GHSA-vchh-r53j-8mpw CVE-2026-50569 GO-2026-6131

Fission: HTTPTrigger admission omits RelativeURL / Prefix validation; kubectl apply bypasses CLI checks

Medium Go

Severity: 4.3 / 10; Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.23%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 13.55% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
Fix: 1.25.0; Upgrade github.com/fission/fission to this version or later

Description

HTTPTriggerSpec.Validate() validated Methods, FunctionReference, Host, IngressConfig, and CorsConfig, but silently skipped RelativeURL and Prefix. Those two fields were validated at the CLI level only (pkg/fission-cli/cmd/httptrigger/create.go:83). The post-CRD-modernization webhook for HTTPTrigger was retired in favor of API-server CEL — and CEL had no rules on those fields either — so an HTTPTrigger created via kubectl apply or a direct Kubernetes REST API call bypassed every URL-level check.

A tenant with HTTPTrigger create permission could therefore create triggers whose RelativeURL or Prefix:

was empty (with both fields unset, the trigger has no URL),
did not start with /,
was exactly / (claiming the entire router root),
contained .. traversal segments (e.g. /api/../admin),
collided with router-owned routes: /router-healthz, /readyz, /_version, /auth/login,
collided with the router-internal function prefix /fission-function/<ns>/<name>.

Affected

Project: github.com/fission/fission
Versions: all versions through v1.24.0
Audited commit: 647c141
Component: pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go:HTTPTriggerSpec.Validate (and the missing CEL on HTTPTriggerSpec)
Configuration: default

Fix section (paste into the Fix / Patches field)

Fixed in v1.25.0 by:

PR #3464 (commit 0deed6bf) — enforce the path-safety invariants at both admission layers so the API server's CEL evaluation and the Go-side HTTPTriggerSpec.Validate() agree:
- Three +kubebuilder:validation:XValidation rules on HTTPTriggerSpec (the API server's CEL admission gate, regenerated into crds/v1/fission.io_httptriggers.yaml):
  - at least one of relativeurl or prefix must be non-empty;
  - relativeurl, when set, must start with /, must not be /, must contain no .. segment, must not be in the reserved exact-path set, and must not start with /fission-function/;
  - prefix, when set, the same rules guarded by has(self.prefix).
- validateTriggerPath helper in pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go, invoked from HTTPTriggerSpec.Validate(), mirrors the CEL rules so the CLI's early rejection and the router reconciler's status-Condition path match what the API server admits.

Regression coverage: a new TestHTTPTriggerSpecValidate_Path table in pkg/apis/core/v1/validation_validators_test.go exercises every PoC case from the advisory plus literal ..-prefixed-segment positives that must remain allowed.

Affected versions

Go

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
github.com/fission/fission	`< 1.25.0`	`1.25.0`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/fission/fission Go → `1.25.0`

go

go get github.com/fission/fission@v1.25.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 4.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: None
Integrity: Low
Availability: None

Weakness

CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

References

Advisories

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50569

Packages

github.com/fission/fission

Timeline

Jun 10, 2026 Published
Aug 18, 2026 Last updated by the source
Oct 31, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v Fission: MessageQueueTrigger scaler manager materializes Secret values into Deployment envvars and accepts arbitrary user PodSpec	High	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-qf5v-m7p4-95rp Fission: Incomplete capability denylist in Environment/Function PodSpec validation allows tenant-added CAP_SYS_TIME and cross-tenant node wall-clock corruption	High	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4 Fission: SanitizeFilePath lexical HasPrefix bypass permits sibling-directory escape	Low	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-q6vm-xqc9-v3ff Fission: Zip Slip in pkg/utils/zip.go:Unarchive allows fetcher to write outside the destination directory	High	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-m63v-2g9w-2w6v Fission: Environment Runtime.Container and Builder.Container SecurityContext bypass allows privileged pod creation	Critical	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-8wcj-mfrc-jx5q Fission builder pods auto-mount the fission-builder ServiceAccount token in the user-supplied builder container	Medium	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 Fission Environment CRD podspec passthrough enables hostPID/hostNetwork/privileged pods, node escape	Critical	Also affects github.com/fission/fission
GHSA-v455-mv2v-5g92 Fission Container Executor Function PodSpec Injection Leading to Node Escape	Critical	Also affects github.com/fission/fission

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