permissions leak denied elements to record users
- Severity
- 7.1 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.36%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 29.54% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
- Fix
3.1.4- Upgrade surrealdb to this version or later
Description
A SELECT permission defined on an array element (DEFINE FIELD field.* … PERMISSIONS FOR select …) is not enforced correctly for RECORD users. Instead of hiding the denied elements, the query leaks a subset of them: a deny-all returns the odd-indexed elements, and a per-element predicate keeps and drops the wrong ones.
The filter removed each denied element by index while walking the array forwards. Because removing an element shifts every later index down, each cut invalidated the indices still pending in the loop, leaving denied elements behind. Field-level permissions are enforced correctly; only the element (field.*) level is affected, and only for record users — root and record-owner sessions are not.
Impact
What an attacker can do:
- As a record (scope) user, read array elements that an element-level (
field.*) SELECT permission should hide, on any table they can already SELECT. - Recover denied elements through both a deny-all and a
WHEREpredicate — the wrong elements are selected either way.
What it can't do:
- Bypass field-level SELECT permissions, which are evaluated correctly.
- Affect root or record-owner sessions, or cross namespace/database isolation.
- Modify data, escalate privileges, or affect availability (confidentiality only).
Patches
The three permission-filtering paths (doc/reduce.rs, doc/output.rs, exec/operators/scan/pipeline.rs) now remove denied elements in reverse index order, so removing one element no longer shifts the elements still to be checked. Regression tests reproducing the issue were added.
The fix is included in SurrealDB 3.1.4.
Workarounds
- Do not rely on element-level (
field.*) permissions to hide data from record users; use field-level permissions, which are enforced correctly. - Restrict record users from selecting tables whose schema uses element-level permissions.
Resources
- DEFINE FIELD
- USERS
- DEFINE TABLE … PERMISSIONS
fix(sec): stop array element-level SELECT permissions leaking elements(commit8f89b260b)
Affected versions
crates.io
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| surrealdb | < 3.1.4 |
3.1.4 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
surrealdb crates.io → 3.1.4
- cargo
cargo update -p surrealdb --precise 3.1.4
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 7.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Not defined
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 6.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-848m-r628-vrxw SurrealDB: Custom API route lets authenticated callers override namespace/database scope via URL path | High | Also affects surrealdb |
| GHSA-m3c3-78fh-w3w7 SurrealDB allows bypass of deny-net flags via DNS resolution | High | Also affects SurrealDB |
| GHSA-whwg-vh4f-pmmf SurrealDB: Edge PERMISSIONS FOR delete bypassed when a connected node is deleted | Medium | Also affects surrealdb |
| GHSA-fwg2-gr34-q3w8 SurrealDB: ES512 silently downgraded to ES384 due to jsonwebtoken crate limitation | Medium | Also affects surrealdb |
| GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp SurrealDB: Field-level SELECT permissions bypassed via indexed COUNT fast paths | Medium | Also affects surrealdb |
| GHSA-wp87-mgvq-5j93 SurrealDB: USE NS/DB implicit creation bypasses DEFINE authorization | Medium | Also affects surrealdb |
| GHSA-97vg-427p-8hx5 SurrealDB: Port-specific --deny-net rules silently bypassed on HTTP redirect | Medium | Also affects surrealdb |
| GHSA-6wqw-vhfr-9999 SurrealDB: Authenticated subscribers can read records hidden by SELECT permissions via LIVE subscriptions | Medium | Also affects surrealdb |
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