GHSA-g53g-w8rj-fmg7 CVE-2026-83606
xmldom PI grammar regex ReDoS: quadratic backtracking on unterminated processing instructions
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.52%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 44.45% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Fix
0.9.11- Upgrade @xmldom/xmldom to this version or later
Description
Summary
@xmldom/xmldom's processing-instruction (PI) grammar regex exhibits quadratic-time backtracking
(ReDoS) when parsing an unterminated processing instruction. A single small XML document
containing <? + a target + a long run of whitespace and no closing ?> forces the regular
expression engine into O(n²) work, stalling the Node.js event loop. The input is parsed with
DOMParser.parseFromString under default options, so it is reachable from unauthenticated,
network-delivered XML (SOAP/SAML, webhooks, uploads, XML APIs).
Details
The PI production in lib/grammar.js compiles (flags mu) to:
^<\?(NameChars)(?:[\x20\x09\x0D\x0A]+([Char]*?))?\?>
^^^ S+ greedy ^^^ Char*? lazy
lib/grammar.jsline 261: https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/grammar.js#L261
In the optional tail (?:S+(Char*?))?, both the greedy separator S+ and the lazy data Char*?
match XML whitespace. When the required trailing ?> is absent, the engine must ultimately fail —
but first it tries every partition of the whitespace run between S+ and Char*?, which is O(n²)
in the length of the trailing whitespace.
The regex is executed against the entire remaining source string in two places in lib/sax.js,
so the whole whitespace tail is scanned:
parsePI— https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/sax.js#L680-L691parseProcessingInstruction— https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/sax.js#L862-L879
Affected Versions
Only the 0.9.x line is affected. lib/grammar.js (and this PI regex) was introduced in
commit 726b471 ("fix!: preserve DOCTYPE internal subset (#498)"), first released in
0.9.0-beta.9, and is unchanged through 0.9.10.
The 0.8.x line (≤ 0.8.13) and the unscoped xmldom package (≤ 0.6.0) parse PIs via a different
code path bounded by indexOf('?>') — they do not contain this regex and are not affected
by this issue. (They were not separately tested for a different PI ReDoS; the scope here is the
specific grammar.js regex.)
| Line | PI code path | Affected? |
|---|---|---|
0.9.x (0.9.0-beta.9 … 0.9.10) |
grammar.js PI regex over full remaining source |
Yes |
0.8.x (≤ 0.8.13) |
parseInstruction, bounded by indexOf('?>') |
No |
unscoped xmldom (≤ 0.6.0) |
older indexOf('?>')-bounded parsing |
No |
Proof of Concept
const { DOMParser } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
const n = 32 * 1024;
const payload = '<a><?p' + ' '.repeat(n); // unterminated PI, no `?>`
console.time('parse');
new DOMParser().parseFromString(payload, 'text/xml');
console.timeEnd('parse');
Measured (Node 18), trailing whitespace after <?p, no ?> — time quadruples per doubling of
input length (canonical O(n²)):
| Trailing whitespace | g.PI.exec |
parseFromString |
|---|---|---|
| 2 KB | 4.4 ms | 5.1 ms |
| 4 KB | 16.9 ms | 17.0 ms |
| 8 KB | 111.4 ms | 66.3 ms |
| 16 KB | 263.8 ms | 336.5 ms |
| 32 KB | 1073.1 ms | — |
Impact
Availability only: a single parse of a small crafted document blocks the Node.js event loop for the duration of the quadratic scan (≈1 s at 32 KB; multi-second with larger inputs). No memory blow-up, no data exposure, no integrity impact. Because XML is routinely accepted from untrusted sources and parsed with default options, one request can stall a server.
Fix Applied
Fixed in @xmldom/xmldom 0.9.11 (0.9.x-only; the 0.8.x LTS line and the
unscoped xmldom package use a different, bounded PI code path and are not affected).
PR #1039 inserts a fixed-width negative lookahead
(?!\s) immediately after the greedy S+, so the separator can no longer hand whitespace back to
the lazy data group:
- var PI = reg(/^<\?/, '(', Name, ')', regg(S, '(', Char, '*?)'), '?', /\?>/);
+ var PI = reg(/^<\?/, '(', Name, ')', regg(S, '(?!', _SChar, ')(', Char, '*?)'), '?', /\?>/);
The change is correct, minimal, and behavior-preserving: it produces identical [target, data]
captures on all valid PIs tested (incl. whitespace-heavy, tab/newline, empty-data, and xml-decl
cases) and removes the backtracking blow-up (linear, ~0.4 ms at 128 KB after the fix). The lookahead
is fixed-width and cannot itself backtrack — a strict improvement with no new parsing risk.
Severity note
The complexity is quadratic, not exponential, so a multi-second stall requires
tens-to-hundreds of KB of input. VA:H reflects that xmldom applies no input-size limit and the
path runs on default-options parsing, so a single unbounded parse can fully stall the event loop.
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| @xmldom/xmldom | >= 0.9.0-beta.9, < 0.9.11 |
0.9.11 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
@xmldom/xmldom npm → 0.9.11
- npm
npm install @xmldom/xmldom@0.9.11- yarn
yarn add @xmldom/xmldom@0.9.11- pnpm
pnpm add @xmldom/xmldom@0.9.11
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- None
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
Weakness
CWE-1333: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
The product uses a regular expression with a worst-case computational complexity that is inefficient and possibly exponential.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use regular expressions that do not support backtracking, e.g. by removing nested quantifiers.
- System Configuration: Set backtracking limits in the configuration of the regular expression implementation, such as PHP's pcre.backtrack_limit. Also consider limits on execution time for the process.
- Implementation: Do not use regular expressions with untrusted input. If regular expressions must be used, avoid using backtracking in the expression.
- Implementation: Limit the length of the input that the regular expression will process.
CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
- Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
- Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-x4fp-j954-r2f4 xmldom: End-tag Whitespace-Trim Regex ReDoS — quadratic backtracking in the 0.8.x end-tag parser | High | Also affects @xmldom/xmldom |
| GHSA-vr34-hp96-76pp xmldom: requireWellFormed DocType publicId/systemId validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator | High | Also affects @xmldom/xmldom |
| GHSA-jxjr-3g7g-3944 xmldom: requireWellFormed element/attribute name validation is bypassable via an embedded line terminator | High | Also affects @xmldom/xmldom |
| GHSA-c7q8-3ch8-vqpv xmldom: Processing Instruction Target Injection Bypasses requireWellFormed | High | Also affects @xmldom/xmldom |
| GHSA-965w-775f-mr7g xmldom: Quadratic-memory consumption | High | Also affects @xmldom/xmldom |
| GHSA-93r5-fhx6-vmg9 xmldom: Quadratic-time parsing via the malformed-input recovery path — `parseElementStartPart` re-scan and `normalize()` adjacent-text merge | High | Also affects @xmldom/xmldom |
| GHSA-8344-3jmq-59r6 xmldom: Quadratic-time attribute deduplication | High | Also affects @xmldom/xmldom |
| GHSA-6mj3-qw4j-hgrw xmldom: HTML raw-text closing-tag case mismatch causes output amplification | High | Also affects @xmldom/xmldom |
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