GHSA-gc3j-79f2-7vvw CVE-2026-49822 GO-2026-5854

Fission: Cross-namespace event leakage via KubernetesWatchTrigger allows persistent tenant surveillance

High Go

Severity: 7.7 / 10; High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.23%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 13.99% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-284 Improper Access Control; CWE-862 Missing Authorization
Fix: 1.24.0; Upgrade github.com/fission/fission to this version or later

Description

Summary

A low-privilege developer who could create a KubernetesWatchTrigger (KWT) in their own namespace was able to establish a persistent surveillance channel over any other namespace.

Details

Two independent flaws compounded:

pkg/kubewatcher/kubewatcher.go::createKubernetesWatch used w.Spec.Namespace (user-controlled) directly as the Watch target without checking it against w.Namespace (the KWT's own namespace). kubewatcher established the Watch using its cluster-scoped service account and serialized every Pod/Service/Job change event as full JSON over HTTP POST to the attacker's function.
The validating webhook (pkg/webhook/kuberneteswatchtrigger.go) registered verbs=create only, so update/patch requests bypassed validation entirely.

A separate leak: an empty spec.namespace resolved to all namespaces via the controller's default, letting an attacker omit the field to surveil the entire cluster.

Impact

A tenant with kuberneteswatchtriggers.fission.io/create could continuously receive full event payloads for Pods, Services, and Jobs in any namespace — a persistent cross-tenant surveillance channel requiring no additional privileges.

Fix

Fixed in #3379 and released in v1.24.0.

The validating webhook marker is extended to verbs=create;update.
Validate rejects KubernetesWatchTrigger.spec.namespace != metadata.namespace.
A controller guard in createKubernetesWatch rejects cross-namespace targets that bypass admission and coerces an empty Spec.Namespace to the trigger's own namespace.

Behavioural change

KubernetesWatchTriggers with an unset spec.namespace now watch only their own namespace instead of all namespaces. Anyone relying on the previous all-namespaces behaviour must create a separate KWT per namespace.

Affected versions

Go

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
github.com/fission/fission	`< 1.24.0`	`1.24.0`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/fission/fission Go → `1.24.0`

go

go get github.com/fission/fission@v1.24.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.7

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Changed
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: None
Availability: None

Weakness

CWE-284: Improper Access Control

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design, Operation: Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

CWE-862: Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Advisories

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49822

Packages

github.com/fission/fission

Timeline

Jun 10, 2026 Published
Jul 7, 2026 Last updated by the source
Oct 31, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v Fission: MessageQueueTrigger scaler manager materializes Secret values into Deployment envvars and accepts arbitrary user PodSpec	High	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-qf5v-m7p4-95rp Fission: Incomplete capability denylist in Environment/Function PodSpec validation allows tenant-added CAP_SYS_TIME and cross-tenant node wall-clock corruption	High	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-vchh-r53j-8mpw Fission: HTTPTrigger admission omits RelativeURL / Prefix validation; kubectl apply bypasses CLI checks	Medium	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4 Fission: SanitizeFilePath lexical HasPrefix bypass permits sibling-directory escape	Low	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-q6vm-xqc9-v3ff Fission: Zip Slip in pkg/utils/zip.go:Unarchive allows fetcher to write outside the destination directory	High	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-m63v-2g9w-2w6v Fission: Environment Runtime.Container and Builder.Container SecurityContext bypass allows privileged pod creation	Critical	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-8wcj-mfrc-jx5q Fission builder pods auto-mount the fission-builder ServiceAccount token in the user-supplied builder container	Medium	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 Fission Environment CRD podspec passthrough enables hostPID/hostNetwork/privileged pods, node escape	Critical	Also affects github.com/fission/fission

Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor