GHSA-gcp9-5jc8-976x CVE-2026-34973
phpMyFAQ has a LIKE Wildcard Injection in Search.php — Unescaped % and _ Metacharacters Enable Broad Content Disclosure
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.35%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 28.56% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-943 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic
- Fix
4.1.1- Upgrade thorsten/phpmyfaq to this version or later
Description
Summary
The searchCustomPages() method in phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Search.php uses real_escape_string() (via escape()) to sanitize the search term before embedding it in LIKE clauses. However, real_escape_string() does not escape SQL LIKE metacharacters % (match any sequence) and _ (match any single character). An unauthenticated attacker can inject these wildcards into search queries, causing them to match unintended records — including content that was not meant to be surfaced — resulting in information disclosure.
Details
File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Search.php, lines 226–240
Vulnerable code:
$escapedSearchTerm = $this->configuration->getDb()->escape($searchTerm);
$searchWords = explode(' ', $escapedSearchTerm);
$searchConditions = [];
foreach ($searchWords as $word) {
if (strlen($word) <= 2) {
continue;
}
$searchConditions[] = sprintf(
"(page_title LIKE '%%%s%%' OR content LIKE '%%%s%%')",
$word,
$word
);
}
escape() calls mysqli::real_escape_string(), which escapes characters like ', \, NULL, etc. — but explicitly does not escape % or _, as these are not SQL string delimiters. They are, however, LIKE pattern wildcards.
Attack vector:
A user submits a search term containing _ or % as part of a 3+ character word (to bypass the strlen <= 2 filter). Examples:
- Search for
a_b→ LIKE becomes'%a_b%'→_matches any single character, e.g. matches"aXb","a1b","azb"— broader than the literal stringa_b - Search for
te%t→ LIKE becomes'%te%t%'→ matchestest,text,te12t, etc. - Search for
_%_→ LIKE becomes'%_%_%'→ matches any record with at least one character, effectively dumping all custom pages
This allows an attacker to retrieve custom page content that would not appear in normal exact searches, bypassing intended search scope restrictions.
PoC
- Navigate to the phpMyFAQ search page (accessible to unauthenticated users by default).
- Submit a search query:
_%_(underscore, percent, underscore — length 3, bypasses the<= 2filter). - The backend executes:
WHERE (page_title LIKE '%_%_%' OR content LIKE '%_%_%') - This matches all custom pages with at least one character in title or content — returning content that would not appear for a specific search term.
Impact
- Authentication required: None — search is publicly accessible
- Affected component:
searchCustomPages()inSearch.php; custom pages (faqcustompages table) - Impact: Unauthenticated users can enumerate/disclose all custom page content regardless of the intended search term filter
- Fix: Escape
%and_in LIKE search terms before interpolation:
Or use parameterized queries with properly escaped LIKE values.$word = str_replace(['\\', '%', '_'], ['\\\\', '\\%', '\\_'], $word);
Affected versions
Packagist
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| thorsten/phpmyfaq | < 4.1.1 |
4.1.1 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
thorsten/phpmyfaq Packagist → 4.1.1
- composer
composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.1.1
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
CVSS 3.1 5.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-943: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic
The product generates a query intended to access or manipulate data in a data store such as a database, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that can modify the intended logic of the query.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rw77-vq4g-x3hp phpMyFAQ has SQL Injection in `StopWords::add()` — Unescaped Stop Word Insertion | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5 phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-pgwp-vc7q-cvj3 phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in Admin FAQ Editor via HTML Entity Bypass in Frontend FAQ Submission | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-6pvm-2vjj-rx4w phpMyFAQ: SQL LIKE Wildcard Injection in Chat User Search Allows Authenticated User Enumeration | Medium | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-mf8r-wm2w-f8c5 phpMyFAQ public FAQ APIs expose inactive FAQ content | Medium | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-88g4-74f3-63x9 phpMyFAQ has Potential Authenticated Path Traversal in PDF Export | Medium | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-pg62-f8g4-4wqh phpMyFAQ privilege escalation: GroupController::updatePermissions lets a GROUP_EDIT admin grant rights they do not hold | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
| GHSA-985r-q3qp-299h phpMyFAQ has an incomplete fix for GHSA-xvp4-phqj-cjr3 — editUser() and updateUserRights() lack authorization guards | High | Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq |
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