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GHSA-gcp9-5jc8-976x CVE-2026-34973

phpMyFAQ has a LIKE Wildcard Injection in Search.php — Unescaped % and _ Metacharacters Enable Broad Content Disclosure

Medium Packagist
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.35%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 28.56% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-943 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic
Fix
4.1.1
Upgrade thorsten/phpmyfaq to this version or later

Description

Summary

The searchCustomPages() method in phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Search.php uses real_escape_string() (via escape()) to sanitize the search term before embedding it in LIKE clauses. However, real_escape_string() does not escape SQL LIKE metacharacters % (match any sequence) and _ (match any single character). An unauthenticated attacker can inject these wildcards into search queries, causing them to match unintended records — including content that was not meant to be surfaced — resulting in information disclosure.

Details

File: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Search.php, lines 226–240

Vulnerable code:

$escapedSearchTerm = $this->configuration->getDb()->escape($searchTerm);
$searchWords = explode(' ', $escapedSearchTerm);
$searchConditions = [];

foreach ($searchWords as $word) {
    if (strlen($word) <= 2) {
        continue;
    }
    $searchConditions[] = sprintf(
        "(page_title LIKE '%%%s%%' OR content LIKE '%%%s%%')",
        $word,
        $word
    );
}

escape() calls mysqli::real_escape_string(), which escapes characters like ', \, NULL, etc. — but explicitly does not escape % or _, as these are not SQL string delimiters. They are, however, LIKE pattern wildcards.

Attack vector:

A user submits a search term containing _ or % as part of a 3+ character word (to bypass the strlen <= 2 filter). Examples:

  • Search for a_b → LIKE becomes '%a_b%' → _ matches any single character, e.g. matches "aXb", "a1b", "azb" — broader than the literal string a_b
  • Search for te%t → LIKE becomes '%te%t%' → matches test, text, te12t, etc.
  • Search for _%_ → LIKE becomes '%_%_%' → matches any record with at least one character, effectively dumping all custom pages

This allows an attacker to retrieve custom page content that would not appear in normal exact searches, bypassing intended search scope restrictions.

PoC

  1. Navigate to the phpMyFAQ search page (accessible to unauthenticated users by default).
  2. Submit a search query: _%_ (underscore, percent, underscore — length 3, bypasses the <= 2 filter).
  3. The backend executes: WHERE (page_title LIKE '%_%_%' OR content LIKE '%_%_%')
  4. This matches all custom pages with at least one character in title or content — returning content that would not appear for a specific search term.

Impact

  • Authentication required: None — search is publicly accessible
  • Affected component: searchCustomPages() in Search.php; custom pages (faqcustompages table)
  • Impact: Unauthenticated users can enumerate/disclose all custom page content regardless of the intended search term filter
  • Fix: Escape % and _ in LIKE search terms before interpolation:
    $word = str_replace(['\\', '%', '_'], ['\\\\', '\\%', '\\_'], $word);
    
    Or use parameterized queries with properly escaped LIKE values.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
thorsten/phpmyfaq
< 4.1.1
4.1.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

thorsten/phpmyfaq Packagist → 4.1.1

composer
composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.1.1

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
Low
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 5.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-943: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic

The product generates a query intended to access or manipulate data in a data store such as a database, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that can modify the intended logic of the query.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-rw77-vq4g-x3hp
phpMyFAQ has SQL Injection in `StopWords::add()` — Unescaped Stop Word Insertion
High Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5
phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor
High Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
GHSA-pgwp-vc7q-cvj3
phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in Admin FAQ Editor via HTML Entity Bypass in Frontend FAQ Submission
High Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
GHSA-6pvm-2vjj-rx4w
phpMyFAQ: SQL LIKE Wildcard Injection in Chat User Search Allows Authenticated User Enumeration
Medium Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
GHSA-mf8r-wm2w-f8c5
phpMyFAQ public FAQ APIs expose inactive FAQ content
Medium Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
GHSA-88g4-74f3-63x9
phpMyFAQ has Potential Authenticated Path Traversal in PDF Export
Medium Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
GHSA-pg62-f8g4-4wqh
phpMyFAQ privilege escalation: GroupController::updatePermissions lets a GROUP_EDIT admin grant rights they do not hold
High Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
GHSA-985r-q3qp-299h
phpMyFAQ has an incomplete fix for GHSA-xvp4-phqj-cjr3 — editUser() and updateUserRights() lack authorization guards
High Also affects thorsten/phpmyfaq
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